O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar se a probabilidade dos trabalhadores do mercado formal serem demitidos aumenta quando esses são elegíveis ao recebimento do seguro-desemprego. Utilizando da Relações Anuais de Informações Sociais (RAIS), a alteração na elegibilidade ao auxílio promovida pela MP665/2014 permitiu uma estimação de diferenças em diferenças a fim de identificar esse efeito. O resultado encontrado aponta uma queda de 0,73 p.p. na probabilidade de demissão sem justa causa dos grupos que eram elegíveis no período anterior à mudança e deixaram de ser após sua entrada em vigor, em comparação com os não-elegíveis nos dois períodos. A partir desse número, conclui-se que pelo menos 13% das demissões sem justa causa são induzidas. Os efeitos são maiores para os indivíduos empregados em firmas pequenas, que tenham baixa escolaridade e que não estejam no setor de serviços ou indústria. Utilizando a Pesquisa Mensal do Emprego (PME) em uma análise complementar, conclui-se que 34% dos indivíduos que saem do formal para acessar o seguro-desemprego se empregam no setor informal no mês subsequente. / This study investigates whether the probability of Brazilian formal workers being laid-off increases when they are elegible to receive the unemployment insurance. Using an administrative data, Relações Anuais de Informações Sociais (RAIS), for the universe of formal workers, we estimate the effect of a change in the elibility criteria on the probability of lay-off for the workers using a diff-in-diff model. The results point out to a 0,73 p.p. decrease in this probability for groups who were elegible before the change and became inelegible afterwards, in comparison to the non-eligible workers in both periods. We conclude that fake layoffs accounts for at least 13% of total layoffs. The effects are more relevant for workers employed in small firms, with low education level and not employed in service or industrial sectors. In an additional analysis using a survey of labor force, Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME), we find that 34% of workers engaged in fake layoffs are reemployed in the informal sector in the next month.

The passage of the Unemployment Assistance Act in July, 1956 represented a significant break with the traditional approach to public assistance in Canada for it brought Dominion government participation into a field always regarded as the exclusive responsibility of the provinces. This study has been undertaken to consider its implications for Social Security in Canada, including the effects of the Act on existing provincial programs. The method of study has been both historical and analytical. In order to identify the political and social factors which lead to this radical change in attitude on the part of the Dominion, Parliamentary debates have been reviewed and the proceedings of Dominion-Provincial conferences studied. In addition, such reports as that of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, the National Employment Commission and the various publications of the Canadian Welfare Council were useful sources of information. A study of the legislation itself was essential to analyze its effects on provincial programs and this was done in conjunction with a review of provincial legislation pertinent to the subject. A definitive evaluation of the legislation is limited by the fact that it is of such recent origin that there has been little time to study its total effect. Furthermore, an amendment to the Act which took effect on January 1, 1958 broadened the terms of the legislation to extend the degree of participation by the Dominion. Significant points which do emerge however, are; (a) Those provinces which have developed high standards in their public assistance programs are the principal beneficiaries under the legislation, (b) Those provinces which have relied heavily on Mothers' Allowances to meet the needs of a large segment of dependent persons are at a serious financial disadvantage, (c) The application of the Act is uneven among the provinces because of the wide variations in services offered. An important element in the legislation is the abolition of residence regulations between the participating provinces, a step which may bring an end to one of the most vexing problems in public welfare administration. / Arts, Faculty of / Social Work, School of / Graduate

No description available.

This dissertation studies different Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems and how critical design and institutional features affect individual behavior. In the first chapter, I analyze the UI system in Chile, whose benefits are primarily financed by work- ers’ own savings in Individual Savings Accounts (ISA). In 2002 Chile implemented a mandatory savings system for the formal labor sector. Every worker accumulates funds to be withdrawn in future unemployment spells, accompanied by a Solidarity Fund (SF) that may provide benefit extensions in case of low savings balances. Using administrative records of the Chilean formal labor market, I exploit the SF extension’s eligibility conditions to identify its effect on nonemployment duration. I estimate a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) that uses the eligibility for SF extension as an instrument for its take-up. Results show that an additional potential monthly installment financed by the SF extension increases nonemployment durations by 11.4 days, similar to what the literature documents for other developing economies. The second chapter builds on the previous one by empirically examining the im- pact of an additional monthly installment of UI benefits financed by ISAs. I implement a dynamic panel data model with individual fixed effects controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Using this empirical strategy, I find that nonemployment durations, on average, increase by 5.1 days when the unemployed have an additional monthly payment financed by their savings. Finally, I combine these two reduced-form outcomes to perform a decomposition of the disincentive effect of a more generous UI system funded by general taxes. Job search effort is depressed via a substitution effect when UI benefits increase (moral hazard). Still, there is also an incentive to exert less effort because the household’s consumption is sensitive to cash-on-hand (liquidity effect). I extend the existing literature by proposing a ratio pertinent to a system based on ISA that measures the liquidity effect over the total disincentive effect. Results show that around one-third to one-half of the negative impact of a UI extension on job search effort can be attributed to moral hazard, which this design of UI system eliminates. In the 1990s, Germany saw a massive rise in unemployment of workers in their late 50s compared to younger workers. In the third chapter (joint with Matthew Gudgeon, Johannes Schmieder, Simon Trenkle, and Han Ye), we show that a large share of this increase can be explained by the interaction of UI and the retirement system, where UI benefits affect labor supply by inducing individuals to leave employment. We show considerable bunching in UI inflows at age thresholds that allow for using UI as a bridge to early retirement. The bunching mass moves as the age threshold moves due to reforms of the UI system. To quantify the impact of this channel on labor supply, we use our reduced-form evidence to estimate a dynamic lifecycle model of labor supply that endogenizes unemployment and retirement transitions. We show that the increase in potential benefit durations in the late 1980s increased unemployment rates for workers aged 55-59 by around three percentage points (or about a 30 percent increase), playing a significant role in the large increases in unemployment rates for older workers.

<p>A common assumption of in literature regarding unemployment insurance (UI) take-up is unemployed individuals will claim UI benefits immediately after job loss. Using SIPP 2008 panel, I find that this assumption about immediate unemployment insurance take-up can not be supported in the data. I constructed a revised McCall search model to provide a mechanism to explain the delay of UI take-up found in the data. This dissertation contains three chapters. In Chapter 1, I provide evidence that UI application delay is significant. Many people delay at least one week -- 87\% of unemployed individuals delay at least one week, 37\% delay at least 4 weeks and 27\% individuals delay at least 12 weeks. The average delay is large -- unemployed individuals on average have 12.99 weeks of delay before claiming UI benefits after job loss. I also analyze factors that correlate with application delay. I find a lower age, being disabled, being female, facing good economic conditions and fewer experienced number of job separations make delay more likely and increase length of delay. In Chapter 2 , I provide a job search and separation model to explain the findings from the data in Chapter 1. I find that the application costs are large compared to benefits received. Counterfactual analysis show that reducing hassle of aplying for UI can have large impacts on delay of application. In Chapter 3 , I extend the methodology to study the effect of availability of other welfare programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on the application delay of UI for people who have reported disability. I find that the availability of other welfare programs such as SSI is a contributing factor that make delay more likely and longer for people with disability. </p>

Unemployed people consistently report worse health than employed people do. However, different support measures can potentially buffer the impact of unemployment on health. The aim of this study is to assess to what extent two such measures –unemployment insurance (UI) and individual social relationships – relates to self-rated ill health among unemployed people in Europe, and if unemployment insurance is a more important health resource for those with weak social relationships. The study uses cross-sectional individual-level data from European Social Survey (round 6-9) in 26 European countries combined with measures of different aspects of unemployment insurance policy from the SPIN database. The sample was restricted to unemployed individuals in the ages 18-65 years. Multilevel linear probability models were used to assess the probability of having poor health. The results showed that having weak social relationships was related to a slightly higher probability of having poor health but did not find unemployment insurance to be related to health, regardless of the type of unemployment insurance measure studied. However, when excluding one outlier country, unemployment insurance generosity was associated with a small decreased probability of having poor health in the least generous countries. Furthermore, UI coverage moderated the relation between social relationships and ill health – increasing UI coverage was more important for the health of those with weak social relationships compared to those with more comprehensive relationships. However, because the results were sensitive to the variable operationalization of social relationships as well as the included countries, the main takeaway is that the present study found very limited evidence of unemployment insurance generosity being related to ill health among the unemployed in Europe.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--McMaster University, 2003. / Advisor: Charlotte A.B. Yates. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 272-299). Also available via World Wide Web.

LEGAL REGULATIONS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS IN CZECH REPUBLIC AND IN SELECTED COUNTRIES This graduation thesis describes and analyzes legal regulations of unemployment benefits in Czech Republic and in Sweden. Main reason why I have chosen that topic could be seen in the fact that in both countries exist two different systems. In Czech Republic we have compulsory state system of unemployment benefits but Sweden is one of four European countries where we can find so-called Ghent system. Sweden is also known as typical example of welfare state, so I came to conclusion it could be interesting to focus attention also to this matter and its influence to the topic. The aim of the thesis is to compare both systems, individual institutes of this problematic, focus on main differences and also point out common rules and principles. The thesis involves an introduction, main part and conclusion. The main part is divided into seven chapters. The first one presents explanation of unemployment, its different types and consequences. Following two chapters concern development of legal regulations of this problematic both in Czech Republic (also in Czechoslovakia) and in Sweden. Because some of the mentioned acts are very extensive, I focused only on legal rules concerning the unemployment benefits. The main part of...

Cette thèse consiste en trois essais sur les réponses des individus aux systèmes fiscaux et à la taxation. Le premier chapitre, "Partial Unemployment Insurance and Hour Decisions", mesure l'impact des incitations contenues dans le programme d'activité réduite. L'activité réduite (AR) permet aux chômeurs qui travaillent de garder leurs allocations chômage sous conditions. Nous exploitons comme quasi-expérimentation la réforme de 2006 en France, qui consiste en une baisse de 20% du seuil horaire. La réforme a significativement augmenté la probabilité conditionnelle de choisir une AR peu intensive. Le second chapitre, "Potential Drivers of Undeclared Work", explore les déterminants potentiels de l'activité dissimulée en France et en Europe. Cette étude utilise une enquête pilote examinant les comportements d'activité dissimulée des ménages en France (EPMF). Nos résultats montrent que l'hétérogénéité individuelle (la perception de l'entourage, les sanctions et les valeurs civiques) sont positivement corrélées à l'activité dissimulée. A l'aide d'une enquête semblable, nous obtenons des résultats comparables au niveau européen. Le troisième chapitre, "Top-income tax avoidance and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from the Panama Papers" explique l'impact des scandales sur les préférences pour la redistribution. Les Panama Papers sont utilisés comme quasi-expérimentation: ce scandale exogène a mis en lumière les comportements d'optimisation fiscale des ménages. Après le scandale, les individus sont plus en faveur des politiques de redistribution: les scandales financiers encouragent une mise à jour de la perception des inégalités. / This dissertation gathers three essays on behavioral responses to fiscal systems and benefits.The first chapter, ``Partial Unemployment Insurance and Hour Decisions", measures how financial incentives in Partial Unemployment Insurance (PUI) programs affect job uptake. PUI programs allow jobseekers to keep their benefits when working if the job abides by eligibility conditions. We exploit as a quasi-experiment the 2006 French PUI reform consisting in a decrease in the hour threshold. The main finding is that the reform significantly increased the conditional probability to take up a PUI job below the new hour threshold. A narrowed benefit availability contributes to a decline in worked hours for PUI claimants.The second chapter, ``Potential Drivers of Undeclared Work", investigates undeclared work in France and Europe. This study exploits a unique pilot survey on supply and demand of households. We find that the social circle, autoestimated risk and sanctions and civic values are strongly correlated with undeclared work. Individual heterogeneity adds up but is not substitutable to standard socio-demographic variables. Using the Eurobarometer survey, we find comparable estimates at the European level.The third chapter, ``Top income tax evasion and redistribution preferences: Evidence from the Panama Papers" attempts to explain changes in perceived inequality after worldwide fiscal scandals. I exploit as an exogeneous shock the 2016 Panama Papers scandal revealing top-income households' tax avoidance. I find that, post-scandal, stated preferences for redistribution strongly increases. Using additional data, I find consistent results at the European level.

This thesis examines a number of issues regarding the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model’s empirical performance. Chapter 1 documents the volatility puzzle with the Canadian data. The combined data from both Canada and the United States present an additional difficulty. Even if the unobserved value of leisure is allowed to be as high as required to fit the business cycle in the United States or in Canada, the model cannot reconcile the similar labor cycles with the large policy differences in the UI benefits and income taxes in the two countries when the value of leisure is assumed to be the same in both countries. Chapter 2 takes into account the realistic institutional features of the UI system and investigates the impacts of the UI benefits on the labor market outcomes. If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to an employment relationship, so it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, UI is fairly priced, and the UI system prevents moral-hazard unemployed workers, the generosity of UI has no effect on unemployment. Chapter 3 shows that the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model can be successfully parameterized to generate observed large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and modest responses of unemployment to changes in the UI benefits. The key features behind this success are the endogenous eligibility for UI benefits and the heterogeneity of workers. With the linear utilities commonly assumed in the Mortensen-Pissarides model, a fully rated UI system designed to prevent moral hazard has no effect on unemployment. However, the UI system in the United States is neither fully rated nor able to prevent workers with low productivity from quitting their jobs or rejecting employment offers to collect benefits. As a result, an increase in UI generosity has a positive, but realistically small, effect on unemployment. This chapter answers the Costain and Reiter (2008) criticism with the Mortensen-Pissarides model.