This paper explores transformation of Norwegian Special Operation Forces, raising the hypothesis that current organizational structure is inconsistent with future roles and missions. The inconsistency is derived from official documents pertaining to the transformation of Norwegian Armed Forces for the period 2005-2008. Where the military recommends disbanding two existing units, Marinejegerkommandoen and Hærens Jegerkommando, to re-commission a single unit under a single, unspecified command, the Government insists on maintaining the status quo. A likely consequence is a sub-optimal development of NORSOF as a strategic asset. Using the dichotomy of direct action vs. indirect action capabilities as a framework for understanding how Special Operation Forces (SOF) in general conduct operations, the author claims NORSOF possess capabilities only for the former. Analysis of the forces themselves, the security environment, and the strategies adopted to deal with current and future threats leads to the conclusion that NORSOF will increase its relevance by acquiring competency in indirect capabilities. If indirect capabilities become a core task for NORSOF, then the current organization should be maintained. If not, both units will continue to maintain overlapping tasks in direct capabilities. Future transformation issues will then evolve based on traditional arguments related to the maritime and land domains. / Royal Norwegian Navy author

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1993? / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 10, 2003). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1996. / Shipping list no.: 1998-0921-M. "August 1997." Includes bibliographical references. Also available via Internet from the Air University Press web site. Address as of 11/7/03: http://aupress.au.af.mil/SAAS%5FTheses/Torrens/torrens.pdf; current access is available via PURL.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Arquilla, John. "June 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 13, 2009. DTIC Identifiers: Principles of war, information age, contemporary militaries. Author(s) subject terms: Principles of war, Information Age, military history, military doctrine, military strategy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 127-130). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Washington, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 104-106). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) -- Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006. / Thesis advisor : Richard Grahlman. "June 2006." Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-63). Full text available on Public Stinet.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006. / "14 Apr 2006." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 68-74).

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2005. / "26 May 2005." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-66).

Throughout American history, policymakers have struggled with the use of American military power. The Limited War argument holds that the use of force needs to remain an option to support American diplomacy. The Never Again argument, meanwhile, holds that the use of American military power should be undertaken only in the face of threats against vital national interests. The most influential Never Again argument has been the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, later expanded to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which sought to limit the use of American military power. After the Vietnam War and the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was ascendant over Limited War arguments like Secretary of State George Schultz's case in favor of the limited use of American military force against targets of less than vital interest. Between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, however, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine lost much of its influence with American policymakers. This thesis will establish a link between the loss of influence by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and the rise in the utility of force based on improvements in military technology and doctrines, leading to a broadening of policy objectives that would not have been possible during the Cold War. / US Army (USA) author.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1991-92. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 27, 2003). "May 1992." Includes bibliographical references.