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Iranian Military Modernisation, 1921-1979: assessing the interrelationships between internal politics, the nature of the internal and external security environment and the processes of military modernisation and expansion Gholamali Chegnizadeh The objective of this thesis is to investigate the factors that positively and/or negatively affected the process of military modernisation and expansion in Iran during 1921-79. In doing so, the thesis will embark on a thorough historical study of the Iranian armed forces. This involves an examination of the link between the changes which took place in the size, mission and armament of the armed forces and the characteristics of Iranian society and polity on the one hand, and the nature of the external and internal security environment on the other. One important theme in this study is the radical break which took place in the process of military modernisation and expansion in the period after 1963. Prior to this era, the process of military modernisation was mainly influenced by the Shah's weak internal position, by the internal struggle for power, internal uncertainty and instability, and by the objection of the United States (as the main provider of financial and hardware resources) to any major change in the size and/or armament of the military forces. Therefore, during this period Iran possessed a modest and not even efficient military establishment preoccupied mainly with internal sources of insecurity. However, several internal, regional and international developments in the post -1965 period changed the entire strategic context within which the army sought to operate. These changes alongside an increase in oil revenues, on the one hand, paved the way for the formation of a highly personalised form of internal politics; and on the other it created an opportunity for Iran to gain predominance in the politics of the region. The study shows that it was these two factors - the formation of a highly personalised, highly centralised form of internal politics and the changing regional strategic environment - which greatly shaped the understanding and definition of security threats and the process of military modernisation and expansion in the latter half of the 1960' s. The main characteristic of the established political system after the mid-1960s was the centrality of the Shah in the decision-making process. This, in conjunction with the Shah's personal interest in military and strategic affairs, hindered the formation of any meaningful bureaucratic organisation and frustrated the emergence of any independent power base in the armed forces. This consequently led to a one-man system of control. As a result, the Shah's personal characteristics and psychological make-up became the sole determining factor in issues such as the definition of security threats and the structure, organisation, armament and mission of the military forces. The armed forces, accordingly, became identified with the Shah's personal apprehension and aspirations and organisationally became totally dependent on him for its reproduction. A second important theme is that the army, in the midst of its wholesale reorganisation, was faced with a major civil upheaval in 1978179. This study shows that the army was neither trained or equipped, or morally or organisationally capable of dealing with the emerging political crisis. With the Shah's mental and physical health in dramatic decline, and with the economic recession intensifying, the above factors combined resulting in a total collapse of the Shah's regime and paralysation of the armed forces. This characterised the end of hali a century of efforts towards military modernisation in Iran.

This dissertation is a strategic and operational history of the Royal Navy's Home Fleet in the Second World War. Its primary focus is on the mission of the Home Fleet under Allied strategy: to protect the UK; to prevent the deployment of German Navy surface ships into the Atlantic; to enforce a blockade of Germany; after 1941, to fight through the convoys to north Russian ports. These themes are explicated against the backdrop of a shifting set of strategic priorities and the needs of other theatres. They are placed in the context of the ships available, the building program of the 1930s, and the Anns Control diplomacy that dictated the shape of both. Significant attention is given to the actions of the Home Fleet's four Commanders-in-Chief: Sir Charles Forbes, Sir John Tovey, Lord Fraser of North Cape, and Sir Henry Moore. Their interaction with the top political and military leadership in Britain, most crucially with Winston Churchill and Dudley Pound, is discussed, and their individual tenures in command evaluated. Certain minor commanders are also discussed and their performance critiqued. The dissertation highlights such tactical operations as the First and Second Battles of Narvik, the loss of the carrier Glorious, the Bismarck chase, and the battles of the Barents Sea and North Cape. Attention is given to the Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union, and their place in the overall Allied war effort. The above is based on a thorough review of Admiralty records and other primary sources plus readings in the secondary literature.