• Refine Query
  • Source
  • Publication year
  • to
  • Language
  • 1
  • 1
  • Tagged with
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

俄羅斯戰略火箭軍裁併之研究

陳建志, CHEN, JIAN-ZHI Unknown Date (has links)
本論文旨試圖透過克里姆林宮政治暨嚇阻戰略研究途徑,剖析俄羅斯將獨立軍種「戰略火箭軍」裁併至空軍編制的原因。 本論文假設戰略火箭軍遭到裁併是基於下列兩項原因: 第一、俄羅斯武裝力量本身的態度與國內幾次重大政治鬥爭,導致俄羅斯必須修正軍事準則。 由於總統葉里欽在獨立初期,並沒有為俄羅斯的外交與國家安全政策領域構築一個法制化、有效率的決策系統,造成諸如國防部、外交部、總參謀部、聯邦安全會議、國防會議與國家軍事檢察署等相關機構,彼此間不斷爭奪軍事資源、議題詮釋權,政治鬥爭頻仍。另外,在某些政治危機中,例如1993年砲轟國會事件、第一次車臣戰爭以及1996年總統大選,葉里欽需要拉攏軍方支持以應付反對勢力,這就讓俄羅斯武裝力量有機會涉足克里姆林宮政治。結果是國家安全政策領域呈現各行其道、莫衷一是的混亂局面,並且有愈來愈多的政府官員對於在國家安全政策領域中攫取政治利益躍躍欲試。 其次,俄羅斯地緣政治環境的劇烈惡化導致龐大的反軍事改革勢力。 為了要在冷戰後與美國保持最低限度的戰略均勢狀態,好保障俄羅斯的國家利益及國際地位,並且順利解決因宗教或種族要素在俄羅斯或獨立國協境內所引發的區域戰爭或軍事衝突,有些官員諸如思科可夫、謝爾蓋耶夫等人主張俄羅斯應該繼續維持強大的戰略武力,特別是著名的戰略火箭軍。他們反對軍事改革以及裁減軍備。而由於當前國防預算困窘,葉里欽與普欽必須兩害相權取其輕,整肅拒絕裁軍的官員或是部隊。 在謝爾蓋耶夫與克瓦什寧激烈的政治鬥爭結束後,最後的贏家克瓦什寧終於如願以償,將戰略火箭軍予以裁併,由軍種單位降為兵種單位。不過俄羅斯的戰略武力仍然將在未來扮演極具影響力的角色。 / The purpose of the thesis is to attempt to analyze the factors that exert great impact on the reduction of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces(SMF) in status from a separate branch of service to a separate command from the perspective of Kremlin politics and Strategy of Deterrence. This thesis takes the position that the SMF has been reduced by two main motives: First, the attitude of the Russian army and domestic political struggle has forced the Russian government to adjust its military doctrine. Due to Yeltsin failing to set up a well-organized and efficient system for foreign and national security policy decision-making, so the struggle between the key ministries involved in foreign and security policy- the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the National Security Council, the Defense Council, the State Military Inspectorate- was hard. And in some political crises, such as the bloody event of Oct. 1993, the presidential election in 1996, and the crisis in Chechnya, Yeltsin needed army to defeat the counterforces. The Russian army has became more influential in politics. As a result, the decision-making process has been chaotic and confused, and various bureaucratic players have often been able to impose their their own special interests on the security policy agenda. Second, the worsening geopolitical situation has brought about considerable resistance to the military reform. In order to keep minimum strategic balance with the United States, ensure its national interest and international status and settle local wars or military conflicts caused by religion and ethnic conflicts within Russia’s own territory and Commonwealth of Independent States, some officials like Yuri Skokov and Igor Sergeyev advocated maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent force, especially the prominent role for the SMF. The president was likely to face considerable resistance to the reform. Owing to the current financial constraints on defense spending, Yeltsin and Putin carried out a purge of army officers who were against arms reduction. After the hard political struggle between Igor Sergeyev and Anatoliy Kvashnin, the winner- Kvashnin demanded the SMF must be reduced in status from a separate branch of service to a separate command. But the Russian strategic force will still play influential role in the near future.

Page generated in 0.0826 seconds