Thesis (D. Min.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2002. / Vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 208-213).

This thesis examined the connection between Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as an international norm and the education of soldiers in Sweden and America. In a number of military handbooks and guides, the United States has emphasized the importance of R2P training as fundamental to the conduct of peace operations. One of the Swedish Armed Forces' four pillars (crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing) is international peace operations, which indicates that training in such operations is of great importance. Sweden and the United States have a positive stance on the UN principle R2P and have expressed themselves in that it is an important tool in the work towards peace. The education within the four crimes that are included in R2P is thus of great importance for both Sweden and the United States in peace work. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to describe and compare the connection between R2P as an international norm and the training of soldiers in the four crimes that are included in the R2P principle. The results showed that R2P contains parts that are more or less prioritized by the Swedish and American military in terms of training of soldiers. It is clear that the principle R2P is not prioritized per se, but the education is instead given in subjects that the principle concerns, and therefore the education can be counted as being given, to a certain extent, in R2P.

The history of the United States' occupation and administration of the Philippines is a premiere example of the evolution of the American military's civil administrative approach as it evolved from simple Army security in 1898, through an evolving ‘whole-of-government' method, to what was practically the full military administration of the country by March 1945. The second liberation and subsequent administration of the Philippines by the United States Army was unique, not simply because of the physical characteristics of the operations, but more so because of the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur used a rather self-reliant approach that rejected much of the direction from various authorities in Washington and adopted independently authored local solutions, but he took advantage of external resources when necessary. Ultimately the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) under his command had to accept external direction to gain external resources. The Army's civil administrative planning and execution in the Philippines in 1944-1945 was the direct result of the social, political, economic, and military relationships between Americans and Filipinos from 1898 to 1944, much of which involved MacArthur, and the institutional changes that developed from these interactions. The result was civil administration that met the local and immediate requirements suitable for the conditions at hand. By August 1945 the Army ended civil affairs operations and transferred responsibility to the Commonwealth government of the Philippines and the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA).

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This dissertation analyzes the relationship that developed between the British Army and the United States Army between 1917 and 1941. Although those two forces operated as allies during World War I, both nations’ leaders grew frustrated with each other following the Armistice and the Treaty of Versailles. Officers in both armies built on their positive wartime experiences, however, to ensure their armies viewed each other as prospective allies should a future global conflict arise. In the two decades after World War I, personal exchanges initiated by individual officers and information sharing between these two armies improved relations and encouraged cooperation in a number of areas. The resulting cordiality that spread to a majority of the officers in both armies manifested itself in their socializing, reports, war plans, professional journals, and personal papers. Long before President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill took steps toward forming the Anglo-American alliance during World War II, their nations’ armies laid the military foundation for the special relationship. / History

Many scholars have written about the counterinsurgency phase of the Philippine- American War (1899-1902). Military historians often downplayed the impact of human rights abuses, while emphasizing the success of the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency instead. In contrast, social historians frequently focused on human rights abuses at the expense of understanding the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency efforts. Unlike the majority of earlier works, this thesis unifies military, social, and legal history to primarily answer these questions: what significant factors led U.S. soldiers to commit human rights abuses during the war, and at what cost did the U.S. pacify the Filipino rebellion? The war was successfully waged at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, but wavered at the grand strategic level.1 This study argues that racism, ambiguous rules and regulations, and a breakdown of discipline contributed to U.S. soldiers committing human rights abuses against Filipinos during the counterinsurgency. Primary sources from the perspectives of American policy makers, military leaders, and common soldiers—in addition to documents on U.S. Army regulations and its past traditions—reveal a comprehensive story of what happened during this conflict. The U.S. Army’s abuse were not a historical anomaly, but a growing trend extending from nineteenth century conflicts against other races. The counterinsurgency revealed that beneath the stated principles of 1 For the purposes of this thesis, grand strategy is “the direction and use made of any and all of the assets of a security community, including its military instruments, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.” This differs from the strategic level of war, which is the direction and exclusive use of military forces for the purposes of policy as decided by politics. Finally, the operational level is the level of war where the tasks, decided by strategy, are coordinated and individual units are commanded. These units, in turn, engaging in tactics to achieve operational objectives. Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 29, 47. iii America’s benevolent mission, violent racial underpinnings existed in U.S. desires for global and domestic hegemony. The U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency resulted in a flawed victory, won at the cost of combatants, innocent civilians, and American idealism. / History

The training of Latin American militaries at the United States Army School of the Americas has lasted through many stages of U.S. foreign policy. The training of approximately 55,000 Latin American civilian, military, and police personnel throughout the USARSA's 54-year existence placed the United States in an influential position to achieve U.S. national interests. Prior to World War II, the training of Latin American militaries was intended to supplant German and Italian military missions. As the Allies neared victory in WWII, training programs formalized to sustain Inter-American military cooperation. The enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the Soviet Union's pledge to spread communism created a bipolar superpower conflict. As Cold War flashpoints arose such as the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War, the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War, the school continuously reorganized to grant the United States a clear political advantage to influence rising military leaders, government leaders, and consequently its political system and the future relations with that country. This thesis will examine one element of U.S. foreign policy, formerly the United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA), now known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation to determine whether this institution served U.S. interests, and if so, when and how did it accomplish its mission. / Master of Arts

The politicization of military forces is not a development of the 21st century. Throughout history, armies have taken on roles traditionally relegated to non-military entities and accepted the notion that the actions of even the most junior members of their force may have substantial political implications. The development of the politicization of the U.S. military in Iraq since 2003 has been particularly ubiquitous. Although the politicization of military forces is not a recent development, little effort has been made to locate the manner in which the politicization has been reflected by the doctrines included in the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24). I hypothesize that the doctrines included in FM 3-24 not only codified many systemic strategic and tactical changes for the U.S. military, but also supported the politicization of the military in the 21st century. I conclude that while not at the level I initially suspected, the doctrines included in the FM 3-24 reflected the politicization of the U.S. military in Iraq following its release in early 2007. / Master of Arts