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Shortly after the February 2014 Euromaidan revolution which ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia orchestrated a rapid and mostly bloodless annexation of the Crimea. Following the removal of Ukrainian authority from the peninsula, the Kremlin focused simultaneously on legitimizing the annexation via an electoral reform in Crimea and fermenting political unrest in the Donbas. As violence broke out in the Donbas, anti-Ukrainian government militias were formed by defecting Ukrainian security forces members, local volunteers, and volunteers from Russia. The Kremlin provided extensive support for these militias which sometimes even came in the form of direct military intervention by conventional Russian forces. However, the use of state-sponsored militias by Russia is not a new phenomenon. Since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation has been relying on militias to help stabilize local security environments, and more recently, achieve foreign security policy objectives in the Near Abroad. By tracking the history of Vostok (East) Battalion during its two distinctly different iterations, first as a militia for the Yamadayev family which operated primarily in Chechnya as well as briefly in South Ossetia and Lebanon and then as separatist formation in Eastern Ukraine, my thesis seeks to examine why Russia uses militias. Using the theoretical frameworks of principle-agent relations and organizational hierarchy, my thesis examines post-Soviet military reforms to contextualize the Kremlin's rationale for utilizing militia groups as well as analyzing the costs and benefits Moscow ultimately incurs when it leverages militias as force projection assets domestically and in the Near Abroad. / Master of Arts

Until 2008, almost two decades since the end of the cold war, Russia still retained old Soviet military structures. Steady opposition by the Russian generals against military modernization and reforms was finally broken in relation with the poor performance of Russian forces during the Russia-Georgian war in 2008. The process of modernization commenced in the following years has important security implications for post-Soviet countries. We could observe the new abilities of the Russian military during the seizure of the Crimean peninsula in 2014. Russian forces had been considered an ineffective institution with outdated military technology where corrupt practices were the rule rather than the exception. As we could see in 2008 Georgia Russian forces depended on numerical superiority and blunt military force. On the other hand during the Crimean events of 2014 the Russian military conducted the whole operation with high level of professionalism, without any bloodshed, and with modern weaponry. This research is based on the theory of neorealism which defines key parameters for performing a military modernization analysis. These include numbers, effectivity and strategy of military forces that help us to determine the current strength and power of each state. Therefore this research focuses on the...

This dissertation examines the practice of writing military history in conjunction with military theory. It shows that in the pursuit of establishing military theory, military history is often actively distorted and manipulated by military theorists. Those military theorists who, consciously or subconsciously, succumb to this practice are identified here as "theorist-historians". The effect of this manipulation, its implications and consequences for the field of study as a whole are examined, as is the didactic nature of military history in the light of historical accuracy. In conclusion the role and effect of the military theorist~historians are evaluated against those of purely academic historians. The unique didactic needs of military history are also highlighted. Two twentieth century British military theorists, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, were chosen as being representative of the military theorist-historian group. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

本論文之研究目的是企圖從前蘇聯文武關係研究途徑與克里姆林宮政治研究途徑來探討蘇聯解體後俄羅斯軍方之政治參與範疇與背後之動機。 就軍方政治參與之範疇而言，蘇聯於1991年底解體後，俄羅斯軍方在政治舞台上扮演了重要的角色。首先，我們可以從軍方在1993年俄羅斯新軍事準則成型的過程中，其強硬主張佔了主導的地位。第二、軍方在「近鄰」與前南斯拉夫維和行動的政策即便與外交部意見相衝突仍獲得最後主導權。第三、軍方在1993年10月政爭中並未完全保持中立，而最後軍方是站在葉里欽總統一方結束了此一政治危機。第四、軍方試圖從俄羅斯獨立後歷屆國家杜馬選舉中，藉由其投票行為或是主動參與競選來表達其政治態度與影響有關軍事方面之政策。 本論文以為，蘇後俄羅斯軍方的政治參與背後動機之主要原因有二。其一是蘇聯解體以後俄羅斯軍方制度利益嚴重惡化：蘇聯解體以後，軍方在軍事改革上無法有效進展、軍事預算嚴重不足、軍中生活條件惡化以及國防工業轉產上面臨了嚴重的問題。這些皆使得軍方為了自救不得不試圖從政治層面來解決軍隊之問題。其二是受到克里姆林宮政治互動之影響：葉里欽為了鞏固政軍大權，運用高超的政治手腕以及「分而治之」的統御方式，引用軍方的力量來打擊政治對手，另一方面也運用政治危機分化軍隊之團結性，使其無法在政治上形成對統治者之威脅。 / The purpose of the thesis attempts to analyze the scope and motives of post-soviet Russian military’s political participation by using former Soviet civil-military relations approach and Kremlin politics approach. As far as the scope of military’s political participation is concerned, since the dissolution of USSR in 1991, the Russian military has been playing an important role in Russian politics. First of all, during the process of formulating Russian new military doctrine in 1993, Russian military’s hard-line position dominated this process and its opinion finally won out. Secondly, peacekeeping operation took by the Russian military in the “Near Abroad” and former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, usually conflicted the peaceful option hold by the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs, but the Russian military still took control of the final policy initiative. Thirdly, in October 1993, the Russian military didn’t remain neutral in the political struggle between president and Congress of People’s Deputies. It sided with president and therefore ended this severe political crisis. Fourthly, in each Duma election hold after Russia’s independence, the Russian military tried to express its political inclination and exerted its influence by voting, even actively took part in the election. This thesis is taking the position that the political participation of post-soviet Russian military is driven by two motives. First and foremost is the institutional interest of Russian military suffered great damage since the breakup of the USSR：military reform hasn’t made much progress; military budget received hasn’t sufficed the need of military; military faced the growing acute social problems within itself; the conversion of defense industry encountered difficulties. These problems made the Russian military try to preserve itself by political means. The second motive is affected by Kremlin political interaction：in order to strengthen his control over politics and military, Yeltsin used brilliant political art and managed the military by means of “divide and rule”. He used the military to attack his political opponent, on the other hand, he made use of each political crisis to split the military and therefore the military couldn’t constitute a political threat to the ruler of Russian polity.

This dissertation examines the practice of writing military history in conjunction with military theory. It shows that in the pursuit of establishing military theory, military history is often actively distorted and manipulated by military theorists. Those military theorists who, consciously or subconsciously, succumb to this practice are identified here as "theorist-historians". The effect of this manipulation, its implications and consequences for the field of study as a whole are examined, as is the didactic nature of military history in the light of historical accuracy. In conclusion the role and effect of the military theorist~historians are evaluated against those of purely academic historians. The unique didactic needs of military history are also highlighted. Two twentieth century British military theorists, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, were chosen as being representative of the military theorist-historian group. / Political Science / M.A. (International Politics)

中共認為體制編制變革，既是武裝力量管理方法及作戰力量體系編組思路的體現，也是提升軍隊戰鬥力，引導軍隊現代化發展的重要措施，特別是習近平在中共十八大會後，藉反貪名義積極進行整風運動，改革已確定是習近平政權的重要施政目標，2015年9月，習近平於閱兵時公開宣布將裁軍30萬，更讓外界增添許多想像空間，在2016年裡逐步落實四總部的重整，軍委機關改制，二砲部隊改為火箭軍，及新成立戰略支援部隊，撤銷七大軍區，改設立五大戰區，完成推動領導指揮體制、優化結構規模力量編成與強化軍事訓練等，勢必對解放軍的體制與發展造成相當的影響。 中共歷任領導人都將掌握軍權視為權力穩固的基礎，上任之後安排信任者或同一派系擔任重要領導角色。本研究嘗試從中共中央軍委直轄體系與軍隊的變化，探討戰區改革現況，及軍事法治改革之意圖與目標，並從中分析改革對軍文職關係之影響。 / PLA thought that the change of armed forced‘structure and organization’is a good way to show the management and combat force system as well as the measure for power enhancement and leading the development of modernization, especially after the 1th CPC National Congress,‘reformation’has been determined to be an important policy objective of regime of Xi Jinping. Particularly in September of 2015, Xi Jinping announced at the parade that they will disarm 300,000 people, and leave a lot of imagination to outside world. And in 2016, it was gradually implemented in reforming of the four general departments, restructured the Central Military Commission, and reorganized the Second Artillery to the Rocket Forces and the new established strategic support units. The announcement of cancelling seven military regions to establish five war regions at same level. Already completed the leadership system change, forces and structure reform and improve the combat training , which is bound to cause a considerable impact. Xi’s predecessors regarded securing military power as a basis for a stable authority. Therefore, they usually assigned major positions to people they trusted or from the same factions. This study attempts to discuss the change of the PLA Central Military Commission to the variation of the governance system to military, as well as practices of joint operations while seven MR integrate into war regions. And the intentions and objectives of military rule of law reform. And analyzes the influence of reform on military relations.

This dissertation studies military’s withdrawal from politics. It examines military reform in Indonesia which aiming at withdrawing the Indonesian armed forces, currently known as Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI, from politics following the fall of Suharto in 1998. It seeks to explain the driving force of the progress of military reform in Indonesia and asks the question of: why has the reform been progressing differently from one agenda to another? It focuses on three agendas of reform, which are: the establishment of normative democratic control over TNI, the disbandment of TNI’s business activities, and the reorganization of TNI’s territorial command structure. It argues that variation in the progress of reform in those three agendas is closely related to military interests. The relatively successful establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces has been mostly driven by the primacy of national interests within the brass, while the struggling disbandment of military’s business activities is rooted at factional/personal interests within TNI, and the complete failure in the abandonment of territorial command structure is related to strong organizational interests of TNI. This dissertation adopts a within-case comparison to answer the puzzle and focusing on Indonesia which represents the transplacement model of democratization in the third wave of democratization. Since transplacement involves coalition between reformers within the old and the new elites, it allows a process of negotiation in the transition. Hence, it creates a variation of the progress of the reform. Since this dissertation focuses on a single case studies, with three sub-cases, this dissertation is lacking of the power to generalization. However, it allows an in-depth analysis of the case using a process-tracing method. To conduct a proper process-tracing, this dissertation engages in various types of sources such as official documents, meetings’ notes, transcripts of in-depth interviews, personal communications, reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and secondary sources from newspapers’ reports. This dissertation concludes that the progress of the reform, in the case of Indonesia, varies according to the interests of the armed forces, and interaction between those interests and other variables such as the interests of civilian groups. It suggests that the organizational interests of the armed forces are the most influential variable to define the progress. Strong organizational interests would lead to a stall in the reform. The case of territorial command structure as well as, to a lesser degree, the second phase of the normative democratic control over the armed forces suggests this claim. In the absence of organizational interests, the existence of strong factional/personal interests would lead to problems in the advancement of the reform. The case of disbandment of military informal business activities supports this claim. Finally, the progress of the reform would be relatively smooth in the absence of those two interests and in the guidance of national interests.

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