Doktrin utgör en del av grunden till en nations krigföringsförmåga och skall i detta avseende ses somen normativ styrning med riktlinjer för nuet och den omedelbara framtiden. Doktrin skall såledesutgöra ett verktyg för militära chefer att hantera situationer som annars hade upplevts som mycketpressade och omöjliga att genomföra. För att så skall vara fallet måste en doktrin bygga på relevantunderlag baserad på omvärldsanalys samt de erfarenheter de väpnade styrkorna vunnit genomdeltagande i skarpa insatser, men även erfarenheter kopplade till övningsverksamhet och nationenshistoria och förutsättningar. En doktrin borde således ses som riktlinjer för handling baserat påkunskap. Är detta verkligen fallet? I doktriner hävdas att de baseras på prövad kunskap. En vackertanke eller är verkligheten en annan med helt andra styrande påverkansfaktorer på en nationsdoktrinutveckling. Analys och utvärdering resulterar i lärdomar. Denna dyrköpta kunskap är värd attminnas och nyttjas. Syftet med denna uppsats blir därför att undersöka om de lärdomar som denbrittiska försvarsmakten identifierade efter Falklandskriget 1982 påverkade den brittiskadoktrinutvecklingen efter kriget. För att uppnå detta syfte kategoriseras två brittiska maritimadoktriner - The Naval War Manual (1969) samt The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine(1995). Doktrinerna tillsammans med de brittiska lärdomarna från kriget kategoriseras utifrån de sexgrundläggande förmågorna. Resultatet visar på att brittiska Marinen drog en stor mängd lärdomarunder och efter kriget. Med anledning av att 26 år förflutit mellan de båda doktrinerna kankonstateras att doktrinen utvecklats. Lärdomarna från Falklandskriget har tagits tillvara men inte iden omfattning man skulle kunna tro och önska. Den omvärldsutveckling som skett efterFalklandskriget är i många stycken omfattande och av sådan art att lärdomarna från Falklandskrigetär mer aktuella idag än de var under utvecklingen av 1995 års doktrin. / Doctrine is one of the foundations of a nation’s war fighting capability and, in this respect,should be seen as normative guidelines for the present and immediate future. As such,doctrine provides military commanders with a tool to manage situations, which wouldotherwise be seen as extremely stressful and impossible to deal with. For this to be the case,doctrine must be built on relevant information based on an analysis of the world around usand the experiences of armed forces on live operations, but also on experiences linked toexercise activities and a nation’s history and circumstances.Thus doctrine should be seen as knowledge-based guidelines for action. Is this actually thecase? Doctrine claims to be based on tried and tested knowledge. Is this wishful thinking, or isreality something else, with completely different controlling factors influencing thedevelopment of a nation’s doctrine? Analysis and evaluation results in lessons learned and itis worth remembering and taking advantage of this hard-earned knowledge. The aim of thisessay is, therefore, to investigate whether or not the lessons learned by the British ArmedForces during the 1982 Falklands War have influenced the development of British doctrinesince the War. To achieve this aim two publications of British maritime doctrine, The NavalWar Manual (1969) and The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (1995), have beenexamined, along with the lessons learned from the War, using the six fundamental capabilitiesas a basis. The results show that the British Royal Navy learned a considerable number oflessons both during and after the War. Because there are 26 years between the publications ofthe two documents, it can be stated that there has been a development in doctrine. Accounthas been taken of the lessons learned during the Falklands War, but not to the extent that onemight expect or wish. Developments in the world around us since the Falklands War are, inmany cases, so comprehensive and of a kind that the lessons learned from the Falklands Warare more current today than they were during the development of the 1995 doctrine. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 06-08

Student report -- Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1988. Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation; Sponsor, Col Robert J. Courter, Director, Force development, HQ/DED; Faculty advisor Lt Col Rober L. Peters, ACSC/3823 Stus / "Apr 1988" "Report number 88-2300"

In this thesis the Russian Federation is investigated to understand if it still tries to continue its classic Soviet style of security perception in the post-Cold War era and its views concerning national security as reflected in Russia&#039 / s military doctrines. It is so obvious that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emrgence of Russia as an independent entity in the post-cold war era have compelled the Russian Federation to redefine its national interest. In this context it experienced a crisis of describing its identity and national interests in changing security environment. Although in the early years of Yeltsin it preferred close cooperation with the West then abandoned this approach. It was implied that some states and coalitions were still main threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the military doctrine and the near-abroad policy re-gained importance. In addition with the inauguration of Putin as the Russian President the reaction of the Russian Federation regarding both internal and external security issues displayed the growing significance of traditional interests and old-style security issues. Thus in this thesis it is asserted that the Russian Federation still tries to sustain its well-known traditional interests the classic Soviet style of security perception in the post-Cold War period. Therefore this study tries to explain this argument through examining the effects of its imperial past, transformation years and its situation in the new security environment of post-Cold War era under Yeltsin and Putin.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 130-134). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 133-146).

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "December 2002." AD-A411 335. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.S. in Systems TEchnology (Command, Control, and Communications))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 1990. / Thesis Advisor(s): Sovereign, Michael G. Second Reader: Caldwell, William. "June 1990." Description based on signature page as viewed on October 21, 2009. DTIC Identifier(s): Military doctrines, air land battles, command and control systems, Warsaw pact countries, theses. Author(s) subject terms: NATO, C³, C², Warsaw Pact, warfighting doctrine, Airland Battle. Includes bibliographical references (p. 125-128). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006. / "14 April 2006." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "05 April 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 64-67).

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007. / Thesis Advisor(s): Erik Jansen, George Lober. "June 2007." Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-81). Also available in print.