This thesis explores the production of collective memory(s) connected to the World War II activities of the American military in Europe by focusing on two regions - East Anglia (England) and Normandy (France), and by assessing the work of three sets of commemorative agents - American veterans, English and French communities, and an agency of the American government. It examines the practices of commemoration within which collective memories are produced by historical investigation of several 'sites of memory' including: memorials, ceremonies, re-enactments, and veterans' pilgrimages. This thesis demonstrates that whilst the production of collective memory(s) is always framed by the concerns of the present, three factors can frequently be identified as prompts to, or influences upon, commemorative activity connected to the American military in Europe. These issues are psychological, political and commercial. The first refers to the fact that war is often a traumatic experience, particularly for those who do the fighting. Thus, commemorative activities have frequently involved those seeking to make sense of these experiences. In this instance, these activities have involved Americans and Europeans, and the result has been the production of cross-cultural commemorative forms. Discourses of transatlantic politics have also been drawn into commemoration because these were years of Cold War. As such, this thesis shows that the production of collective memory(s) has always scripted the past according to the politics of the present. Finally, this thesis considers the commercial dynamics to commemorative activity, and in doing so it argues that commercial memory media do not represent the trivialising of memory, or the profaning of the sacred. Rather, commercial commemoration is simply another form of memory production. This thesis concludes by considering the implications for the production of collective memory(s) when those 'who were there' depart the stage.

Intelligence was declared by Clausewitz to be a source of uncertainty on the battlefield, and he advised commanders to rely on their intuition instead. It is a paradox of the Second World War that when, as never before, an abundance of intelligence was available to Allied commanders, Clausewitz's dictums still influenced some of their operational decisions. This thesis explores this duality, and how it influenced the relationship between intelligence and command at the operational level of war during the conflict. It does so through the medium of the British Army, in particular Eighth Army's operational performance - under Bernard Montgomery, Oliver Leese and Richard McCreery - at defining moments of the Italian campaign. The thesis demonstrates the ambiguity present within the British Army's doctrinal attitude towards intelligence at the operational level, which was reflected in the . tardiness with which intelligence was incorporated into the army's operational machinery during the first half of the war. That this was eventually achieved was illustrated by the general efficacy of Eighth Army's intelligence organisation in Italy, and the viability of its intelligence product. Nevertheless, the peculiarities of the Italian theatre reduced the productiveness of the chief sources of intelligence, and created occasional, but critical, gaps in the intelligence picture. This only partially explains, however, why Eighth Army's operational performance in Italy was punctuated by intelligence failure. Under Montgomery and Leese, intelligence was merely an ancillary, and often sidelined, tenet of their operational technique, and it was only under McCreery that Eighth Army practised intelligence-led warfare. These findings seriously question the historiographical belief that, by the second half of the war, the British Army had fully and unconditionally incorporated intelligence into its operational considerations, and that commanders were willing to act upon it and fashion their operational methods according to its dictates.

This thesis investigates the emergence of the field of humanitarian intervention in war. From negative connotations of 'excessive sentimentalism' in the late eighteenth / early nineteenth centuries, this thesis charts the rise of more positive notions of rational and humane gift giving in the 1870-1918 period. To investigate this shift, it focuses on the strategies of representation relief workers used to signify their benevolent, but strictly calculated, intentions. Inspired by Bourdieu's 'correspondence analysis', it also maps the affiliations between rival relief organisations and wider journalistic, academic and political networks. In particular, it traces the transformation of initially ad hoc and independent relief practices into increasingly institutionalised, quasi-official humanitarian agencies. These are assessed in correspondence with the rise of an initially dissenting, but latterly more mainstream, politics of sentiment. In doing so, it considers the multi-faceted relationship between humanitarianism and the state in this period and the changing concept of 'moral' citizenship in the context of an expanding electorate and unprecedented transformations in the nature of warfare. This concept of citizenship apparently offered a form of belonging to those on the margins of political participation free from clientage; however, the emerging definition of 'moral' citizenship was far from inclusive. The boundaries to this politics of sentiment form a key theme of this thesis. This thesis is organised into two parts. The first traces the development of the field of humanitarian intervention in foreign wars of the late nineteenth century, and the alternative relief practices adopted by Quaker, liberal interventionist and quasi-military agencies. The following part examines how Britain's experience of modem war in the early twentieth century brought to the fore inherent dilemmas within these alternative philosophies of humanitarian intervention. It shows how, during times when the links between the state and ostensibly impartial relief agencies assumed an official status, illusionary strategies were deployed to obscure this relationship. These included a stress on the 'spontaneity' of humanitarian outcry, the feminisation of fund raising images and the maintenance of a 'screen' of voluntarism. In order to counter the emphasis on institutional history in the historiography of humanitarianism, this thesis considers the archives of relief organisations in conjunction with the personal accounts and novels of relief workers and sources covering their wider journalistic, political and academic networks

No description available.

This study examines the educational use made by military forces around the world, but primarily those of the United Kingdom, of visits to past battlefields. Investigation suggests this practice commenced formally in Prussia and may be nearing its 200th anniversary; certainly the British Army’s Staff College at Camberley has been visiting battlefields for educational purposes since at least 1885. To date, no extended academic study of this practice has been undertaken, and no specific use of the Staff College Battlefield Tour Archive has been made in this context. An examination is made of educational theory, by which the effectiveness and value of battlefield visiting can be measured. This study creates a typology of battlefield visiting, and thus acknowledges a much older civilian tradition of making pilgrimages to past scenes of conflict (initially to pray for the souls of the dead), which later evolved into civilian battlefield tourism to destinations such as Waterloo and Gettysburg. The work examines the nature of British battlefield visiting, using the Staff College Battlefield Tour Archive, in four phases: before the First World War; during the inter-war period; during the post-Second World War and Cold War periods, and at the time of writing. Throughout the study, parallels are drawn with military battlefield visits undertaken by the American and German armed forces. The conclusion is made that battlefield visiting is a unique and valuable tool in military education that is not well managed, and that no recognition is given to its value in terms of classic education theory.

The problem of theatre level politico-military arrangements during peace and stability operations is important because the intervening actors, working in complex and often ambiguous circumstances, need to calibrate the application of military and political means as a coherent interdependent whole. This is necessary in order to build peace, secure viable political outcomes and hence strategic successes; however it is not easy in practice. This thesis examines the hypothesis that, beyond their security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to facilitate and sustain the local political process. This requires military co-operation with other relevant actors, responsiveness to political direction and the specific shaping of military operations to impact decisively on political outcomes. This work establishes that Western and United Nations doctrinal guidance extols political primacy and civil-military cooperation but does not fully explain the central importance of the political process, nor does it capture the potential peace building role of the military component. Analysis of practice in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that military commanders retain a uniquely influential position and have generally used their military means to positively influence political progress and help coordinate multi-dimensional plans. On occasion, to secure momentum and fill a void, commanders have quietly assumed a political function. Doctrine now needs to be refreshed to reflect practice. It should explain the military role in supporting the political process, elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of a comprehensive approach to peace building and provide candid guidance on the difficulties to be expected where politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent. Moreover further work is needed on the wider application of this doctrine by the United Nations and the preparation of civilian leaders for politico-military relationships.

The Second World War saw British society mobilised to an unprecedented extent to meet the threat of Total War. ‘Total Defence’ was manifest in organisations such as the ARP and Home Guard. What sets the Home Guard apart was its combatant role. This thesis examines the arms provided for the Home Guard, and concludes that its combat power has been seriously underestimated. It benefitted from huge quantities of high quality smallarms purchased from the United States, which were not issued to the Regular Army, because they chambered American ammunition. What is extraordinary is that these weapons are always characterised as ancient relics, yet the oldest of them was years younger, in real and design terms, than the British Army equivalent. In 1940 Britain lacked the capacity to manufacture arms in the quantities needed to repair the losses of Dunkirk and meet the needs of the expanding armed forces. The remedy was unorthodox weaponry such as the ‘Sticky Bomb’ and the ‘Blacker Bombard’. These are always associated with the Home Guard, yet saw active service against the Africa Corps. These unconventional weapons were more capable than many modern authors suggest, but they suffer from an impenetrable ‘orthodox view’ that characterises Home Guard weapons as ancient, whimsical and inefficient. This has its origins in the Local Defence Volunteers’ disappointment when the Government failed to meet its promise to arm every volunteer; their dismay at receiving foreign equipment; the way in which the media portrayed the Home Guard; and the fact that the great threats the Home Guard existed to combat – invasion and subversion – appeared to be illusory, making the Home Guard itself seem quixotic. This study strips away that conventional narrative, and exposes a Home Guard that was well equipped for its tasks – frequently better equipped than other components of Home Defence.

Clausewitz described military victory as a condition where the enemy‘s ability to enter battle, resist or resume hostilities is destroyed. The concept summarises the paradigm of success that preceded Clausewitz and survived through much of the 20th century. Despite increasingly paradoxical outcomes in the last century and the current one, military planners, strategists and statesmen sought answers for failures in different places, only a few questioned the validity of the notion of victory that Clausewitz had so veritably summarised. The fundamental question that begs an answer is ‗what is victory?‘ The rapid transformation in society and international culture has brought with it changes in geo-political and geo-economic relationships as well as warfare. While the traditional linkages between war and politics remain, the mechanisms driving these have altered. In less than absolute wars, it is the wider bargain and the stakes in that bargain that make the ‗enemy do our will‘ and not purely an inability to enter battle, resist or resume hostilities. The new complexities surrounding war and diplomacy necessitate an organising theory to make better sense of policy and action. This research provides one such theory. War is ultimately a violent clash of societies and its character a reflection of opposing cultures, history and experiences. An external dimension to strategy is thus always at work even if not fully recognised; as is often the case. Such un-factored influences create a sort of volatility in victory and defeat adding new challenges while offering opportunities at the same time. Similarly, diplomacy, which invariably precedes and succeeds coercive or compelling use of violence, too is fettered by such external influences. A bivariate approach that triangulates desired ends with the opposing notions of success and perception of defeat is argued. The theory presented encapsulates traditional precepts, adds new ones and simplifies the complexities that have come to surround victory in contemporary times. Offered here are some valuable ingredient to flavour any strategic recipe, not just war and conflict. The eternal challenge of calibrating means and ends needed more systematic awareness of functional and dominant domains of victory which is arguably possible through application of simple principles. The theory potentially allows for a more focused, proportionate, efficient and productive use of power. It is hoped that strategists and analysts alike, would find here new concepts and tools for use in praxis, perspective planning and retrospective analyses.

No description available.

Throughout the operations of the War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries and Germany, senior commanders such as John Churchill, duke of Marlborough, were aided, abetted and, on occasion, disrupted by a number of general and staff officers. These officers provided the mechanism by which supra-regimental command, military direction and management was effected. While these individuals possessed military dignity according to their rank and station, their real authority in the army was in no small part drawn from the powers and duties delegated to them by the commander-inchief, or assumed upon their own initiative; clear chains of command did not exist. Such officers functioned not only as vital elements in their own army, but within the broader context of the confederate warfare as a whole, in an army composed of English (later British), Dutch, Imperial, Danish and auxiliary German contingents. They came from diverse backgrounds and could possess constrasting political affiliations, aspirations and notions of duty. Their careers were governed as much by patronage and preference as any personal merit. A burgeoning sense of military duty was complicated by personal prejudice and the boundary between public and private endeavour was indistinct. Some officers gained wealth and financial security; others were ruined by the peculations of others.