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Democracy To Come in Derridean Philosophy: Between Sovereignty and Unconditionality” / La democracia por venir en la filosofía derrideana: entre la soberanía y la incondicionalidadBalcarce, Gabriela 09 April 2018 (has links) (PDF)
This article aims to perform a reading of the Derridean notion of democracy to come”. Taking this notion as a starting point, the author makes a deep reading of the problems of democracy with regard to its foundation and concept. Our hypothesis is that democracy to come” allows Derrida to put democracy -as a resistance to any totalizing closure in the name of the common and the same- into an abyss. At the same time, we’ll interpret this notion considering its links with sovereignty and unconditionality, understanding the latter as an infinite openness to otherness. / El presente artículo intenta realizar una lectura de la noción derrideana de democracia por venir”. A partir de esta noción el autor realiza una profunda lectura de la problemática de la democracia, tanto en lo que concierne a su fundamentación como a su concepto. Nuestra hipótesis es que la democracia por venir” permite a Derrida poner en un abismo a la democracia como resistencia a toda clausura totalizante en nombre de lo común y de lo igual. A la vez, nos interesará pensar esta noción en su vinculación con la soberanía y la incondicionalidad, entendida esta última como apertura infinita a la alteridad.Palabras clave:
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Quasi-Unconditionality: Higher Call to the Virtue of ForgivenessOlwendo, Fred 23 April 2010 (has links)
No description available.
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La foi dans la méfiance : "la possibilité de l'impossibilité" chez Derrida, à travers sa lecture de Husserl, Heidegger et Levinas / Faith in mistrust : Derrida’s ‘possibility of the impossibility’ in his reading of Husserl, Heidegger, and LevinasNagasaka, Masumi 06 September 2013 (has links)
Cette recherche se consacre à l’examen de la formation de la notion de foi, formulée comme "possibilité de l’impossible" dans la philosophie de Derrida. Cette notion, décrite sous plusieurs exemples concrets tels que "pardon", "don", "promesse" ou "témoignage" dans sa dernière philosophie, a néanmoins sa source dès le commencement de sa philosophie. La notion de foi n’est pas identifiable à celle de religion – bien qu’elle en soit l’une des sources –, et signifie plutôt un dépassement de la limite du savoir. Afin d’esquisser la formation de ce concept, notre recherche se concentre sur son développement dans la lecture derridienne de Husserl, Heidegger et Levinas. Derrida met en question leurs distinctions philosophiques, à savoir, la distinction husserlienne entre la réalité et l’idéalité, la distinction heideggerienne entre l’étant et l’être et la distinction lévinassienne entre l’être et l’au-delà de l’être. Au moment même où il tente de suivre ces distinctions d’une manière stricte, Derrida découvre des points dans lesquels il devient impossible d’accomplir ces distinctions. Dans cette impossibilité, les trois auteurs prennent, selon Derrida, leurs décisions au sein de l’indécidabilité. La foi en question n’est rien d’autre que cette croyance en les distinctions. En observant ainsi rétrospectivement cette problématique, notre recherche tente de montrer que la notion de foi est une conséquence inhérente de la déconstruction, pratiquée comme l’expérience de l’impossible. / This thesis scrutinises the genesis of Derrida’s notion of faith as the ‘possibility of the impossible’. A milestone of his later philosophy and embodied in many concrete examples as ‘pardon’, ‘giving’, ‘promise’, or “witness”, this notion originates in some problems that inspired him from the beginning of his career. ‘Faith’ is not identical to ‘religion’—although it appears to be one of its sources—, but is rather supposed to designate exceeding the limits of any possible knowledge. To follow the different stages of the formation of the concept, this research focuses on Derrida’s reading of Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas. Derrida challenges the fundamental distinctions introduced by these authors: Husserl’s distinction between reality and ideality; Heidegger's distinction between being (das Seiende) and Being (das Sein); and, finally, Levinas’ distinction between Being and Beyond of Being. Trying to follow these distinctions strictly, Derrida discovers points where these distinctions appear to be impossible. Thus, according to Derrida, the very impossibility of these distinctions should compel these philosophers to make their decisions in the midst of undecidability. The faith in question is these beliefs in their philosophical distinctions that exceed any epistemological arguments. The main purpose of this retrospective research is, therefore, to show that the notion of the faith as the ‘possibility of the impossible’ is an inherent consequence of deconstruction, formulated as an experience of the impossible.
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Liberdade e incondicionalidade do dever na filosofia moral de KantRauber, Jaime José 02 September 2013 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2013-09-02 / The aim of this thesis is to show that Kant's moral philosophy, which finds its basis in the concept of freedom is established with absolute independence of any appreciable influence. Only when man is able to determine their willingness to unconditionally, ie, free from everything empirical effectively becomes free. Within this perspective, there is no room for exceptions to the duty claimed on the basis of empirical circumstances of the shares, as this would lead to a contradiction of pure practical reason with itself. This absoluteness of duty does V. Hösle criticize Kant's moral philosophy insensitivity. At first glance, a response to criticism of V. Hösle seems to be anticipated by Kant with the distinction between duties of strict obligation and duties of obligation can, but research has shown that Kant's moral philosophy remains unconditional and there is no room for exceptions to duty or under or in connection with legal ethics. Nevertheless, the moral philosophy of Kant touches indirectly sensitivity insofar as we are affected and feel the effects of the moral law within us, but this in no way contradicts the purity of his thought. / O objetivo da presente tese consiste em mostrar que a filosofia moral de Kant encontra seu fundamento na ideia de liberdade, que é estabelecida com absoluta independência de toda e qualquer influência sensível. Somente quando o homem é capaz determinar sua vontade de modo incondicional, isto é, livre de tudo o que é empírico, torna-se efetivamente livre. Dentro dessa perspectiva, não há espaço para exceções ao dever reclamadas em função das circunstâncias empíricas das ações, pois isso levaria a uma contradição da razão prática pura consigo mesma. Essa incondicionalidade do dever faz V. Hösle criticar a filosofia moral de Kant, acusandoa de insensibilidade. À primeira vista, uma resposta à crítica de V. Hösle parece ser antecipada pelo próprio Kant com a distinção entre deveres jurídicos, de obrigação estrita, e deveres de virtude, de obrigação lata. A investigação mostrou, porém, que o estabelecimento do fundamento da filosofia prática de Kant, o princípio supremo da moralidade, ou seja, o imperativo categórico, e os demais princípios a ele vinculados permanecem incondicionados e que não há espaço para exceções ao dever, nem no âmbito jurídico nem no âmbito da ética. Não obstante isso, a filosofia moral de Kant toca indiretamente a sensibilidade na medida em que somos afetados e sentimos os efeitos da lei moral em nós, o que fica claro quando trata das predisposições estéticas dos deveres de virtude n´A Metafísica dos Costumes, mas isso de modo algum se contrapõe à pureza de seu pensamento.
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Uplatnění principů přístupu zaměřeného na člověka (PCA) v manažerské praxi / Application of the Person-Centered Approach (PCA) principles in managementMitaczová, Jana January 2011 (has links)
The basic objective of the theoretical part of this diploma thesis is to present Rogers' Person- centred Approach (PCA) in terms of its development, theory, basic principles and potential applications out of therapeutical context, with emphasis on leadership. The first chapter is devoted to general knowledge of the PCA and in the second chapter there is a more detailed description of possible applications of the PCA in management. The basic objective of the empirical part is to verify the relationship between main necessary conditions of PCA in people management (respectively in person-centered leadership) and employees' organizational commitment. The quantitative research in the form of correlation study has been carried out on a sample of 63 respondents, employees of various organizations in various fields. Barrett-Lennard Relationship Inventory (BLRI) and Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ) were used as research methods. The results show the significant correlation between organizational commitment and measures of empathic understanding, congruence, and level of regard expressed by managers towards employees. The significant relationship between organizational commitment and unconditionality has not been confirmed. Besides the hypotheses linked to the basic goal there are some other...
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