In the waning days of apartheid, an operative of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of South Africa’s most powerful dissident organization the African National Congress, returned to his home community of N’wamitwa after over a decade in exile. His mission was to spark a people’s war, an imported form of revolutionary warfare developed by Mao Zedong and perfected by the North Vietnamese in their revolutionary struggles. In this thesis I examine the political context in which the ANC chose to adopt the strategy and how it was imported into South Africa. The later chapters of this thesis use N’wamitwa as a case study examining how a people’s war is successfully implemented on the ground. I argue that one can see the three phases of a people’s war as articulated by Mao play out in N’wamitwa between the years 1989 to 1994 This piece was largely written and researched using oral testimony from nine former members of the MK in N’wamitwa and thus can also be seen as a collection of personal histories of the South African Freedom Struggle. / Graduate

Magister Artium - MA (History) / Nokuthula Simelane, born near Bethal in Mpumalanga, joined the ANC's armed-wing uMKhonto we Sizwe (MK) as a courier while studying at the University of Swaziland in the early 1980s. In 1983 she set out on a mission to South Africa on the pretext of purchasing clothing for her up-coming graduation. Simelane was however abducted, and has since not been heard from nor has her body been found. Her disappearance was one of those examined by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa. These are some facts about Simelane. This thesis seeks to explore how Simelane's biographies manifest themselves across multiple genres and in so doing determine their similarities and differences, with a view to understanding the difficulties of producing the biography of a missing person. The genres of biography I examine relation to Simelane are: the TRC's Amnesty Committee (AC) hearings, the Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) hearing, their transcripts and the TRC reports; a documentary film called Betrayal directed by Mark Kaplan; and a statue of Simelane located in Bethal sculpted by Ruhan Janse van Vuuren.

Thesis (M.A. in International Security and Civil-Military Relations)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2000. / Thesis advisor(s): Paul Stockton, Letitia Lawson. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (Ph.D. (Historical and Heritage Studies))--1992. / Summary in English and Afrikaans. Includes bibliographical references.

Although a great deal has been written over the past two decades on the armed struggle in South Africa and the role that the African National congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP)have played in it, virtually nothing of academic value has been written on the main vehicle of the struggle, namely Umkhonto we Sizwe or 'MK' as it is more commonly known. Besides the research undertaken by Edward Feit in the 1960's and the account left to us by Bruno Mtolo on the formation and activities of Umkhonto in Natal prior to the Rivonia events, most of the material that has been written on the subject of Umkhonto makes no meaningful contribution to the history and activities of the organisation. As a result a serious vacuum has been left in the history of the liberation movement but particularly the armed struggle in South Africa. There was therefore an urgent need for a systematic and detailed study of Umkhonto and the specific role it played in the liberation struggle since 1961. Identifying the need for this study vas however the easy part. Writing it on the other hand presented numerous complex problems, part of which was brought about by the lack of suitable source material, and the fact that the organisation vas proscribed by law. The problem was further compounded by the fact that although Umkhonto was created to be independent (initially at least) of the ANC and to fulfill a function that the ANC could not do in the 1960's, the two organisations became so closely associated with one another and with the SACP that most of the time it is very difficult if not nearly impossible, to always draw a clear distinction between the three of them. Of course the problem has not been made easier by the Press which, for the sake of simplicity and expediency, have chosen to equate the ANC and Umkhonto with one another. Virtually none of the newspapers which have reported on the armed struggle over the years have taken the trouble to draw any meaningful distinction between the organisation and activities of the ANC on the one hand and Umkhonto on the other. While it is true that the two organisations have very close ties and there is a strong degree of overlapping between both members and leaders, this research will show that the two organisations are nonetheless different from one another and have organisational structures and functions that support this. The main difference between the two organisations has always been the fact that while Umkhonto was specifically created as the military component of the ANC-SACP alliance, the ANC on the other hand has remained the main political instrument of the liberation movement. As such, members of the ANC were not supposed to undertake any direct military missions against apartheid targets in South Africa. At best they fulfilled a supportive role such as the distribution of propaganda, the provision of transport, the supply of weapons and the creation of weapons caches etc., to support Umkhonto's cadres in the field. The members of the ANC thus concerned themselves primarily with political and diplomatic work in the armed struggle. By the middle of the 1980's however, the relationship between the ANC and Umkhonto began to change when the political and military functions of the two organisations were brought together under the control of the newly created political-military-council (PMC)following the collapse of the ANC and Umkhonto's organizational structures in the frontline states of Mozambique and Swaziland, as a result of the South African government's persistant counter-insurgency operations. The new organisational structure that was set up by the beginning of 1983 to replace the defunct Regional Command and was sanctioned by the ANC and the SACP and accepted at the former's National Consultative Conference at Kabwe, Zambia, in 1985. This new direction in the armed struggle was further reflected in the decision to introduce compulsory military training for all members of the combined liberation movement. In theory thus, after 1985, all members of the ANC and the SACP were subjected to military training in Umkhonto's training camps in Angola and elsewhere. This move further helped to blur the lines between the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto. Much of this will become clear in the course of this thesis. Where possible, interpretations will be attached to the facts to highlight certain developments in the armed struggle. Unfortunately, the facts pertaining to Umkhonto is not always volumous or conclusive enough to make statements that will withstand the test of time. The aim of this study is to examine the history of Umkhonto from its origins in 1961 to the end of 1988 when as a result of the New York Accord between South Africa, Cuba and Angola the ANC and Umkhonto were forced to remove all their military bases and personnel from Angola with immediate effect. Although this particular move severely crippled the ability of Umkhonto to continue with its armed struggle it vas not the only factor influencing its performance and status by the end of 1988. A host of other factors such as poor organisation, weak leadership, dissention, dissatisfaction with the role of the SACP in the liberation movement, and lack of sufficient funds among others also contributed to its weakened position by the end of the 1980's. These and other factors effecting the position and performance of Umkhonto are extensively dealt with in the second half of this study. Although increased cooperation between the military and political segments of the liberation movement became an important element in the armed struggle after 1985, the leadership of the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto were not always in agreement on important issues. This became increasingly apparent towards the end of the 1980's when the combined effect of the South African government's counter-insurgency operations and the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were beginning to have a direct affect on the position and future of the liberation alliance led by the ANC and the SACP. Although the ANC, like most political organisations, always had a fair share of dissention in its ranks the formation of Umkhonto in 1961, the destruction of the organisation's underground structures inside South Africa by the mid-1960'S and the growing hegemony of the SACP over both the ANC and Umkhonto's leadership since, have produced some serious dissention in the ranks of the liberation movement. The first came in 1975 with the expulsion of the African National Congress African nationalist faction from the ranks of the ANC. The second came with the isolation of the Okhela organisation which was reported to have been a predominantly white anti-communist organisation inside the ANC. The third attack was on the leadership of the liberation movement was averted with the expulsion of the dissident Marxist group known as the “Marxist Tendency within the ANC” in the early 1980's. Although the ANC and the SACP have always denied that the influence of these attacks on its combined leadership were in anyway serious, this study has shown that these developments in association with other developments had indeed a deep effect on the effectiveness of Umkhonto and the outcome of the armed struggle. The latter is particularly evident in the decision by Chris Hani, who was Chief of Staff of Umkhonto and his protégé, Steve Tshwete, to challenge the ANC's National Executive committee in 1981 to allow them to execute the decision taken at the Kabwe conference to extend Umkhonto's attacks to include white civilian targets inside South Africa. Although the ANC had accepted such action in principle at its Kabwe conference in 1985, it remained reluctant to fully implement it out of fear that such action could tarnish its image internationally and loose its much needed international support, particularly among the nations and people of Western Europe. Such considerations seemingly did not carry much support with Marxist radicals and militants such as Hani and others who preferred a military to a political or negotiated settlement in South Africa. With the support of the central Committee of the SACP (or rather. key elements of it) behind them, Hani and Tshwete issued a directive to all Umkhonto commanders in 1987 to extent their attacks to white civilian targets. The fact that the ANC did nothing to stop the directive or to counter Hani's actions is clear indication of the position that the military hardliners had come to occupy in the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto by the latter part of the 1980's. Unfortunately for Hani and his followers, the signing of the New York Accord at the end of 1988 came as a severe setback to their plans and left them with a cause that was becoming increasingly difficult to execute successfully. This research will show that as a result of these developments and the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union particularly with regards to Soviet Third World policy, the military hardliners in the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto were increasingly forced to take a backseat to the views and activities of more moderate leaders such as Thabo Mbeki, who was the ANC's Chief of Foreign Affairs. In view of the above this study will show that the SACP since the early 1970'S has taken steadily control of the ANC and the liberation struggle in South Africa and that by the end of the 1980'S Umkhonto was more a fief of the SACP and its Central Committee than of the ANC and its National Executive Committee, which had a clear majority of communist members by 1988. Although some major developments have taken place since the signing of the New York Accord in December 1988, such as the unbanning of the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto and the release of many political prisoners, these events and developments falls outside the scope of this study and are dealt with in the postscript. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Historical and Heritage Studies / unrestricted

M.A. / The year 1976 will always go down the history of South Africa as the pinnacle and turning point in the country’s politics by the unwavering stand took by the students, males and females alike in the education field to fight apartheid in all its forms. It was during this time that the borders of South Africa became sieve to its youth when they fled to neighbouring states to join the outlawed ANC in a special and only mission to unseat apartheid by way of military action, which, by then seemed the only option. In this mission, these women had to be like any liberation soldier whose main intention was to fight for his/her country and liberate its people from all forms of oppression. The entry and active participation of women who, largely were in their teens and of school going age, in MK was a great contribution and sacrifice that the South African women ever ventured into in a quest to liberate their country politically. This was a watershed in the history of the military or army in this land, because, for the first time, such a step of joining an army did not go along with remuneration package whatsoever attached as an incentive. These women saw MK as their last option and a difficult choice to make in the face of the suppression, torture and cold blooded killings they had to deal with regularly from the apartheid security forces. It was the peaceful mass protest actions by students, residents and workers against the unjust apartheid policies that finally led to the adoption of the armed struggle which women joined in an attempt to make a contribution. Their involvement in the liberation struggle was sacrifice in any definition in the sense that most of them had to abandon their schooling, their dreams, families, comfort of their homes to venture and forage into the unknown foreign lands to prepare to take part in a war or open confrontation against the well trained, well equipped and sophisticated SADF. These women ventured into this with the full knowledge of the repercussions and risks that went along with their actions that they stood to suffer greatly. Yet, they saw that as the only viable solution to their own circumstances they faced rather and opted to take the risk than to stay in the highly unsafe townships and locations which were supposed to be their safe homes.

Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was a military organization dominated by black Africans. Although it is not generally associated with Indian South Africans, who form a minority in the country, there were Indian MK members. This thesis explores the way in which Indian MK members reconciled aspects of their ethnic identity with their membership of MK. It explores the experiences of two generations of members: those born between 1929 and 1944 and those born between 1960 and 1969. In particular it looks at whether they experienced tensions between their ethnic and political identities. It explores what set these Indian South Africans apart from the rest of the Indian South African community that did not join MK. It also looks at what significant differences there were between different generations of Indian MK members. The research results show that the first generation MK members believe that their MK activities were „the highest form of passive resistance‟. An explanation for this way of referring to their activities could be that this was a way of reconciling tensions between their ethnic and political identities. The first generation was also very critical of the Indian SA community. This could be because they still feel part of this community despite having a strong political consciousness that is different from most of the community. It was found that some of the features that set Indian MK members apart from other Indian South Africans were that they were not raised in very religious households and occupied a fairly low rather than „middle man‟ economic position. In addition, members of the first generation of MK members were raised in comparatively multi-racial areas. Both generations made the decision to join MK because of Indian role models. There were some marked differences between the two generations of MK veterans. Most notably, the younger did not see their activities as in line with passive resistance and they also displayed more ambivalence about their ethnic identities.

M.A. (National Strategy) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

After its banning in 1961 the ANC, together with the South African Communist Party, adopted the armed struggle. Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was formed and had its debut in December of the same year. When the MK command was arrested at Rivonia outside Johannesburg most of the remaining members went into exile. The banning of the ANC forced the members not just to go underground but also to go into exile and their first haven was the newly independent Tanzania. The 1960's witnessed the flight into exile of most members of the organisation. In Tanzania, members of the ANC and MK came into contact with members of other liberation movements, including the liberation movements [Tom Portuguese Africa. As the 1960's progressed MK was responsible for training recruits in various African countries, most notably in Tanzania and Zambia. In 1967 they launched their first major campaign, together with the Zimbabwe People's Union (ZAPU), into southern Rhodesia in an effort to reach South Africa. The campaign failed and several members were put in prison in Bechuanaland. On their release some of the cadres, amongst them Chris Hani, voiced criticism of the leadership. This criticism was expressed just as the leaders of the organisation gathered for their first major conference in exile, the Morogoro conference in Tanzania At Morogoro the emphasis on armed struggle was affirmed, and it was agreed that the other pillar supporting the struggle would be international relations. After the Morogoro conference MK continued to train recruits in Zambia and Tanzania, but the situation was increasingly difficult as internal problems in these countries led to the expulsion of several liberation movements. In 1974 a new wave of South Africans went into exile, and at the same time the liberation war in Portuguese Africa entered its last phase. When Angola became independent the ANC began negotiating with the new government about the possible establishment of new training facilities for MK in Angola. When the students of Soweto went into revolt, reacting against the introduction of Afrikaans as the main language in their schools, the ANC, the MK command and their rivals the PAC were taken aback. The first wave of new recruits was flown to Tanzania before they were re-routed to Luanda In Angola they were sent to the southern parts of the country, to Benguela and later to Nova Katengue. By 1979 nine camps had been established in Angola: there was a transit camp outside Luanda, and camps at Benguela, Nova Katengue, Gabela, Fazenda, Quibaxe, Pango, Camp 32 (Quatro) and Funda The main camp was Nova Katengue. The camp got the nickname of University of the South because of the emphasis there on ideological, political and academic courses. But one episode of attempted food poisoning and later the bombing by the South African Air Force focused attention on the need for internal security in the camps, and a Security Department took shape in the region. After the bombing which left Nova Katengue flattened to the ground, MK left their southern camps; a series of meetings took place in Luanda which resulted in a revised strategy outlined in "the Green Book". In 1979 MK participated in a second campaign together with ZAPU; as the attempt to reach South Africa was once again unsuccessful most of the participants found themselves back in the Angolan camps. This failure, together with the degrading conditions in which the cadres were living, fuelled a spiral of discontent in the camps. The food was sparse and the sanitary conditions were bad. A feeling of stagnation spread among the cadres, who were disillusioned at the bleak prospect of infiltrating back into South Africa. In the beginning of the 1980's the roads between Luanda and the eastern camps around Malanje, Caculama and Camalundi became unsafe as the South African-backed UNITA guerrillas increased their attacks. MK forces were deployed around the town of Cacuso to guard the railway line and secure the safety of the road, and this deployment aggravated the dissatisfaction of the cadres. At the end of 1983 some members of the security department beat a sick cadre to death. This triggered off a mutiny in some of the camps. The leadership defused this, the first in a series of mutinies. In 1984 a second mutiny took place in Viana The mutineers elected a Committee of Ten to forward a set of demands to the leadership. But the leadership was not ready to listen and the Angolan presidential guard quelled the mutiny. When a third mutiny erupted in Pango three months later no demands were made and no committee was elected, but the Pango mutiny was more violent. After the disturbances at Viana but before the Pango mutiny, a commission had been sent out from Lusaka to find the reasons for the uprising. The commission found that the main reasons were the deteriorating living conditions, the lack of proper health services and the deployment on the eastern front. Later reports came to similar conclusions regarding the reasons for the mutiny. However, the reports differ regarding the degree of punishment used in the region after the mutinies. The Committee of Ten was imprisoned after the mutinies. However preparations were made to meet their main demand, which had been for the calling of a national consultative conference and in 1985 the Kabwe conference took place in Zambia. Some restructuring of the organisation and army took place and the much criticised Security Department was made accountable to the leadership. Life in the Angolan camps continued much as before but efforts were made to provide some vocational training and better health services. The deployment on the eastern front came to an end, but soon MK came under attack on the roads between Luanda and their northern camps. The attacks intensified as other forces in Angola gathered around the south central town of Cuito Cuanavale, and eventually the siege of Cuito Cuanavale forced the South African regime to the negotiating table. After the siege the Namibia Agreement was signed. One of the terms of the agreement was that MK had to leave Angola and search for new havens, and in 1989 and 1990 most of the cadres were flown to Uganda. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2002.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: South Africa consists of a vast, culturally diverse population, entrenched in customary tribal influences which are essentially based on stringent patriarchal directives. These spilt over into other societal spheres, one of which is the media, which is part of an existing male hegemonic society. The rationale for this study is essentially to determine the role played by the media in their representation of women, before and shortly after the liberation of South Africa. This study will establish whether the voices of women were represented, or not, in the media, in the period shortly after the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and affiliated organisations in 1990. By interviewing and recording the oral histories of a few female ANC Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) soldiers, the need is evident to, through this oral tradition process, give a voice to these voiceless women. The theoretical foundations for this study is firstly based on “womanism”. Womanism was born from the shortcomings of feminism (a largely Western concept) that was unable to address the issues unique to the situation of black women. A second theoretical point of departure is the Social Responsibility Theory, a media theory that could, based on research done for this study, play a profound role to the benefit of women. The methodological investigation is based on a mixed method research approach where Content Analysis (CA) and Grounded Theory (GT) are triangulated with the literature review. The GT processes gave a voice to some unknown female MK soldiers by conducting interviews based on in-depth interview questions. The CA process led to the conclusion that the voices of women who contributed to the struggle were largely ignored by the media. The researcher found that given the contributions and sacrifices women have made in democratising South Africa, acknowledgement of these efforts are sorely lacking, especially in the media. This study therefore seeks to contribute to the lost and repressed voices of women, and to redress a history of omission to a history of commission. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Suid-Afrika beskik oor 'n kultureel diverse bevolking met tradisionele stam-invloede wat essensieel gebaseer is op streng patriargale riglyne. Dit het oorgespoel na ander sosiale kontekste, waarvan een die media is, en wat deel uitmaak van 'n bestaande manlike hegemoniese gemeenskap. Die rasionaal vir hierdie studie was om vas te stel watter rol die media gespeel het in die representasie van vroue kort ná die eerste stappe tot 'n bevryde Suid-Afrika. Hierdie studie wou vasstel of die stemme van vroue verteenwoordig was, of nie, in die media, in die tydperk kort ná die ontbanning van die African National Congress (ANC) en ander geaffilieerde organisasies in 1990. Die veronderstelling is dat vrouestemme nie in die media waarneembaar was nie, en dat die situasie teengewerk kan word deur die toepassing van mondelinge geskiedenis. In hierdie geval is die verhale van 'n paar vroulike Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)-soldate geboekstaaf om sodoende deur die mondelinge geskiedenistradisie 'n stem te gee aan stemlose vroue. Die teoretiese grondslag vir hierdie studie is eerstens gebaseer op “Womanism”. Dié teorie het ontstaan weens die tekortkominge van Feminisme (grootliks ‟n Westerse konsep), wat nie in staat was om die kwessies wat uniek is aan die situasie van swart vroue aan te spreek nie. 'n Tweede teoretiese vertrekpunt is die Sosiale Verantwoordelikheidsteorie. Gebaseer op die navorsing vir hierdie studie, kan dit 'n groter rol in die media in die belang van vroue speel. Die metodologie is gebaseer op 'n gemengde metode-navorsingsbenadering waar Inhoudsanalise en Grounded Theory (GT) trianguleer met die literatuurstudie. Die GT-proses gee 'n stem aan 'n paar onbekende vroulike MK-soldate deur onderhoudvoering wat op in-diepte onderhoudvrae gebaseer is. Die inhoudsanalise proses het bevind dat vroue wat bygedra het tot die Vryheidstryd grootliks deur die media geïgnoreer is. Gegewe die bydraes en opofferings wat vroue gemaak het in die demokratisering van Suid-Afrika, ontbreek erkenning van hul pogings in ons geskiedskrywing, en beslis so in die media. Hierdie studie was 'n poging om by te dra tot die omkeer van hierdie situasie, naamlik om 'n “geskiedenis van uitsluiting” te herstel na 'n “geskiedenis van insluiting”.