Between 1893 and 1920 the rising tide of racial antagonism and discrimination that swept America fundamentally altered racial relations in the United States Navy. African Americans, an integral part of the enlisted force since the Revolutionary War, found their labor devalued and opportunities for participation and promotion curtailed as civilian leaders and white naval personnel made repeated attempts to exclude blacks from the service. Between 1920 and 1942 the few black sailors who remained in the navy found few opportunities. The development of Jim Crow in the U.S. Navy occurred in three phases. During the first, between 1893 and 1919, a de facto policy excluded African Americans from all ratings save those of the messman's branch. The second major phase began in April 1919 with the cessation of domestic enlistments in the messman’s branch. The meant the effective exclusion of blacks, as the navy had previously limited them to this one area of service. Between World War I and 1933 thousands of East Asians enlisted as messmen and stewards, replacing native-born Americans. The third phase, between 1933 and 1942, represented a qualified step forward for blacks as the navy again began to recruit them, though it limited them to the messman branch. In their circumscribed roles on board ship, black messmen and stewards suffered discrimination and possessed few opportunities for advancement. In the late-1930’s and early-1940’s public figures, including prominent leaders of the African American community, charged the navy, army, and defense industries with practicing racial discrimination. The navy, reflecting its general conservatism, responded slowly to demands for change. By 1942, however, the navy began detailing black men to billets outside the messman’s branch, a first step away from Jim Crowstyle policies. This thesis analyzes the evolution of discriminatory and exclusionary enlistment policies in the navy. While others have provided the basic outline of segregation in the navy, this thesis provides a more complete analysis of the navy’s actions in the context of wider American society. This thesis also confirms that the navy was a slow-moving actor which followed the society’s lead and did not substantially revise existing racial hierarchy.

This thesis examines the formative years of the Joint Army and Navy Board, 1903 to 1919. It serves as an institutional history, focusing on the function of the interservice coordination body. The Joint Board is examined within the context of formulating American military strategy and U.S. diplomatic affairs from its creation in July 1903 to its reconstitution in 1919. At present no comprehensive historical study exists focusing on the Joint Board. Currently, interservice cooperation and coordination during this period receive no more than peripheral analysis in war plan studies. Thus, this work begins the first comprehensive history of the precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This thesis analyzes the origins and creation of the Joint Board, the Board??s basic duties and responsibilities, and Joint Board actions as they impacted U.S. diplomacy and military strategy concerning the homeland and coast defense, the Caribbean and Cuba, the Panama Canal, as well as the Pacific and the Philippines. Within this geographical framework, this thesis explores the relation of the Joint Board to the Navy General Board and Army General Staff, the cooperation of the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy between the Spanish-American War and World War I, the impact of Joint Board actions on American civil-military relations, and the efficacy of interservice cooperation. This thesis is based largely on unpublished as well as published primary sources, including the records of the Joint Board, Navy General Board records, Army War College Division records, and members?? personal papers housed at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. In addition, secondary sources are used to place the Joint Board within the larger contextual framework of interservice cooperation, U.S. civil-military relations, and American military history during the early twentieth century.

This thesis examines the formative years of the Joint Army and Navy Board, 1903 to 1919. It serves as an institutional history, focusing on the function of the interservice coordination body. The Joint Board is examined within the context of formulating American military strategy and U.S. diplomatic affairs from its creation in July 1903 to its reconstitution in 1919. At present no comprehensive historical study exists focusing on the Joint Board. Currently, interservice cooperation and coordination during this period receive no more than peripheral analysis in war plan studies. Thus, this work begins the first comprehensive history of the precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This thesis analyzes the origins and creation of the Joint Board, the Board??s basic duties and responsibilities, and Joint Board actions as they impacted U.S. diplomacy and military strategy concerning the homeland and coast defense, the Caribbean and Cuba, the Panama Canal, as well as the Pacific and the Philippines. Within this geographical framework, this thesis explores the relation of the Joint Board to the Navy General Board and Army General Staff, the cooperation of the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy between the Spanish-American War and World War I, the impact of Joint Board actions on American civil-military relations, and the efficacy of interservice cooperation. This thesis is based largely on unpublished as well as published primary sources, including the records of the Joint Board, Navy General Board records, Army War College Division records, and members?? personal papers housed at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. In addition, secondary sources are used to place the Joint Board within the larger contextual framework of interservice cooperation, U.S. civil-military relations, and American military history during the early twentieth century.

No description available.

Naval Underwater Operation Unit (UOU), evolving from the Fleet Salvage Unit, is the only body specifically responsible for underwater operation under the Ministry of National Defense (MND). The mission of this Unit is to provide diving, salvage, mine counter-measurement, explosive ordnance disposal and diving training services to all armed forces and other government agencies. Since its establishment, UOU has been involved in many high visibility maritime distress operations over the years. UOU has a definite position and plays an important role in Taiwan¡¦s naval defensive warfare, maritime distress salvage, maritime pollution control and commercial diver training. With its professional capability and facilities, UOU has become the most capable governmental unit in diving and salvage in this country. To highlight its emphasis on marine affairs, the Executive Yuan established the ¡§National Council on the Advancement of Marine Affairs¡¨ on 7 January 2004 as a decision-making forum for marine affairs on the cabinet level. The adoption of the ¡§National Oceans Policy Guidelines¡¨ on 13 October 2004 and the formulation of the ¡§Program for the Development Planning of Marine Affairs¡¨ accordingly by this Council have set a new demarche to march towards an Ocean Nation for the country. Integration of government resources and cooperation among agencies are vital to the policy implementation. To implement the goals of national oceans policy and marine affairs development, government agencies should collaborate among themselves through resources integration. The main purpose of this study is to explore the position and development of the UOU in various domains of national marine affairs while the Government is making its effort to advance national oceans policy. To this end, this study examines the differences between the UOU and its equivalent units in the U.S. Navy from four perspectives, namely, organizational status, missions, capabilities and the relationship between these units and other government agencies, analyzes the needs imposed upon the UOU by various domains of national marine affairs, and then proposes the approaches for improving UOU¡¦s capabilities so as to fulfill the requirements of national marine affairs development.

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"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009." / Advisor(s): King, Cynthia. ; Salem, Anita. "December 2009." "MBA Professional report"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on April 12, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Energy Conservation; Strategic Communication; U.S. Navy Energy Conservation Programs; Motivations; Incentives; Behavior Change Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-87). Also available in print.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / This dissertation examines the influence of the treaty system inaugurated at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 upon innovation in the design of the interwar U.S. fleet. The way in which sea power was viewed by the U.S. Navy of the period combined with the Navy’s unique organizational structure to shape the Navy’s efforts in building a “treaty fleet.” In particular, the General Board of the Navy, a formal body established by the Secretary of the Navy to advise him on both strategic and other matters with respect to fleet, served as the organizational nexus for the interaction between fleet design and treaty implementation. The General Board members orchestrated the efforts by the principal Naval Bureaus, the Naval War College, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in ensuring that the designs adopted for the warships built and modified during the period of the Washington (Five Power) and London Naval Treaties both met treaty requirements while meeting strategic needs. The leadership of the Navy at large, and the General Board in particular, felt themselves especially constrained by Article XIX (the fortification clause) of the Five Power Treaty that implemented a status quo on naval fortification in the Western Pacific. The treaty system led the Navy to design a measurably different fleet than it might otherwise have done in the absence of naval limitations.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Mark P. Parillo / ABSTRACT Historians of the integration of the American military and African American military participation have argued that the post-World War II period was the critical period for the integration of the U.S. Navy. This dissertation argues that World War II was “the” critical period for the integration of the Navy because, in addition to forcing the Navy to change its racial policy, the war altered the Navy’s attitudes towards its African American personnel. African Americans have a long history in the U.S. Navy. In the period between the French and Indian War and the Civil War, African Americans served in the Navy because whites would not. This is especially true of the peacetime service, where conditions, pay, and discipline dissuaded most whites from enlisting. During the Civil War, a substantial number of escaped slaves and other African Americans served. Reliance on racially integrated crews survived beyond the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, only to succumb to the principle of “separate but equal,” validated by the Supreme Court in the Plessy case (1896). As racial segregation took hold and the era of “Jim Crow” began, the Navy separated the races, a task completed by the time America entered World War I. The Navy paid the price in lost efficiency to maintain the policy. After the war, the Navy chose to accept African Americans solely for duty as messmen and stewards. Matters changed in World War II. The Navy eventually lifted its restrictions on African American enlistment and promotions, commissioned its first African American officers, and finally committed itself to a program of integration. The increased interaction between whites and African Americans had also led to white officers and policymakers re-assessing the value of African American sailors, a crucial sine qua non for the actualization of integration in the postwar years.

Admiral Thomas C. Hart And The Demise Of The Asiatic Fleet 1941 – 1942 is a chronicle of the opening days of World War II in the Pacific and the demise of the U.S. Navy’s Asiatic Fleet. Beginning with the background of Four Star Admiral Thomas Hart, this chronicle shows the history of the nearly obsolete ships that fought in the beginning of World War II. The reader will come to realize how and why this fleet ceased to exist within ninety days from the start of the war. Historical evidence will show that the damage inflicted on the Japanese was much greater than what was recorded in popular history. Hart was relieved of his command due to political considerations but not a single ship was lost while he was in command of the Asiatic Fleet. Hart fulfilled his orders to preserve the integrity and safety of the American Asiatic Fleet.