Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1963. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [297]-309).

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisors: Robert A. Divine and Michael B. Stoff. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis examines the formative years of the Joint Army and Navy Board, 1903 to 1919. It serves as an institutional history, focusing on the function of the interservice coordination body. The Joint Board is examined within the context of formulating American military strategy and U.S. diplomatic affairs from its creation in July 1903 to its reconstitution in 1919. At present no comprehensive historical study exists focusing on the Joint Board. Currently, interservice cooperation and coordination during this period receive no more than peripheral analysis in war plan studies. Thus, this work begins the first comprehensive history of the precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This thesis analyzes the origins and creation of the Joint Board, the Board??s basic duties and responsibilities, and Joint Board actions as they impacted U.S. diplomacy and military strategy concerning the homeland and coast defense, the Caribbean and Cuba, the Panama Canal, as well as the Pacific and the Philippines. Within this geographical framework, this thesis explores the relation of the Joint Board to the Navy General Board and Army General Staff, the cooperation of the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy between the Spanish-American War and World War I, the impact of Joint Board actions on American civil-military relations, and the efficacy of interservice cooperation. This thesis is based largely on unpublished as well as published primary sources, including the records of the Joint Board, Navy General Board records, Army War College Division records, and members?? personal papers housed at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. In addition, secondary sources are used to place the Joint Board within the larger contextual framework of interservice cooperation, U.S. civil-military relations, and American military history during the early twentieth century.

This thesis examines the formative years of the Joint Army and Navy Board, 1903 to 1919. It serves as an institutional history, focusing on the function of the interservice coordination body. The Joint Board is examined within the context of formulating American military strategy and U.S. diplomatic affairs from its creation in July 1903 to its reconstitution in 1919. At present no comprehensive historical study exists focusing on the Joint Board. Currently, interservice cooperation and coordination during this period receive no more than peripheral analysis in war plan studies. Thus, this work begins the first comprehensive history of the precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This thesis analyzes the origins and creation of the Joint Board, the Board??s basic duties and responsibilities, and Joint Board actions as they impacted U.S. diplomacy and military strategy concerning the homeland and coast defense, the Caribbean and Cuba, the Panama Canal, as well as the Pacific and the Philippines. Within this geographical framework, this thesis explores the relation of the Joint Board to the Navy General Board and Army General Staff, the cooperation of the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy between the Spanish-American War and World War I, the impact of Joint Board actions on American civil-military relations, and the efficacy of interservice cooperation. This thesis is based largely on unpublished as well as published primary sources, including the records of the Joint Board, Navy General Board records, Army War College Division records, and members?? personal papers housed at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. In addition, secondary sources are used to place the Joint Board within the larger contextual framework of interservice cooperation, U.S. civil-military relations, and American military history during the early twentieth century.

The Army, despite having been vexed for a century on how to effectively fight the Plains Indians, ultimately defeated them only a decade after the Civil War. This thesis will bring to the forefront those individuals who adapted fighting techniques and ultimately achieved victories on the Texas frontier before the Civil War. The majority of these victories came as a result of mounted warfare under the direction of lower ranking officers in control of smaller forces. The tactic of fighting Indians from horseback was shown to be effective by the Rangers and later emulated by the Army.

No description available.

Many scholars of the First World War have examined the European armies in new ways that have shown not only how those armies actually fought along the Western Front, but how they changed their ideas and methods over time, and why they fought the way they did. This dissertation does the same for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). It examines how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, what they learned about modern combat in those battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. Although this dissertation describes AEF training and operations, its focus is on ideas and methods, and the changes in both during the war. It shows that when the United States joined the war in 1917, the U.S. Army was doctrinally unprepared for the industrial combat of the Western Front. It demonstrates that General John J. Pershing and other AEF leaders accepted this inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas, which retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on a battlefield dominated by artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire. However, this dissertation also shows that AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods, as they fought. Experienced divisions prepared more comprehensive attack plans, employed more flexible infantry formations, and maximized firepower to seize limited objectives. Although some of these adaptations were accepted by senior officers at AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), the American First Army, and the various corps, the lessons seem to have been learned first, and best, by officers and men within the combat divisions. Often the extent of these changes reduced the operational relevance of senior officers at GHQ, including Pershing, many of whom failed to make the same doctrinal adjustments. In short, this study exposes the battle of ideas waged within the AEF, between those who adhered to the traditional, human-centered ideas of the prewar army and those who increasingly appreciated the modern, industrial ideas then prevalent in the European armies.

Many scholars of the First World War have examined the European armies in new ways that have shown not only how those armies actually fought along the Western Front, but how they changed their ideas and methods over time, and why they fought the way they did. This dissertation does the same for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). It examines how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, what they learned about modern combat in those battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. Although this dissertation describes AEF training and operations, its focus is on ideas and methods, and the changes in both during the war. It shows that when the United States joined the war in 1917, the U.S. Army was doctrinally unprepared for the industrial combat of the Western Front. It demonstrates that General John J. Pershing and other AEF leaders accepted this inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas, which retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on a battlefield dominated by artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire. However, this dissertation also shows that AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods, as they fought. Experienced divisions prepared more comprehensive attack plans, employed more flexible infantry formations, and maximized firepower to seize limited objectives. Although some of these adaptations were accepted by senior officers at AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), the American First Army, and the various corps, the lessons seem to have been learned first, and best, by officers and men within the combat divisions. Often the extent of these changes reduced the operational relevance of senior officers at GHQ, including Pershing, many of whom failed to make the same doctrinal adjustments. In short, this study exposes the battle of ideas waged within the AEF, between those who adhered to the traditional, human-centered ideas of the prewar army and those who increasingly appreciated the modern, industrial ideas then prevalent in the European armies.

The Western Apache Scouts of the 1870s who assisted the United States Army in tracking down the Chiricahua Apaches that had escaped from the federal reservations in the Arizona Territory laid the foundation for what became seventy-six years of military service in the U.S. Army. Consolidated and reassigned to Ft. Huachuca, Arizona in 1922, these scouts continued to serve with distinction long after the Army needed their skills as trackers. In 1947, the final four scouts retired from United States military service, each having served for over twenty-five years. This thesis explores how these men used their military service in order to survive, serving with honor while maintaining their cultural traditions within a changing world.