The Ph.D. thesis chronicles the establishment and history of the Defense Intelligence Agency under its first director, Lt. General Joseph Carroll, from 1961-1969. Based on published works, archival materials, declassified documents, and interviews with cognoscenti, the thesis explores the creation of the agency in the context of the historical propensity to consolidate common military functions under the auspices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Although the intelligence function of the military departments resisted this trend for over two decades after the Second World War, by 1960 the perceived failures of military espionage made the consolidation of this function ineluctable. Impelled by the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, in 1961 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara concluded that the creation of a potent military intelligence agency was necessary to meliorate the strategic estimate process - which he believed to be flawed and ineffectual - through the centralisation of military espionage activities. The military leadership was averse to this design, alternately favouring the establishment of a weak co-ordinating body as a means to preserve the autonomy of existing military structures. After fervent debate, the DIA was eventually created as a compromise between both factions. The thesis argues that the history of the agency, its successes and failures, largely has been the result of the dialectic between both visions of the agency. Caught between the dissimilar, often competing, requirements and expectations of its two masters - the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff - the agency strove to forge its identity, establish and preserve its autonomy, and secure the resources necessary to fulfil its responsibilities.

This study investigates and proves the continuity between Tsarist, Soviet, and current Russian military thought which is predicated on the twin conceptual pillars of <I>voennyi nauk</I> (military science) and <I>buduschchaia voina</I> (future war); identifies the integral military-civilian commission consensus/decision process; defines the context for Aleksandr Svechin's 1920s works; and contributes original General Staff source materials. The continuity of process for developing Russian military doctrine is documented in three parts: 1) The <I>Imperial Russian Army Reforms 1856 to 1914</I> are linked with the issues of forming and training a standing "professional" conscript army that first became significant in the mid-19<SUP>th</SUP> century. The Ridiger and Miliutin Reforms advanced the process of creating a modern Russian military establishment in the wake of humiliating Russian defeats in the Crimean War (1853-56) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) 2) Lessons from the <I>The 1921-1923 Interregnum, and the 1924-1930 Frunze</I> <I>Reforms</I> are pertinent due to the striking economic and geo-political similarities between this time period and the present Russian situation. For a decade up to 1930 within the Red Army there transpired an open debate - the first and only such open debate for nearly 60 years - about the nature of <I>Budushchaia voina</I>. 3) <I>Findings: Past, Present, Future</I> investigates the nature of the current Russian <I>Budushchaia voina</I> concept which must reflect the vastly altered political-military, geo-strategic, social, economic, and technological situation in which Russia finds itself in the aftermath of the December 1991 disbanding of the Soviet Union; and then project into the 21<SUP>st</SUP> Century the type of threats, the most likely nature of warfare, and hence the deployed military force structure required to defend Russia.

The thesis is a case study of British home front propaganda in the period 1939-45, with particular reference to film propaganda; newsreels, official films, and feature films. It examines propaganda about German bombing raids against Britain during the Blitz and about RAF bombing raids against Germany in the Bomber Offensive. Chapter One sets out the aims and objectives of the thesis and gives some details about the primary sources used. Chapter Two deals briefly with pre-war planning for a propaganda Ministry and the basic structure of the wartime Ministry of Information (MOI). It also discusses in detail the way in which the MOI planned to shape propaganda about the Blitz in the period before the Blitz began. Chapter Three gives a detailed examination of propaganda about the Blitz during the period when it was taking place, and the way in which the RAF's raids against Germany were dealt with in this early phase of the war. The main emphasis is on film propaganda but some comparative data is given covering press and radio presentations. Chapter Four examines the period May 1941 to May 1942 and looks at the way in which propaganda policies for presenting the Blitz and Bomber Offensive were restructured to take account of changing circumstances: the need for increased aircraft production to support Britain's war effort; and the Alliance with the Soviet Union and America. Chapter Five deals with propaganda output about the Blitz and Bomber Offensive for the period covered by Chapter Four. Chapter Six discusses the development of Britain's bombing policy against Germany during the period 1940 to 1945. This chapter sets the context for a detailed study of propaganda about the latter stages of the Bomber Offensive.

During the course of the Second World War the small, traditionally conservative pre-war Regular Army absorbed some three million new recruits, the vast majority of them conscripts. The objective of the thesis is to assess the impact of this process on the Army as a social institution. In order to achieve this, six areas of the Army's social organization have been examined; other rank selection, officer selection, promotion, officer-man relations, welfare and education. The results of research show that the Army did change in relation to its new intake. It became an institution seemingly more careful of human values, more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the ordinary soldier, and more democratic in spirit. Yet traditionalist elements in the Army remained unconvinced of the new methods and techniques, and tempered their application in a number of the areas investigated. Change there was, but not perhaps as deep-seated as some might have hoped.

This thesis focuses on one battalion of infantrymen who trained for, and served during,the D-Day landings and north-west Europe campaign. Battalion histories in this detail are rare, as they usually form part of self-serving and uncritical histories produced by the parent regiment. This small unit acts as a microcosm of the' infantry of the line during the period, reflecting the typical high casualty rates and long periods on the front line. The existing sparse evidence about the 2nd Battalion was enhanced by interviews with veterans of the unit, which proved central to the study. Their memories revealed a wealth ofrich and previously unknown detail. Existing secondary literature is critical of the battalion's, and 3rd Division's, efforts on D-Day and the units of the 3rd Division were dubbed 'The Unspectaculars' in the press. These criticisms are challenged in the first three chapters of the thesis, which examine the level of training the infantrymen received; the battalion's performance on D-Day; and the progress ofthe battalion from D-Day onwards. The performance of the battalion is argued to have been solid yet unspectacular for much of the campaign. However in February 1945 came its spectacular moment, at the Battle of the Bridge. Chapters Four and Five address what life was like for the infantrymen of the battalion and assess what happened to these soldiers when they returned home, since for many, the war did not end when Germany surrendered. The thesis provides a social and cultural history of the 2nd Battalion, albeit within the military sphere. While individual memories remain an important source, the narrative of the battalion also' forms a group memory, particularly focusing on one outstanding officer, Major 'Banger' King. A group record is also apparent during commemorative events, in particular the 60th anniversary of D-Day, in June 2004.

The purpose of this thesis is an examination of the military career of Alexander the Great. The intention is to reconstruct and examine every campaign of Alexander's brief reign, and to determine what the tactics and strategies were that allowed his unparalleled success; further to determine if there was a development in tactical or strategic thought during his life. Chapter 1 considers Alexander's first campaign in the Balkans and northern Greece. Chapter2 discussesth e Battle of the GranicusR iver, and attemptsa n entirely new theory. Chapter 3 is a discussion of the sieges of Miletus and Halicarnassus. Chapter 4 contains an examination of the campaign of Issus. Chapter 5 concentrates on the sieges of Tyre and Gaza. Chapter 6 discusses the battle of Gaugamela. Chapter 7 concentrates on the campaign on the north-east frontier: Bactria and Sogdiana. Chapter 8 focuses on the campaign in India, culminating in the battle of the Hydaspes River. Chapter 9 is an examination of the journey back to Babylon: the final campaign. Chapter 10 is the conclusion which draws together the arguments which run through the thesis. The copyright of this thesis rest with the author: no quotation from it should be published without his prior consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. I allow consultation by bona fide scholars without delay. The material in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree in this or any other university. This thesis consists of approximately 99,700 words, and thus conforms to the word limit set out in the Durham University degree regulations.

Due to the nature of trench warfare and the unprecedented human cost, issues of command and control in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) during the First World War have been the subject of controversy and debate ever since the war ended. Although the historiography has developed considerably in recent years, the role and impact of communications has failed to attract serious scholarly attention. What little has been written on the subject has been limited in terms of its focus, methodology and use of sources. This thesis will attempt to fill this gap in British military history by examining the organisational, doctrinal and technological components that constituted the BEF's communications system. Based on sustained archival research within the United Kingdom and the United States, it utilises both a thematic and case study approach in order to trace the development of the BEF's communications system and assess its impact upon British military operations on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918. In the context of recent research on the 'learning curve' and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), this thesis aims to shed new light on a neglected, albeit crucial, component of the BEF's machinery for command and control, thus contributing to a greater understanding of the conduct of British military operations during the First World War.

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A dissertation concerning the secret British-American intelligence hub that developed in Algiers during the Second World War, and its subsidiary clandestine networks in Italy, southern France and Spain. From 1941, when the first US intelligence agents arrived in the area, until late 1944, when the Anglo-American covert contingent largely departed to follow the Allied armies on their advance into the Axis heartland, the city served as a regional headquarters in the secret war against fascism. Utilising a comparative approach, this dissertation analyzes the three main geographical areas covered by the Algiers-based secret networks. New archival research and oral testimony is used to illuminate important topics in the field: particularly the history of wartime intelligence in Italy. The discrepancy between the disappointing Anglo-American clandestine campaign in Italy, and the more successful experience in France, is probed. Drawing on these investigations, and ongoing trends in the historiography of intelligence, it comes to the following conclusions on the nature of the secret war. First, the universal application of special operations, regardless of political or military conditions in the target country was ill-judged. Second, the British and American intelligence agencies were engaged in a constant struggle for authority and leadership. A cooperative approach was usually favoured by the stronger power; the weaker party viewed ‘cooperation’ as a euphemism for subordination. Finally, Allied policymakers sometimes ignored or misinterpreted intelligence that did not fit their political priorities.