This dissertation examines the practice of writing military history in conjunction with military theory. It shows that in the pursuit of establishing military theory, military history is often actively distorted and manipulated by military theorists. Those military theorists who, consciously or subconsciously, succumb to this practice are identified here as "theorist-historians". The effect of this manipulation, its implications and consequences for the field of study as a whole are examined, as is the didactic nature of military history in the light of historical accuracy. In conclusion the role and effect of the military theorist~historians are evaluated against those of purely academic historians. The unique didactic needs of military history are also highlighted. Two twentieth century British military theorists, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, were chosen as being representative of the military theorist-historian group. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

本論文旨試圖透過克里姆林宮政治暨嚇阻戰略研究途徑，剖析俄羅斯將獨立軍種「戰略火箭軍」裁併至空軍編制的原因。 本論文假設戰略火箭軍遭到裁併是基於下列兩項原因： 第一、俄羅斯武裝力量本身的態度與國內幾次重大政治鬥爭，導致俄羅斯必須修正軍事準則。 由於總統葉里欽在獨立初期，並沒有為俄羅斯的外交與國家安全政策領域構築一個法制化、有效率的決策系統，造成諸如國防部、外交部、總參謀部、聯邦安全會議、國防會議與國家軍事檢察署等相關機構，彼此間不斷爭奪軍事資源、議題詮釋權，政治鬥爭頻仍。另外，在某些政治危機中，例如1993年砲轟國會事件、第一次車臣戰爭以及1996年總統大選，葉里欽需要拉攏軍方支持以應付反對勢力，這就讓俄羅斯武裝力量有機會涉足克里姆林宮政治。結果是國家安全政策領域呈現各行其道、莫衷一是的混亂局面，並且有愈來愈多的政府官員對於在國家安全政策領域中攫取政治利益躍躍欲試。 其次，俄羅斯地緣政治環境的劇烈惡化導致龐大的反軍事改革勢力。 為了要在冷戰後與美國保持最低限度的戰略均勢狀態，好保障俄羅斯的國家利益及國際地位，並且順利解決因宗教或種族要素在俄羅斯或獨立國協境內所引發的區域戰爭或軍事衝突，有些官員諸如思科可夫、謝爾蓋耶夫等人主張俄羅斯應該繼續維持強大的戰略武力，特別是著名的戰略火箭軍。他們反對軍事改革以及裁減軍備。而由於當前國防預算困窘，葉里欽與普欽必須兩害相權取其輕，整肅拒絕裁軍的官員或是部隊。 在謝爾蓋耶夫與克瓦什寧激烈的政治鬥爭結束後，最後的贏家克瓦什寧終於如願以償，將戰略火箭軍予以裁併，由軍種單位降為兵種單位。不過俄羅斯的戰略武力仍然將在未來扮演極具影響力的角色。 / The purpose of the thesis is to attempt to analyze the factors that exert great impact on the reduction of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces(SMF) in status from a separate branch of service to a separate command from the perspective of Kremlin politics and Strategy of Deterrence. This thesis takes the position that the SMF has been reduced by two main motives: First, the attitude of the Russian army and domestic political struggle has forced the Russian government to adjust its military doctrine. Due to Yeltsin failing to set up a well-organized and efficient system for foreign and national security policy decision-making, so the struggle between the key ministries involved in foreign and security policy- the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the National Security Council, the Defense Council, the State Military Inspectorate- was hard. And in some political crises, such as the bloody event of Oct. 1993, the presidential election in 1996, and the crisis in Chechnya, Yeltsin needed army to defeat the counterforces. The Russian army has became more influential in politics. As a result, the decision-making process has been chaotic and confused, and various bureaucratic players have often been able to impose their their own special interests on the security policy agenda. Second, the worsening geopolitical situation has brought about considerable resistance to the military reform. In order to keep minimum strategic balance with the United States, ensure its national interest and international status and settle local wars or military conflicts caused by religion and ethnic conflicts within Russia’s own territory and Commonwealth of Independent States, some officials like Yuri Skokov and Igor Sergeyev advocated maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent force, especially the prominent role for the SMF. The president was likely to face considerable resistance to the reform. Owing to the current financial constraints on defense spending, Yeltsin and Putin carried out a purge of army officers who were against arms reduction. After the hard political struggle between Igor Sergeyev and Anatoliy Kvashnin, the winner- Kvashnin demanded the SMF must be reduced in status from a separate branch of service to a separate command. But the Russian strategic force will still play influential role in the near future.

Ce mémoire vise la compréhension du mécanisme des choix stratégiques de l’Inde en fonction de la menace perçue de la Chine. Selon une logique réaliste néoclassique, l’étude de l’effet des contraintes systémiques et domestiques présente un paradoxe dans les volontés stratégiques indiennes. L’Inde est soumise à la pression systémique de la montée de la Chine dans un monde post-Guerre froide qui la verrouille dans sa position traditionnellement défensive, alors que sa volonté de projection de la puissance guidée par sa perception, ses idées et sa culture stratégique la porte à adopter une position plus offensive. L’Inde perçoit la menace chinoise de manière dissonante avec l’orientation stratégique chinoi-se. Elle se concentre ainsi sur des signaux et des indices particuliers afin de justifier cette me-nace perçue. C’est pourquoi l’ambiguïté du langage diplomatique de la Chine envers l’Arunachal Pradesh et de sa présence dans l’océan Indien engendre un accroissement de la menace chinoise et une réponse plus agressive conséquemment. La réponse stratégique in-dienne doit s’adapter aux changements de la puissance relative de la Chine. N’ayant pas les capacités relatives suffisantes, l’Inde choisit une stratégie située entre une émulation dans une logique de poursuite aux armements afin de maintenir la parité technologique et un engage-ment afin de désamorcer la rivalité et éviter une réaction chinoise pré-emptive. La culture stratégique de l’Inde traditionnellement défensive se transforme vers une position offensive sous l’effet du nation building du nationalisme hindou. Les préférences stratégiques indiennes agressives s’illustrent principalement dans le choc multidirectionnel des sphères d’influence sino-indiennes en Asie. / This thesis seeks to understand the process of India strategic choice based on the perceived threat of China. According to a neoclassical realism framework, the study of the effect of sys-temic and domestic constraints shows a paradox in India strategic intentions. India is lock in a defensive posture by the systemic pressure of China rise in a post-Cold War era, although its desire to project his power lead by its perception, ideas, and strategic culture shows a progres-sive shift for an offensive posture. India perceives China threat in dissonance with the strategic aims of China. It is focusing on specific signals and indices in order to justify the perceived threat. This is why China’s ambi-guity toward its diplomatic discourse concerning Arunachal Pradesh and its presence in the Indian Ocean creates an increase Chinese threat and therefore a more aggressive response. India’s strategic response must cope with the changes in China’s relative power. Without the necessary relative capacity, India chooses a strategy between emulation defined by a pursuit of armaments logic in order to keep the technologic parity and engagement for the purpose of defusing the rivalry and avoiding a pre-emptive reaction from China. Traditionally defensive India’s strategic culture progressively transforms itself under the influence of the Hindu na-tion building that clash with the nehruvian nationalism. The aggressive Indian strategic pref-erences principally show themselves in the multidirectional clash of India and China spheres of influence in Asia.

Blue Force Tracking (BFT) är en term för system som lokaliserar och övervakar egna militära förband inom operationsområdet. Ett potentiellt användningsområde för BFT är som hjälpmedel för förbättrad förmåga till eld och rörelse. Innan ett sådant användningsområde undersöks vidare är det dock nödvändigt att studera hur BFT påverkar tillämpandet av uppdragstaktik och manöverkrigföring.      Syftet med detta arbete är att skapa en förståelse för hur teknik och doktrin förhåller sig till varandra, för att besvara om användandet av BFT för eld och rörelse är möjligt inom Försvarsmakten med tanke på rådande doktrin. För att studera detta genomfördes en fallstudie där det undersöktes hur teknik och doktrin påverkar varandra, kopplat mot användandet av ledningssystem med BFT inom Försvarsmakten. För analys av empirin användes ett sociotekniskt synsätt för att förstå förhållandet mellan teknik och doktrin.   Resultatet visade på att användningen av BFT inte påverkade tillämpandet av uppdragstaktik. Däremot försvårar BFT-användningen tillämpandet av manöverkrigföring, främst genom att röja det egna handlandet. Diskussionen berörde skillnader i nyttjande av BFT mellan Flygvapnet och Armén. Diskussionen ledde också fram till rekommendationen, att om BFT ska implementeras på manöverbataljonerna så bör det till förändringar i rådande doktrin för att skapa ett fungerande sociotekniskt system / Blue Force Tracking (BFT) refers to systems for monitor and location of friendly military forces in a particular area of operation. A possible use for BFT is as an aid to improve fire and movement skills. Before such use is investigated further, it is necessary to examine the impact of BFT on the application of mission command and manoeuvre warfare. The purpose of this paper is to create an understanding of what effects technology and doctrine have on each other. The aim is to be able to answer the question whether or not BFT can be used to improve fire and movement in the Swedish Armed Forces. To do this, a case study of the relationship between technology and doctrine in the Swedish Armed Forces was carried out. For analysis of the empirical data, a socio-technical approach was used to understand the relationship between technology and doctrine.  The results showed that the use of BFT had no effect on the application of mission command. However, the use of BFT had a negative effect on the ability to carry out manoeuvre warfare, mainly on the ability to hide our own actions from the enemy. The discussion concerned differences in the use of BFT between the Air Force and the Army. The discussion also concluded with the recommendation that a change in doctrine is necessary, if BFT is to be introduced to battalions, in order to create a functioning sociotechnical system.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T20:20:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Buzetto.pdf: 1600822 bytes, checksum: 4ebd29ac535cbe031d1b8e2acdeaed90 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The focus of this research is the strategic importance of national defense in the development of so-called "Bolivarian Revolution", a process underway in Venezuela. We intend to use as a reference several theoretical works that are in the field of Marxism, and authors who, while not having total affinity with this current of contemporary thought, made a significant contribution to the study of Art of War and the Theory of Strategy. The key to our work will be an evaluation of the Bolivarian New Military Doctrine and its relation to the strategy known as "War of All the People" (WAP). We also seek to check what are the contradictions and innovations brought about by the process of political, economical and social transformation in Venezuela for the study of national defense in an anti-imperialist perspective / O foco desta pesquisa é a importância estratégica da defesa nacional no desenvolvimento da chamada Revolução Bolivariana, processo em curso na Venezuela. Pretendemos utilizar como referência teórica diversas obras que se encontram no campo do marxismo, além de autores que, mesmo não tendo total afinidade com esta corrente do pensamento contemporâneo, deram uma contribuição significativa para o estudo da Arte da Guerra e da Teoria da Estratégia. O principal em nosso trabalho será uma avaliação da Nova Doutrina Militar Bolivariana e sua relação com a estratégia conhecida como Guerra de Todo o Povo (GTP). Também procuramos verificar quais são as contradições e as inovações trazidas pelo processo de transformação política, econômica e social na Venezuela para o estudo da defesa nacional numa perspectiva antiimperialista

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T14:53:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Buzetto.pdf: 1600822 bytes, checksum: 4ebd29ac535cbe031d1b8e2acdeaed90 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The focus of this research is the strategic importance of national defense in the development of so-called "Bolivarian Revolution", a process underway in Venezuela. We intend to use as a reference several theoretical works that are in the field of Marxism, and authors who, while not having total affinity with this current of contemporary thought, made a significant contribution to the study of Art of War and the Theory of Strategy. The key to our work will be an evaluation of the Bolivarian New Military Doctrine and its relation to the strategy known as "War of All the People" (WAP). We also seek to check what are the contradictions and innovations brought about by the process of political, economical and social transformation in Venezuela for the study of national defense in an anti-imperialist perspective / O foco desta pesquisa é a importância estratégica da defesa nacional no desenvolvimento da chamada Revolução Bolivariana, processo em curso na Venezuela. Pretendemos utilizar como referência teórica diversas obras que se encontram no campo do marxismo, além de autores que, mesmo não tendo total afinidade com esta corrente do pensamento contemporâneo, deram uma contribuição significativa para o estudo da Arte da Guerra e da Teoria da Estratégia. O principal em nosso trabalho será uma avaliação da Nova Doutrina Militar Bolivariana e sua relação com a estratégia conhecida como Guerra de Todo o Povo (GTP). Também procuramos verificar quais são as contradições e as inovações trazidas pelo processo de transformação política, econômica e social na Venezuela para o estudo da defesa nacional numa perspectiva antiimperialista

Ce mémoire vise la compréhension du mécanisme des choix stratégiques de l’Inde en fonction de la menace perçue de la Chine. Selon une logique réaliste néoclassique, l’étude de l’effet des contraintes systémiques et domestiques présente un paradoxe dans les volontés stratégiques indiennes. L’Inde est soumise à la pression systémique de la montée de la Chine dans un monde post-Guerre froide qui la verrouille dans sa position traditionnellement défensive, alors que sa volonté de projection de la puissance guidée par sa perception, ses idées et sa culture stratégique la porte à adopter une position plus offensive. L’Inde perçoit la menace chinoise de manière dissonante avec l’orientation stratégique chinoi-se. Elle se concentre ainsi sur des signaux et des indices particuliers afin de justifier cette me-nace perçue. C’est pourquoi l’ambiguïté du langage diplomatique de la Chine envers l’Arunachal Pradesh et de sa présence dans l’océan Indien engendre un accroissement de la menace chinoise et une réponse plus agressive conséquemment. La réponse stratégique in-dienne doit s’adapter aux changements de la puissance relative de la Chine. N’ayant pas les capacités relatives suffisantes, l’Inde choisit une stratégie située entre une émulation dans une logique de poursuite aux armements afin de maintenir la parité technologique et un engage-ment afin de désamorcer la rivalité et éviter une réaction chinoise pré-emptive. La culture stratégique de l’Inde traditionnellement défensive se transforme vers une position offensive sous l’effet du nation building du nationalisme hindou. Les préférences stratégiques indiennes agressives s’illustrent principalement dans le choc multidirectionnel des sphères d’influence sino-indiennes en Asie. / This thesis seeks to understand the process of India strategic choice based on the perceived threat of China. According to a neoclassical realism framework, the study of the effect of sys-temic and domestic constraints shows a paradox in India strategic intentions. India is lock in a defensive posture by the systemic pressure of China rise in a post-Cold War era, although its desire to project his power lead by its perception, ideas, and strategic culture shows a progres-sive shift for an offensive posture. India perceives China threat in dissonance with the strategic aims of China. It is focusing on specific signals and indices in order to justify the perceived threat. This is why China’s ambi-guity toward its diplomatic discourse concerning Arunachal Pradesh and its presence in the Indian Ocean creates an increase Chinese threat and therefore a more aggressive response. India’s strategic response must cope with the changes in China’s relative power. Without the necessary relative capacity, India chooses a strategy between emulation defined by a pursuit of armaments logic in order to keep the technologic parity and engagement for the purpose of defusing the rivalry and avoiding a pre-emptive reaction from China. Traditionally defensive India’s strategic culture progressively transforms itself under the influence of the Hindu na-tion building that clash with the nehruvian nationalism. The aggressive Indian strategic pref-erences principally show themselves in the multidirectional clash of India and China spheres of influence in Asia.

The objective of this thesis is to analyze the changes in Israeli security policy. The thesis consists of four main parts. In the first part, the factors influencing the formation of Israeli security policy such as history, religion, ideology and threat perceptions are examined. Israeli military doctrine and its offensive, defensive and deterrence strategies are identified as the most important subcomponents of the security policy. The following part analyzes the changes and continuities in Israeli threat perceptions and the implementation of the military doctrine during and after the six main wars of the War of Independence, the war against Egypt in 1956, the Six Day War, the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War and the War in Lebanon in 1982. In the third part, the changes in Israeli security policy during 1990s are scrutinized. With the peace process, Israel&rsquo / s existential threat perception decreased but new threat perceptions of terrorism and conventional and nuclear military buildup in the region emerged / therefore security was redefined by the Israeli political and military decision-makers. In the last part the impact of the collapse of peace process and Sharon&rsquo / s coming to power on Israeli security policy is analyzed. Sharon&rsquo / s period can be defined by offensive security strategies aiming at preventing terror which has been the top security problem since the Al Aqsa Intifada. As a result, this thesis argues that Israeli security policy did not indicate significant changes until 1990s, however during 1990s Israeli security situation and security policy changed as a response to the regional and international developments. Post-2000 period witnessed changes as well with Sharon&rsquo / s returning to offensive strategies.

本論文之研究目的是企圖從前蘇聯文武關係研究途徑與克里姆林宮政治研究途徑來探討蘇聯解體後俄羅斯軍方之政治參與範疇與背後之動機。 就軍方政治參與之範疇而言，蘇聯於1991年底解體後，俄羅斯軍方在政治舞台上扮演了重要的角色。首先，我們可以從軍方在1993年俄羅斯新軍事準則成型的過程中，其強硬主張佔了主導的地位。第二、軍方在「近鄰」與前南斯拉夫維和行動的政策即便與外交部意見相衝突仍獲得最後主導權。第三、軍方在1993年10月政爭中並未完全保持中立，而最後軍方是站在葉里欽總統一方結束了此一政治危機。第四、軍方試圖從俄羅斯獨立後歷屆國家杜馬選舉中，藉由其投票行為或是主動參與競選來表達其政治態度與影響有關軍事方面之政策。 本論文以為，蘇後俄羅斯軍方的政治參與背後動機之主要原因有二。其一是蘇聯解體以後俄羅斯軍方制度利益嚴重惡化：蘇聯解體以後，軍方在軍事改革上無法有效進展、軍事預算嚴重不足、軍中生活條件惡化以及國防工業轉產上面臨了嚴重的問題。這些皆使得軍方為了自救不得不試圖從政治層面來解決軍隊之問題。其二是受到克里姆林宮政治互動之影響：葉里欽為了鞏固政軍大權，運用高超的政治手腕以及「分而治之」的統御方式，引用軍方的力量來打擊政治對手，另一方面也運用政治危機分化軍隊之團結性，使其無法在政治上形成對統治者之威脅。 / The purpose of the thesis attempts to analyze the scope and motives of post-soviet Russian military’s political participation by using former Soviet civil-military relations approach and Kremlin politics approach. As far as the scope of military’s political participation is concerned, since the dissolution of USSR in 1991, the Russian military has been playing an important role in Russian politics. First of all, during the process of formulating Russian new military doctrine in 1993, Russian military’s hard-line position dominated this process and its opinion finally won out. Secondly, peacekeeping operation took by the Russian military in the “Near Abroad” and former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, usually conflicted the peaceful option hold by the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs, but the Russian military still took control of the final policy initiative. Thirdly, in October 1993, the Russian military didn’t remain neutral in the political struggle between president and Congress of People’s Deputies. It sided with president and therefore ended this severe political crisis. Fourthly, in each Duma election hold after Russia’s independence, the Russian military tried to express its political inclination and exerted its influence by voting, even actively took part in the election. This thesis is taking the position that the political participation of post-soviet Russian military is driven by two motives. First and foremost is the institutional interest of Russian military suffered great damage since the breakup of the USSR：military reform hasn’t made much progress; military budget received hasn’t sufficed the need of military; military faced the growing acute social problems within itself; the conversion of defense industry encountered difficulties. These problems made the Russian military try to preserve itself by political means. The second motive is affected by Kremlin political interaction：in order to strengthen his control over politics and military, Yeltsin used brilliant political art and managed the military by means of “divide and rule”. He used the military to attack his political opponent, on the other hand, he made use of each political crisis to split the military and therefore the military couldn’t constitute a political threat to the ruler of Russian polity.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 11, 2010).