Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "5 April 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-101).

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 8, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1996. / Shipping list no.: 1998-0921-M. "August 1997." Includes bibliographical references. Also available via Internet from the Air University Press web site. Address as of 10/28/03: http://aupress.au.af.mil/SAAS%5FTheses/Lewis/lewis.pdf; current access is available via PURL.

Should U.S. political decision-makers decide to wage a moral war, it is not as easy a merely saying go do it. To ensure moral targeting decisions, American national political leaders must suffer the costs of monitoring in terms of time and money, and provide not only detailed direction, but also constant oversight to ensure objectives are clear and subordinates carry out directions. Military officers must ensure that their motivations align with those of their principals, and they must ensure that constraining doctrine for planning and executing combat operations is followed. Having satisfied these variables, moral targeting decisions, wherein proportionality of non-combatant casualties is weighed against target necessity, should then be easily attainable. The process of aligning motivations with respect to desired outcomes, and the process of planning strategies according to doctrine together lead to moral targeting decisions. By following the processes of getting war plans approved according to published U.S. doctrine, a deliberate dialogue is followed with direction and feedback through several steps of planning and approval that result in multiple people working on a product that results in a sort of corporate buy- in. I posit that it is difficult to follow this process and end up with targeting decisions that do not weigh harm to non-combatants against the necessity of individual targets, especially when principals and agents come together to deliberately ensure they align their motivations with respect to objectives. This theory is applicable to U.S. involvement in war, but is not necessarily generalizable to other countries. Through case studies of American involvement in Desert Storm (the first Gulf War), Operation Allied Force (NATOs air war over Serbia), and the U.S. War on Terror (campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq), I find that only in the War on Terror were moral targeting decisions consistently made by US national leaders. Furthermore, that was the only case study wherein both constraining doctrine was present and principal-agent motivations were aligned with respect to objectives. The other two cases showed that the variables were not followed and proportionality- necessity decisions were not made.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis strives to shed light on the genuine significance of the current transformation of the U.S. foreign and strategic policy. In essence, this thesis concludes that the Bush doctrine of preemption is inconsistent with the American strategic culture and view of the use of force displayed throughout the American foreign policy ever since the Truman administration. Although not a revolution per se in the American goals, the new foreign policy represents a radical change in the manner to pursue them. While promoting a unilateralist foreign policy and revived "warfighting" strategies, the current administration takes old rationales a step further. By elevating preemption from the tactical to strategic level, the doctrine transforms a last resort policy option into a primary offensive strategy with destabilizing consequences for international relations. The analysis concludes that the increased authority of the hard-line approach in the American foreign and security policy is circumstantial, and the likelihood of its endurance is unrealistic. The international system comprises built-in constraints that raise the cost of isolationist and unilateralist impulses to unbearable levels in the long term. These constraints are the end result of the American national values' projection at international level. / Civilian, Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The US military has proven its strengths many times over through its ability to dominate opponents on the conventional battlefield. However, when it comes to irregular wars and insurgent conflicts, which are defined by enemies who conduct war from the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field, finding success has been far more difficult. The nature and dynamics of these unconventional wars are dramatically different from the conventional warfare realm, and require innovative approaches and rethinking of many long held conceptions of waging war. Conducting unconventional warfare has been the core mission of US Army Special Forces (USSF) since they were founded in 1952. Throughout a relatively short history, USSF have shown a broad utility in conducting operations with indigenous military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in "irregular wars" and low intensity conflicts (LICs), and thus Special Forces have been widely regarded as the preeminent experts in this particular field of warfare. Now more than ever, the capabilities of Special Forces are invaluable in supporting US national security strategy, continuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and supporting efforts to transform military capabilities for irregular warfare and unconventional conflicts. USSF are now faced with a difficult challenge: high demand and operations tempo require that USSF must find new ways to more effectively and efficiently employ their skills in unconventional environments. In order to enhance the capabilities of USSF in conducting unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that USSF develop a training program that allows recruitment and selection of both indigenous personnel and US foreign-born as auxiliaries and surrogates to USSF operations. Training would take place in the US and would be for the explicit purpose of creating indigenous cadres for assisting Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) in developing operational/security forces and intelligence networks at the local level in order to create long-term stability in unconventional conflict areas.

This study examines processes of military doctrinal change during periods of peace. Given the conventional wisdom of hidebound bureaucratic military organizations, why do these organizations innovate doctrinally? Rather than conduct competitive hypothesis testing between two or more theories of military innovation or pursue a heretofore undiscovered monocausal theory, I develop and test a theoretical framework that synthesizes more than one approach to military doctrinal innovation. I use this framework to conduct a structured, focused, case-study comparison of two military organizations - the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps - from the post-World War II period until 2001. The study yields seven findings. First, the systemic causes of military doctrinal innovation are best described by balance of threat theory. Second, contrary to the existing literature, civilian intervention is not a necessary or sufficient cause of doctrinal innovation. Third, militaries consistently strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a particular jurisdictional domain. Fourth, the frequency of military doctrinal change is a function of the complexity of the strategic problem that doctrine is designed to solve. Fifth, the complexity of the cases studied supports the argument that monocausal explanations fail to account for the interaction of multiple variables that affect doctrinal innovation. Sixth, military doctrinal innovation during peacetime is not anomalous because military organizations constantly revise their theories of victory as threats change in the external environment. Finally, the existence of doctrinal institutions creates a norm for a reliance on military doctrine.

This dissertation explores civil-military relations in democratizing contexts, specifically how the historical relationship between the military and the broader public shapes responses to political crises such as riots and revolutions. I develop a novel theory, rooted in civil-military relations literature from political science and sociology, for how an army's historical interactions with the population and with foreign sponsors create doctrine by shaping organizational culture and practices toward the population. Doctrine, in turn, influences the military’s response to a popular uprising. The foundations of military doctrine are historical and include the military's institutional origins, role in national independence, and relationship to the ruling party. Subsequently, doctrinal innovation occurs as a result of interacting with the domestic population and foreign military sponsors. The dissertation features qualitative case studies of Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria during the Arab Spring and a quantitative data analysis of major uprisings worldwide since 1950. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence demonstrate that the nature of military doctrine explains soldiers' behavior during popular uprisings better than alternative arguments based on capacity, patronage, and ethnicity.

I samband med publicering av militära doktriner startar allt som oftast en betydande debatt därdoktrinernas budskap diskuteras. Detta faktum har varit särskilt tydligt i USA vid utgivande avU.S. Navy´s doktriner. Doktrindiskussionen går till stor del att återfinna på olika militära tidskriftersdebattsidor vilka visar sig utgöra ett frekvent utnyttjat debattforum. Debattens inneboendekaraktär och tidskrifternas löpande publicering av inlägg gör det svårt att skaffa sig en täckandeoch rättvisande bild av den marina doktrindebattens innehåll och uttryck. Det är därför intressantatt på ett systematiskt sätt undersöka hur den marina doktrindebatten är utformad i dessa tidskrifter,vad debatten omfattar och vad den antas innehålla. Syftet med denna uppsats är därför att undersökaden marina debattens natur genom att tematiskt granska relationen doktriner och efterföljandedebatt. Med utgångspunkt i Wilhelm Agrells metod för analys av doktriner har ett analysinstrumentutvecklats i syfte att systematisera genomförandet av undersökningen.Uppsatsens resultat visar att framtagning och utveckling av ett analysinstrument för denna typ avundersökningar i hög grad underlättar och renodlar granskningen av doktriner och debatt. Resultatetvisar också att den marina tidskriftsdebatten är utbredd och omfattande till sin karaktär, menden är även mer dynamisk och oförutsägbar än det intryck som kan ges vid en första anblick. / When military doctrines are published, they often quickly become the subject of considerable debatewhere the message is analysed and discussed. This fact has been particularly evident in theUSA after the publication of U.S. Navy´s doctrines. Discussion of doctrine is most often to befound in debate and commentary in various military journals, which serve as a frequently usedforum for such discussions. The complex nature of the debate and continuous publishing of sucharticles make it difficult to get a comprehensive and accurate picture of the content and expressionof the debate about maritime doctrine. Therefore, it is interesting to examine more systematicallyhow doctrinal debate is shaped in these journals, what the debate encompasses and what its contents.Thus, the purpose of this essay is to study the nature of the maritime debate by thematically examiningthe relationship between doctrine and the subsequent debate. Setting out from WilhelmAgrell´s method for analysis of doctrines, an analytical instrument has been developed in order tosystematize the conduct of this investigation.Results show that the development and use of an analytical instrument for the examination of doctrineand debate greatly facilitates and refines the accomplishment of a systematic investigation.The results also show that the maritime debate is by nature extensive and comprehensive and thatit is even more dynamic and unpredictable then a first impression might indicate. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 06-08

Resultatet från genomförd undersökning ger klara indikationer på att operativ planering inte baraär beroende av en doktrin utan även är en katalysator för densamma, dvs. det sker ständigt ensamverkan mellan planering och de bakomliggande tankarna. Det centrala för en doktrin av idagär att vara normgivande för hur en officer bör förhålla sig till dessa två beståndsdelar och då påden operativa nivån. Resultat tyder på en förskjutning till förmån för metod och då på bekostnadav tankar bakom. Resultatet anger även att det inte är FM-doktrinen som fyller denna roll utan detär NATO:s AJP-01 som är dominerande. För att komma fram till undersökningens resultat har enkombination av kvalitativ och kvantitativ metod använts. Den förstnämnda har främst använts föratt utifrån FM-doktrinen skapa en modell som legat till grund för den del av verkligheten somsenare undersökts via den kvantitativa metoden. Modellen är ett resultat efter en analys av FMdoktrinsom utgjort själva teorin. Någon vedertagen teori nyttjas inte.Gemensamt för de olika forskningsfrågor är operativ planering och FM-doktrin, men ur olikaperspektiv, nämligen hur det är tänkt att vara, hur det är samt hur det borde vara. Utifrån dessafrågor har jag hanterat ett övergripande syfte som har varit att kartlägga det som rubriken för Cuppsatsenanger. Bakgrunden till denna ambition går att finna i en problemställning rörande hurvida FM-doktrinen används i den utsträckning som den borde göra med hänsyn tagit till desstänkta verksamhetsområden. / The importance of the Swedish military doctrine for operational planningThe result from my investigation indicates that operational planning not only aredependent upon a doctrine, it is also necessary for a development of the same. Thereis a close connection between those two parts. A doctrine of today has an importanceof being a standard for in what way an operational planning is made as well inmethods as in concept of how to think. The result indicates that the methods are usedmore frequently than the concept of thinking. The result also point to that the doctrineof NATO for multinational effort are more used than the Swedish military doctrinewhen handling with operational planning.The scientific method of this investigation is a combination of quantitative andqualitative method. The first one has been used for the main process of collectingfacts about the condition for operational planning. The second one has been used tocreate a model for collecting the former.From a scientific point of view there is no established theory of which thisinvestigation is performed. The Swedish doctrine has been used as a kind of theoryfor constructing the model.In common for all my questions have been operational planning and Swedishdoctrine. These have been used in some different aspects, namely how it is thought tobe used, how it is used in reality and how it ought to be used. The overall purpose tothese questions is to make a survey of which the conditions are for using the Swedishdoctrine in terms of operational planning.The circumstances for given purpose are possible to be found in the formulation ofthe problem about that our Swedish doctrine not is used in the way it is thought to be. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 06-08