以色列自一九四八年建國以來，僅五十餘年歷史，國土面積小，人口與敵對的阿拉伯國家相較不成比例。三軍常備部隊始終維持在十餘萬人；惟軍事力量強大，足以稱的上是世界的強國之一，更是中東地區一流的軍事強國。自建軍以來，軍事成就不但令人刮目相看，政治上，更成功扮演維護國家生存的重要資產角色。其建軍如何影響陸軍之發展、在全般戰略與戰爭中的地位、作戰思想及軍事準則之形成與實踐等成就之內涵，均具深入研究價值。 以色列近兩千年歷史中，不曾擁有國家及軍隊，在短短數十年內，能將複雜的軍事藝術發揮的淋漓盡致，究其核心價值，是猶太人的「生存」問題。而軍隊是龐大而複雜的戰鬥組織，其發展及改革長囿於現況或傳統思路，當面對新的戰場時，往往失去其適應能力。然而，以色列陸軍在戰爭中所表現的，是始終引領著戰爭的發展。 以色列因戰爭而全國皆兵，並進行軍隊的建立及脫胎換骨，其成就是從摸索與錯誤、實驗與辯論中將所得實際經驗，從最基本的技能，到錯綜複雜的大軍作戰訓練自己，並在戰爭中通過檢驗。戰爭中，以色列陸軍始終主宰戰場形勢，其成功不僅是作戰準則、戰術及組織進步而有效率，甚至是與他人不同，但全部都是以色列人自己創造出來。而永遠準備打下一場戰爭是其不變的信條，從質與量的提升、作戰指揮及戰略、戰術運用、逐次發展到聯合作戰型態及新式武器裝備發展與運用等，均為下一場戰爭做準備。最寶貴的經驗教訓，是以色列決心自行發展遂行長期作戰所需武器，不再完全依賴外來的武器供應。 以色列軍事準則的形成、制定，有其歷史、地理及心理的複雜因素，這也是它比對手擁有更勝一籌軍事技巧的原因。其攻勢及守勢準則根源是建立在以色列一貫的安全概念上，戰略是守勢的，陸軍的運用向以攻勢為主。關鍵因素為政治孤立、戰略縱深不足及缺乏作戰持續力、強敵環伺及超強干預的脆弱性等考量。作為一個小國，以色列陸軍只有較少的選擇與較小的自由發展適合於自己的軍事準則，即先尋求可用武器，再擬訂其準則。所以其準則主要是可用武器功能之發揮。他充份瞭解大國的準則，僅能有限度地運用於解決小國的問題。因此，以色列在發展自己的準則上，是成功的典範，它經常不斷變化、修正與革新，因為，下一場戰爭必定不同於上一次。所以必須注意戰爭的積極經驗及教訓；且對消極的教訓也相當注意。準則的彈性與不受拘束，使他在研究每一次戰爭教訓時，係假定以軍戰敗，而不是以戰勝者的態度自許。這方面以色列充分掌握小國不似大國，小國通常只需發展適合於地區情況的戰略及軍事準則，因此，機動性與適應性相對提高。 戰略環境改變，因應潛在威脅方面。大多數阿拉伯國家已逐漸傾向接受以色列存在的事實。然而，潛在威脅並不因此而消除。陸軍為因應新情勢變化，主在加強指揮及作戰運用更具彈性，提升三軍聯合作戰能力及相應的軍事準則之革新。在因應恐怖攻擊方面，長期以來，對於阿拉伯人恐怖活動做出的反應都是使用軍事手段，非但未使巴勒斯坦人屈服，反而擴大恐怖攻擊規模，致以色列陸軍傷亡持續增加，反制恐怖主義投資也相對增加，更投入龐大經費構築安全隔離牆。面對與巴勒斯坦衝突持續發生「質」的改變同時，以色列陸軍所擔負對付恐怖攻擊活動的難度將會更高。 以色列陸軍未來仍將強調以實力為原則，始終保持對敵國的絕對優勢：保證「質」的優勢，藉以抵消阿拉伯國家「量」的優勢；保持對阿拉伯國家的嚇阻態勢，準備與阿拉伯國家進行全面戰爭。但是以色列對敵人的軍事嚇阻，卻也有限制：(一)嚇阻態勢是一種不得已的暫時解決當前問題的辦法。長期衝突的事實說明，如果雙方缺乏邁向政治妥協的行動，嚇阻終必失敗。(二)倚賴軍事力量對付侵略的嚇阻戰略，在敵人不顧一切、估計錯誤或以克勞塞維茲戰爭思維(除非軍事結果對政治的後果有極不利的影響，否則政治後果才是至關重要的，而不是立即的軍事結果)的方法下從事，嚇阻也終究會失敗。

本文的研究目的，企圖從地緣政治與克里姆林宮政治研究的角度，就俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則的形成因素作一研究與分析。 本論文發現俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則形成的主要動因有二： 一、地緣政治惡化是促使俄羅斯調整軍事準則的根本動因。 由於冷戰結束後全球戰略格局的變遷，俄羅斯在國際地位明顯下降，地緣政治環境日益惡化，傳統勢力範圍受到侵蝕，國力嚴重衰退，為續與美國保持低水準戰略平衡以及抗衡北約東擴，確保其國家利益和國際地位。另面對解決境內及獨立國協宗教、民族衝突所爆發局部戰爭及軍事衝突，在軍事上重新制定了俄羅斯聯邦軍事基本準則由單一注重外部威脅，轉為同時注重國內、外兩種威脅，重點由世界戰爭轉向地區性衝突。這說明了俄羅斯的新軍事準則在相當大程度上受到地緣戰略的影響。 二、俄羅斯軍方的態度及國內政治生態是促使軍事準則調整變化的另一因素。 隨著俄羅斯超級大國地位的喪失、地緣政治環境惡化、軍隊地位和待遇的不斷下降及士氣日益低落，軍隊對國家的安全和強烈不滿。強烈要求重樹大國地位、恢復軍隊實力。俄羅斯軍隊一些將領紛紛公開批評外交政策和軍事政策。同時，由於在1993年10月流血事件中，葉爾欽動用軍隊戰勝議會，增大了政府對軍隊的依賴，使俄羅斯軍隊在國家政治生活中的發言權和影響力日益增大。故葉爾欽在制定安全政策和軍事準則時不得不更多地考慮軍隊的利益和主張：如在制定新軍事準則中明確保障軍人及其家屬福利、增加軍費開支、放慢軍轉民步伐、以及在境外顯示軍事存在等方面，都採取了一系列迎合軍隊主張的措施和行動。而葉爾欽為贏得民心，鞏固地位，即開始了以恢復大國地位為中心的內外政策的大調整。在這種特定的政治氣氛中，新的俄羅斯軍事準則應運而生。可見，俄羅斯軍方的態度是促使俄羅斯軍隊準則調整與轉變的重要因素之一。 在此兩個主因中以俄羅斯國內政治生態互動，特別是葉爾欽與軍隊間關係影響最大，加上冷戰後美中俄戰略三角互動的架構的國際政治格局，在此條件下，形成了俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則。 / The purpose of the thesis is attempting to analyze the factors that exert great impact on the formation of the Russian Federation's military doctrine from the perspective of geopolitics and Kremlin politics. This thesis is taking the position that Russian Federation's military doctrine has been shaped by two main motives: First, the worsening geopolitical situation demands that Russia adjust its military doctrine. Due to the changes of global strategy after the end of the cold war, the decline of Russia's international prestige, worsening geopolitical situation and the severe threat to Russia's traditional sphere of interest, Russia takes important measures to adjust its military doctrine accordingly. In order to keep minimum strategic balance with the United States, ensure its national interest and international status and settle local wars or military conflicts caused by religion and ethnic conflicts within Russia's own territory and Commonwealth of Independent States, new military thinking has to emphasize both internal and external threats. Second, the attitude of Russian army and domestic political struggle also force Russia to adjust its military doctrine. Owing to the loss of superpower status and the decline of army's status and wellbeing, leading generals of the Russian army became increasingly dissatisfied with government's foreign policy and military thinking. They demanded that Russia restore her great power status and restrengthen its army's forces. In the blooding event of October 1993, Yeltsin used army to defeat the parliament, for this reason Yeltsin had to depend more on army. Russian army has became more influential in politics. Yeltsin had to consider army's interests and opinions in draw up security policy and military doctrine. For example, new military thinking clearly ensures welfare of soldiers and their family, increases military expense, slows down the speed of conversion and other measures to satisfy army. Besides, in order to gain people's support and consolidate political power, Yeltsin started to adopt policy to restore status of great power. Among these two dynamics, domestic political struggle－the relationship between Yeltsin and army－plays more influential role. Russian Federation's military doctrine was thus formulated under Kremlin politics and the interaction of strategic triangle.

1991年12月25日蘇聯正式解體，俄羅斯聯邦作為原蘇聯主要繼承國登上歷史舞台，冷戰的兩極格局也就此結束，俄羅斯為了要全面繼承過去蘇聯在國際間的地位，接管其部隊、武器及軍事設施，另為謀求俄羅斯整體經濟不致崩盤，大量釋出過盛的武器裝備及技術，如此給了中國擴充軍備、接收武器裝備的機會，也直接形成了中國武力崛起，衝擊著西太平洋的安全秩序及台海兩岸的安全。本文旨在就1991年冷戰結束暨蘇聯解體後，克里姆林宮兩任總統對中國的外交、軍事政策及作為，探討台海兩岸因軍事力量失衡所產生的衝擊。 另一方面，隨著冷戰結束、蘇聯解體，美、蘇對抗的終結，崛起的中國成為美國全球戰略的潛在競爭者，尤其是中國自1993年起，從俄羅斯獲得先進武器科技，也取得導彈、雷射、太空系統的先進材料和製造技術，點出中國急欲建構新世紀戰力的企圖心，也對台海兩岸的局勢增添更多的不穩定因素及不安全感。究竟對台海安全造成的衝擊有多大？本論文試圖探討中國在此期間軍事上的獲利及武力上的增長，對海峽兩岸的均勢是否產生變化，以及產生何種變化？本論文依據上述問題，設計相對應之章節，其各章節架構如下：第一章緒論。第二章俄中軍事交流的背景分析。第三章：冷戰後俄中軍事交流概況。第四章：俄中軍事交流對台海安全之衝擊。第五章：俄中軍事交流對台海安全之衝擊：我國因應對策。第六章：結論。 / Russia, the former Soviet Union major successor, stepped on world history stage after Soviet Union collapsed on Dec 25, 1991, which also drew an end for the cold war era. In order to inherit Soviet Union’s international position, to take over troop and weapon and military installations, and to manage to prevent its economy collapse. Russia had released its over produced weaponry and technology. The technology transformation and weaponry releasing led Mainland China a chance to expand its military strength and brought China’s military strength rising abruptly. The situation affects the security of the Western Pacific Ocean and Taiwan Strait. This study aims on the foreign and military policy of Kremlin toward China after the collapse of Soviet Union and the impact of ROC’s inclining military power between two sides of Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, with the end of cold war and the concluded confrontation between U.S and U.S.S.R, the rising China turned out to be the potential global strategic enemy to United States. Especially China, since1993, obtained the cutting edge military technology, the advanced material and manufacture technique for guiding missile, laser and space system from Russia. This transformation pointed out that China’s keen to build a new modern military in the 21 century. The situation also created the unstable factor and insecure feeling between cross strait and no one can predict what impact will it arouse? This study is to analysis on: Will the PRC’s military strength expansion varies the cross strait situation and what variation wills it happen? According to above theory the structure of this thesis is designed as follow: Chapter One: Introduction. Chapter Two: Analysis on Russia–Chain’s military exchange background. Chapter Three: The post cold war general situation of Russia–Chain’s military Exchange. Chapter four: The impact on Taiwan Strait security by Russia–Chain’s military exchange. Chapter Five: The proper way to deal with the impact of Russia–Chian’s military exchange Chapter six: Conclusion.

本論文旨試圖透過克里姆林宮政治暨嚇阻戰略研究途徑，剖析俄羅斯將獨立軍種「戰略火箭軍」裁併至空軍編制的原因。 本論文假設戰略火箭軍遭到裁併是基於下列兩項原因： 第一、俄羅斯武裝力量本身的態度與國內幾次重大政治鬥爭，導致俄羅斯必須修正軍事準則。 由於總統葉里欽在獨立初期，並沒有為俄羅斯的外交與國家安全政策領域構築一個法制化、有效率的決策系統，造成諸如國防部、外交部、總參謀部、聯邦安全會議、國防會議與國家軍事檢察署等相關機構，彼此間不斷爭奪軍事資源、議題詮釋權，政治鬥爭頻仍。另外，在某些政治危機中，例如1993年砲轟國會事件、第一次車臣戰爭以及1996年總統大選，葉里欽需要拉攏軍方支持以應付反對勢力，這就讓俄羅斯武裝力量有機會涉足克里姆林宮政治。結果是國家安全政策領域呈現各行其道、莫衷一是的混亂局面，並且有愈來愈多的政府官員對於在國家安全政策領域中攫取政治利益躍躍欲試。 其次，俄羅斯地緣政治環境的劇烈惡化導致龐大的反軍事改革勢力。 為了要在冷戰後與美國保持最低限度的戰略均勢狀態，好保障俄羅斯的國家利益及國際地位，並且順利解決因宗教或種族要素在俄羅斯或獨立國協境內所引發的區域戰爭或軍事衝突，有些官員諸如思科可夫、謝爾蓋耶夫等人主張俄羅斯應該繼續維持強大的戰略武力，特別是著名的戰略火箭軍。他們反對軍事改革以及裁減軍備。而由於當前國防預算困窘，葉里欽與普欽必須兩害相權取其輕，整肅拒絕裁軍的官員或是部隊。 在謝爾蓋耶夫與克瓦什寧激烈的政治鬥爭結束後，最後的贏家克瓦什寧終於如願以償，將戰略火箭軍予以裁併，由軍種單位降為兵種單位。不過俄羅斯的戰略武力仍然將在未來扮演極具影響力的角色。 / The purpose of the thesis is to attempt to analyze the factors that exert great impact on the reduction of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces(SMF) in status from a separate branch of service to a separate command from the perspective of Kremlin politics and Strategy of Deterrence. This thesis takes the position that the SMF has been reduced by two main motives: First, the attitude of the Russian army and domestic political struggle has forced the Russian government to adjust its military doctrine. Due to Yeltsin failing to set up a well-organized and efficient system for foreign and national security policy decision-making, so the struggle between the key ministries involved in foreign and security policy- the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the National Security Council, the Defense Council, the State Military Inspectorate- was hard. And in some political crises, such as the bloody event of Oct. 1993, the presidential election in 1996, and the crisis in Chechnya, Yeltsin needed army to defeat the counterforces. The Russian army has became more influential in politics. As a result, the decision-making process has been chaotic and confused, and various bureaucratic players have often been able to impose their their own special interests on the security policy agenda. Second, the worsening geopolitical situation has brought about considerable resistance to the military reform. In order to keep minimum strategic balance with the United States, ensure its national interest and international status and settle local wars or military conflicts caused by religion and ethnic conflicts within Russia’s own territory and Commonwealth of Independent States, some officials like Yuri Skokov and Igor Sergeyev advocated maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent force, especially the prominent role for the SMF. The president was likely to face considerable resistance to the reform. Owing to the current financial constraints on defense spending, Yeltsin and Putin carried out a purge of army officers who were against arms reduction. After the hard political struggle between Igor Sergeyev and Anatoliy Kvashnin, the winner- Kvashnin demanded the SMF must be reduced in status from a separate branch of service to a separate command. But the Russian strategic force will still play influential role in the near future.

本論文之研究目的是企圖從前蘇聯文武關係研究途徑與克里姆林宮政治研究途徑來探討蘇聯解體後俄羅斯軍方之政治參與範疇與背後之動機。 就軍方政治參與之範疇而言，蘇聯於1991年底解體後，俄羅斯軍方在政治舞台上扮演了重要的角色。首先，我們可以從軍方在1993年俄羅斯新軍事準則成型的過程中，其強硬主張佔了主導的地位。第二、軍方在「近鄰」與前南斯拉夫維和行動的政策即便與外交部意見相衝突仍獲得最後主導權。第三、軍方在1993年10月政爭中並未完全保持中立，而最後軍方是站在葉里欽總統一方結束了此一政治危機。第四、軍方試圖從俄羅斯獨立後歷屆國家杜馬選舉中，藉由其投票行為或是主動參與競選來表達其政治態度與影響有關軍事方面之政策。 本論文以為，蘇後俄羅斯軍方的政治參與背後動機之主要原因有二。其一是蘇聯解體以後俄羅斯軍方制度利益嚴重惡化：蘇聯解體以後，軍方在軍事改革上無法有效進展、軍事預算嚴重不足、軍中生活條件惡化以及國防工業轉產上面臨了嚴重的問題。這些皆使得軍方為了自救不得不試圖從政治層面來解決軍隊之問題。其二是受到克里姆林宮政治互動之影響：葉里欽為了鞏固政軍大權，運用高超的政治手腕以及「分而治之」的統御方式，引用軍方的力量來打擊政治對手，另一方面也運用政治危機分化軍隊之團結性，使其無法在政治上形成對統治者之威脅。 / The purpose of the thesis attempts to analyze the scope and motives of post-soviet Russian military’s political participation by using former Soviet civil-military relations approach and Kremlin politics approach. As far as the scope of military’s political participation is concerned, since the dissolution of USSR in 1991, the Russian military has been playing an important role in Russian politics. First of all, during the process of formulating Russian new military doctrine in 1993, Russian military’s hard-line position dominated this process and its opinion finally won out. Secondly, peacekeeping operation took by the Russian military in the “Near Abroad” and former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, usually conflicted the peaceful option hold by the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs, but the Russian military still took control of the final policy initiative. Thirdly, in October 1993, the Russian military didn’t remain neutral in the political struggle between president and Congress of People’s Deputies. It sided with president and therefore ended this severe political crisis. Fourthly, in each Duma election hold after Russia’s independence, the Russian military tried to express its political inclination and exerted its influence by voting, even actively took part in the election. This thesis is taking the position that the political participation of post-soviet Russian military is driven by two motives. First and foremost is the institutional interest of Russian military suffered great damage since the breakup of the USSR：military reform hasn’t made much progress; military budget received hasn’t sufficed the need of military; military faced the growing acute social problems within itself; the conversion of defense industry encountered difficulties. These problems made the Russian military try to preserve itself by political means. The second motive is affected by Kremlin political interaction：in order to strengthen his control over politics and military, Yeltsin used brilliant political art and managed the military by means of “divide and rule”. He used the military to attack his political opponent, on the other hand, he made use of each political crisis to split the military and therefore the military couldn’t constitute a political threat to the ruler of Russian polity.