The operational history of Britain's airborne forces during the Second World War ranges from small-scale raids in 1941 through to full divisional deployments in 1944 and 1945. British airborne warfare during the war appears to be characterised by a lack of consistency or apparently observable trends in the military effectiveness. The execution and results of most British airborne operations are extensively recorded within the extant historiography. However, there has been no attempt to examine the process of airborne capability development as a method of identifying the relevant factors that influenced military effectiveness. The inception and growth of any new military capability requires progress and coordination across a number of parallel and inter-linked 'lines of development'. Each line has the potential to create factors that impinge on the progress of other areas of development and ultimately can have effect on the size, shape, and function of the overall capability. Some lines of development have a purely physical effect on the process such as the procurement and supply of equipment and the recruitment and training of manpower. The effect of others is less tangible such as the influence exercised by an individual commander and the control exerted by his staff. While not strictly a line of development the entire process of bringing military capability into service is, at least in part, a function of government policy and therefore the political environment is a significant developmental factor. The process of development is translated into observable military effectiveness by the concepts and doctrine that govern and guide the capability during operations, which is the final line of development examined. This approach to research, using sources previously unexamined in this context, has resulted in the exposure of primary and secondary factors that had either direct or indirect influence on the manner in which Britain's airborne forces fought and the resultant military effect of their employment during the Second World War. New historical insights into the performance of British airborne forces have arisen through this approach to study including the conceptual progression from small-scale raids to divisional operations and the development of tactical doctrine from the Mediterranean in 1943 through northwest Europe in 1944 and 1945.

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The Great War of 1914-1918 continues to attract scholarly attention, not least in the field of neuropsychiatric medicine. The term 'shell shock' is firmly cemented into the language, such that it represents for many the entire", neuropsychiatrical experience of the war. This thesis challenges that view, seeking to establish a new point of departure for the study of Great War neuropsychiatrical medicine. Based on a major study of previously unresearched medical case histories, a much less central role is assigned to shell shock and 'war neuroses' generally. Novel aspects such as the effects of mental disorder on the smallest military social unit - what is called here the 'comradely group' - are explored. By maintaining throughout a clear distinction between functional nervous disorders and the ubiquitous exhaustion syndrome of 'neurasthenia'.. a radically altered view of their relative importance emerges. At the same time, much of the confusion and conflation of previous studies is avoided. The British Army's approach to these problems depended crucially on the availability of appropriately skilled medical practitioners. This thesis maintains that the historical hiatus between the public asylum medical service and the medical profession as a whole constituted an influential and previously unrecognised factor in the evolution of these policies and practices. As war approached, the growing influence of Freudian psychology raised questions as to where the legitimate authority on mental health matters should lie. When circumstances forced the Government to seek help from the asylums in coping with the rising tide of casualties of all kinds, the weight of advantage in this controversy swung decisively in favour of the asylum doctors. This, it is suggested, constituted a major factor in the developmental pattern of, mental health services in post-war Britain, a factor which has up to now been largely overlooked.

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Military historians have frequently noted the 'regimental system' as a central theme and defining feature of the British army, and the Scottish Highland regiments are often particularly noted for their distinctiveness even within the British army. The Highland regiments have featured prominently in a disproportionate number of regimental histories, and seem to have taken on a life of their own in their own minds as well as in the mind of the public. Despite this, issues surrounding the manner in which these regiments developed their individual identities and the interaction between individual self-concepts, military requirements and values, and civilian perceptions remains largely unasked. The original research on which this thesis rests includes detailed examinations of records from a wide variety of sources. Records of service for 1,331 soldiers serving in the British army on 1 July 1881 were examined to develop an understanding of their military experiences. In addition, regimental and military archives were examined for primary documents, poetry, works of art, and silver to examine how regimental characteristics may have been communicated. From this evidence, it becomes clear that theoretical frameworks that have been developed and applied to organisational identity, primarily private sector, can provide a framework to understand issues of group identity in a military context. This thesis finds that there are extensive interconnections between individuals, regiments, and the broader society. The unique set of experiences within each regiment creates its distinctive identity which is then imprinted on members. External sources provide the general context and situation for their shared experiences but internal resources within the regiments interpret the experiences into a blueprint for identity and can, in turn, influence the external sources' own understandings and perspectives.

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The end of the Cold War created an opportunity to examine, through interviews with former Soviet officials, the perceptions, motives and decision-making dynamics that lay behind Soviet Cold-War strategy and behaviour. At the same time, the U.S. declassified key Cold-War-era U.S. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) on Soviet strategic forces, and high-level U.S. national security officials from that period shared in interviews with the author their perceptions of Soviet strategic intentions and the rationale behind U.S. counter strategies. Such post-Cold-War information from U.S. sources has helped to refine understanding of American Cold-War assessments of Soviet intentions and to permit comparison of the latter with results from the Soviet interviews. This research has revealed instances both of great insight and of serious mutual misunderstanding on the part U.S. and Soviet political leaders and military strategists; as well as areas, such as Soviet force sizing, where the quality of understanding essentially did not matter because the primary determinants were internal and systemic, not international. Areas where the author's findings may be most unexpected for Western scholars include: the Soviet's deeply held, very simple concept of deterrence; the duality of Soviet thinking on nuclear first-use characterized by a purely military preference for first-strike accompanied by profound pessimism that same could be achieved, which led, in turn, to extensive preparations for launch-on-tactical -warning and pure retaliation; and the relatively subordinate position of the Soviet General Staff vis-a-vis the military industrialists, and even the armed services, in actually determining the nature, and especially quantity, of weapons produced to support Soviet military strategy.