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Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)

This study will cover the period between 1861 and 1865. It will cover within that period of time, the technical and historical advance of the navy through the Civil War. The technical approach will cover the advancements in design, engineering, and armament from the beginning of hostilities to its end, and contrast those advancements with those of the period immediately preceding them and immediately after it, while the historical approach will cover the main engagements of the war and the results of the technical advances. The study will also cover the advancement and growth of the Confederate States Navy, and the effect which the marine designs of that navy had on the designs of the rival United States Navy.

The United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy developed during the interwar period a doctrine that addressed the problems inherent in the substitution of naval gunfire for artillery support in an amphibious assault. The invasion of Betio Islet, Tarawa Atoll, in November of 1943 was the first test of this doctrine. It has been said many times since the war that the doctrine basically passed this test and that lessons learned at Tarawa increased the efficiency with which the Marine Corps and Navy applied the prewar doctrine during the rest of the war. An analysis of the planning and execution of naval bombardments in the Central Pacific Campaign, after the invasion of the Gilberts, does not support this claim. This analysis leads the researcher to three conclusions. First, the Japanese developed defenses against many of the effects of the gunfire support doctrine that blunted much of the force of American firepower. American planners were slow to recognize the implications of these changes and, consequently, were slow to react to them. Second, many naval commanders responsible for providing naval gunfire support for Central Pacific operations still equated tonnage of ordnance to effectiveness of bombardment, regardless of their frequent references to "the lessons of Tarawa." Finally, strategic concerns and outright ignorance played a large part in determining the use of naval gunfire, the first taking precedence over the "lessons" and the second leading to the ignoring of the "lessons" all together.

U.S. naval expansion is considered to be inevitable. When it is discussed at all, especially in recent scholarly works, it merits at most a few paragraphs briefly mentioning that in the late nineteenth century the United States constructed a modern navy. It is portrayed as if U.S. leaders mostly favored greatly expanding the nation’s naval power and that little to no serious opposition existed among government leaders. Naval expansion, however, fundamentally altered U.S. foreign policy. It represented one of the most significant shifts in the Gilded Age, an era often thought of as a forgettable period in U.S. politics with no major political events taking place. If anything, naval expansion should be the single most discussed political decision to come out of this period and President Benjamin Harrison should be remembered for his role in this development. After all, there are few presidential actions from this period that continue to greatly affect U.S. policy today, and Harrison and his fellow naval expansionists deserve more than a footnote in history.

This thesis investigates the progress of technological development during the interwar period of 1919 to 1939. The interwar period was a time of slashed military budgets and isolationist policies. However, despite political, financial, and organizational handicaps, each branch of the military made significant progress in the development of military technology, and the air corps and navy achieved significantly better results. The reason these two branches were able succeed was through a combination of organizational policy and the development of an overarching goal for their respective branch. Within this thesis, I investigated each of the major military branches during the interwar period, specifically the United States Army, Army Air Corps, and Navy. The air corps is considered a separate branch despite being a segment of the army due to its different strategic goal and its growing independence during the interwar period. In my research I found that the army made by far the least technological progress, but did make significant strides in terms of the development of individual components for larger projects. For example, the army developed the M1 rifle and state-of-the-art shock absorbers for tanks. The air corps succeeded in transforming from a small army auxiliary made up of woodand-fabric biplanes into a largely independent branch of the military made up of all-metal monoplane bombers. The navy developed the aircraft carrier and aircraft to accompany the new ships, in addition to making substantial upgrades to existing ships. These upgrades included strengthening ships against torpedo attacks, making engines more efficient, and adding antiaircraft guns to the ships‟ arsenals