1972年9月21日深夜，菲律賓總統馬可仕(Ferdinand E. Marcos)在衡量菲國的政經情勢後，斷然宣布《戒嚴法》(Martial Law)，藉以挽救當時已深受左、右派政治團體及回教叛軍、新人民軍夾攻，社會經濟秩序已瀕臨瓦解邊緣的菲律賓。《戒嚴法》的頒佈，對菲律賓社會政治各方面都帶來了極大的影響，凱斯勒(Richard J. Kessler)就認為在馬可仕施行戒嚴法下其中一個不幸的影響，便是扭曲了菲律賓社會中對軍人角色的認知。其實從菲國武裝部隊(Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP)創立開始，深受美國專業訓練的影響，不介入政治便是其軍事專業概念的基石，而文人至上的原則(the principal of civilian supremacy)更是AFP非政治(anti-politics)的方針之一。不過在馬可仕刻意的部署之下，大多數的菲國軍官都走進了政治圈中，部分政治化已久的軍官，也漸沾染到文人的習氣，貪污、奢侈之風常有所聞，這也促使日後「軍中改革運動」(Reform of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement, RAM)的出現。一九八六年大選後，菲律賓情勢風雲變色，曾經獨霸一時的威權強人-馬可仕，在軍方倒戈與人民的力量顯現下踉蹌下台。靠軍方倒戈而上台的柯拉蓉總統(Corazon Cojuangco Aquino)，雖然帶著菲律賓人民重回民主，但民主化後的菲律賓卻仍處在一個風雨飄搖的局勢中。其中軍人政變與文武關係互動的問題，亦成為菲律賓後馬可仕時期政治的主要特徵。因此，本文即欲了解重回民主體制後的菲律賓，軍方為何會一再發動軍事政變挑戰政府權威？與此相關的子命題則為：這是否和軍方過去所扮演的角色有關？菲國軍隊何以會介入政治中？這些政變的發生有何特性與背後意義？以及又是什麼樣的原因，阻礙軍方策動成功政變的可能？

本文擬探討塔信政權與泰國政治變遷的關係，從兩方面來分析泰國政黨政治體系的改變，一是從制度面討論1997年憲法的選舉制度對泰國政黨政治的衝擊與影響。二是從憲法的實踐和非制度化因素，分析塔信政權之興起與終結，來觀察泰國政治變遷的過程與意義。塔信政權是在1997年憲法下所運作的產物，最後卻被長達15年不見的軍事政變所終結。本文深入剖析塔信政權執政過程，探討為何會發生軍事政變的原因，以及分析這(場政變)對泰國民主產生什麼樣的意義與影響。 / This study examines the relationship between Thaksin's regime and political change in Thailand. It analyzes the change of the Thai party system from two respects. First, it discusses the impact which the new electoral system of the 1997constitution had on the Thai party politics. Second, it analyzes the rise and the fall of Thaksin’s regime from the constitution practice and the non-institutional factors in order to observe the process and the implication of political change in Thailand. Thaksin’s regime is the result of 1997 constitution. However, it was ended by a military coup which had not happened for 15 years. We discuss deeply the history of Thaksin’s regime, why the military coup took place to close this regime, and the influence of this military coup on Thai democracy.

This dissertation studies military’s withdrawal from politics. It examines military reform in Indonesia which aiming at withdrawing the Indonesian armed forces, currently known as Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI, from politics following the fall of Suharto in 1998. It seeks to explain the driving force of the progress of military reform in Indonesia and asks the question of: why has the reform been progressing differently from one agenda to another? It focuses on three agendas of reform, which are: the establishment of normative democratic control over TNI, the disbandment of TNI’s business activities, and the reorganization of TNI’s territorial command structure. It argues that variation in the progress of reform in those three agendas is closely related to military interests. The relatively successful establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces has been mostly driven by the primacy of national interests within the brass, while the struggling disbandment of military’s business activities is rooted at factional/personal interests within TNI, and the complete failure in the abandonment of territorial command structure is related to strong organizational interests of TNI. This dissertation adopts a within-case comparison to answer the puzzle and focusing on Indonesia which represents the transplacement model of democratization in the third wave of democratization. Since transplacement involves coalition between reformers within the old and the new elites, it allows a process of negotiation in the transition. Hence, it creates a variation of the progress of the reform. Since this dissertation focuses on a single case studies, with three sub-cases, this dissertation is lacking of the power to generalization. However, it allows an in-depth analysis of the case using a process-tracing method. To conduct a proper process-tracing, this dissertation engages in various types of sources such as official documents, meetings’ notes, transcripts of in-depth interviews, personal communications, reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and secondary sources from newspapers’ reports. This dissertation concludes that the progress of the reform, in the case of Indonesia, varies according to the interests of the armed forces, and interaction between those interests and other variables such as the interests of civilian groups. It suggests that the organizational interests of the armed forces are the most influential variable to define the progress. Strong organizational interests would lead to a stall in the reform. The case of territorial command structure as well as, to a lesser degree, the second phase of the normative democratic control over the armed forces suggests this claim. In the absence of organizational interests, the existence of strong factional/personal interests would lead to problems in the advancement of the reform. The case of disbandment of military informal business activities supports this claim. Finally, the progress of the reform would be relatively smooth in the absence of those two interests and in the guidance of national interests.