Using recently declassified material, this thesis traces the Commandant Thomas Holcomb' s role in the development of the Marine Corps Defense Battalion. It thus combines biographical and institutional history. Holcomb was an excellent strategist, manager, and publicist. The defense battalion provides a case study for examining Holcomb's leadership as well as the larger historical context. On a tactical level, planners designed these units to defend island outposts against air, sea, and amphibious assaults. In holding island bases in the western Pacific, defense battalions fit into the grand strategy of the United States Navy. The units comprised one half of the Corps's dual mission: amphibious assault and base defense. Defense battalions also served an equally pivotal public relations function as Holcomb struggled -albeit with little success -- to secure scarce resources for the Corps. Understanding Holcomb's actions and the defense battalion's development illuminates the mentality of America's military and government before World War II. / Department of History

The history of the United States Marine Corps in Oregon, and of the many Oregonians who have served as Marines, is a unique story which has never been told. This thesis examines United States Marines from the state of Oregon and activities by Marines in the state. It covers the Oregon Marine experience from its start in 1841 through the Gulf War conflict of 1991 to the present. From 1838 to 1842, Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, United States Navy, led a remarkable exploration and scientific expedition around the world. In 1841, Wilkes visited the Pacific Northwest, and accompanying him aboard his flagship, the ll.S.S. Vincennes, was Quartermaster Sergeant Marion A. Stearns and thirty-two other United States Marines. Steams set a sound leadership example for both his Marines and those of the future as he landed from the sea and explored inland territory ranging from Puget Sound, to the Cascades, the Columbia River, and the Willamette Valley. Stearns' Marine detachment from the 11.SS Peacock even managed to survive their shipwreck upon the Columbia River bar. Oregon had thus begun her unique military heritage with respect to the United States Marine Corps. From this event in 1841, the one hundred and fifty year history of United States Marines in Oregon continued. In 1846, on the eve of the Mexican War, a Marine officer, First Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie, delivered a secret presidential message from James K. Polk to explorer John C. Fremont at Klamath Lake. Later, Marines from Union warship detachments visited Astoria and Portland during the Civil War. In 1898, at the Battle of Manila Bay, Private Charles C. Schroeder of Oak Grove, fought aboard the ll.S.S. Olympia with Commodore George Dewey. World War I and World War II found Oregon contributing a diverse and dedicated group of Marines who served valiantly in combat against German and Japanese forces. During the long Cold War with the Soviet Union, the wars in Korea and Vietnam exhibited a continuation of faithful Marine service by Oregonians. And in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm of 1991, Marines from Oregon continued as their forefathers had before them to honorably serve, sacrifice, and quietly return home. Their record of courage and professionalism are an important but little known part of Oregon's rich history.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / "MBA professional report"--Cover. Thesis advisor(s): R. Marshall Engelbeck, Ron B. Tudor. Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-32). Also available online.

This study examines processes of military doctrinal change during periods of peace. Given the conventional wisdom of hidebound bureaucratic military organizations, why do these organizations innovate doctrinally? Rather than conduct competitive hypothesis testing between two or more theories of military innovation or pursue a heretofore undiscovered monocausal theory, I develop and test a theoretical framework that synthesizes more than one approach to military doctrinal innovation. I use this framework to conduct a structured, focused, case-study comparison of two military organizations - the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps - from the post-World War II period until 2001. The study yields seven findings. First, the systemic causes of military doctrinal innovation are best described by balance of threat theory. Second, contrary to the existing literature, civilian intervention is not a necessary or sufficient cause of doctrinal innovation. Third, militaries consistently strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a particular jurisdictional domain. Fourth, the frequency of military doctrinal change is a function of the complexity of the strategic problem that doctrine is designed to solve. Fifth, the complexity of the cases studied supports the argument that monocausal explanations fail to account for the interaction of multiple variables that affect doctrinal innovation. Sixth, military doctrinal innovation during peacetime is not anomalous because military organizations constantly revise their theories of victory as threats change in the external environment. Finally, the existence of doctrinal institutions creates a norm for a reliance on military doctrine.

The title of The Edifice Complex presents two metaphors which combine to form the focus of this study's research. The first of these refers to the Oedipus Complex of Freudian psychology: metaphorically, Marine recruits fall in love with the folklore of the Marine Corps they wish to join, yet unwittingly change that Corps over time, thus figuratively killing the older generations of Marines--their forefathers in uniform. In the second metaphor, the edifice is the structure of informal folklore and recorded history; the complex is the rites of passage or maze traversed in time by Marines. As Marines are indoctrinated in the Marine Corps' culture, they internalize the meanings of the edifice's building blocks: its symbols, rituals and myths. Bit by bit, generations of Marines individually and collectively alter the shape of the metaphorical maze and change the meanings of some elements of folklore. The purpose of the study was to analyze the causes and effects of cultural change affecting Marines and the Marine Corps from the mid-1950s to the mid1980s. Using ethnographic field methods and content analysis, the researcher investigated internal and external planned and unplanned changes in the Marine Corps. Cultural data was collected during 1984 and 1985 from print, motion picture and other media, and through interviews with Marine infantrymen, recruiters, journalists, drill instructors, historians, musicians and others, in several cultural settings. The study focused on the cultural reality of primarily male, enlisted Marines. Findings support the working hypothesis that folklore is a behavior-shaping tool which the Marine Corps effectively uses to control the behavior of Marines. Findings reveal that cultural changes have allowed or caused some Marines to value the Marine Corps materially as a source of valuable competencies and material rewards rather than professionally or patriotically as the calling of the profession of arms. Conclusions of The Edifice Complex parallel conclusions in organizational change theory, in that changes in the symbolic realm of the organization's culture are most difficult to change but have significant impact upon members of the organization. Findings and conclusions are also mutually supported in the educational, social and behavioral psychologies.

No description available.

Historians John W. Dower, Craig Cameron, and Ronald Takaki argue that the Pacific War was a war of extermination fueled by race hate. Therefore, the clash between the military forces of the Japanese Empire and United States of America yielded a "kill or be killed" environment across the battlefields of the Pacific. This work examines the conduct of the Second Marine Division during its campaign of conquest against the Japanese held island of Saipan from June 15, 1944-July 9, 1944. It is based upon traditional military history sources to test their theories in context of the conduct of Marines toward Japanese soldiers and civilians during the Saipan campaign. Did Marines practice a war of extermination or conduct themselves in a humane manner?

Master of Arts / Department of History / Michael A. Ramsay / Immediately after World War I, the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps implemented an officer education program. Called the Marine Corps Schools (MCS), the Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune, gave the schools the mission of educating officers throughout their career. MCS struggled during its first decade of existence due to operational tempo and a poor curriculum. The direction of MCS changed greatly with the assignment of James Carson Breckinridge as the commanding officer in 1928. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role Breckinridge, an unconventional and intellectual officer, played in reviving the MCS and turning it into the authority on Small Wars and Amphibious Operations. It will show that Breckinridge, drawing on observations made of college education systems, focused the Marine Corps Schools on the task of teaching officers to analyze problems and find solutions and not rely on memorized book answers.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Michael A. Ramsay / In 1989, the United States Marine Corps published the document Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting. Its appearance signaled the official adoption of maneuver warfare as the Corps's organizational philosophy and the basis of its doctrine for preparing and conducting operations. The decade of debate and experimentation that preceded the publication of Warfighting has not received detailed examination, but merits such for the insights it can provide to understanding intellectual change and military reform. Beginning in 1979, Marine Corps officers engaged in an intraservice debate over the issue of maneuver warfare, a new concept that began to circulate among military reformers in the latter half of the 1970s. A group of Marine officers known as "maneuverists" began meeting in unofficial seminars to study, refine, and promote the idea. Maneuverists believed that maneuver warfare was a more fluid and dynamic way of fighting because it stressed flexibility, creativity, and a focus on enemy behavior. They also thought the new idea offered a more effective alternative for fighting war than contemporary practices, which they thought focused too much on rigid application of standardized procedures and methods of existing manuals. The intellectual transformation of the Marine Corps involved three main mechanisms. The first was a theoretical mechanism centered on public debate in the pages of Marine Corps Gazette to introduce and defend maneuver warfare to Marine audience. The second was a functional/practical mechanism that involved educational and training initiatives at the Amphibious Warfare School and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The third mechanism was the use of institutional authority made possible with the appointment of General Alfred M. Gray, a senior and vocal maneuver warfare champion, to the position Commandant of the Marine Corps. Using the authority of his office, Gray directed the writing of a doctrinal manual encapsulating the ideas of maneuver warfare to provide the Corps organizational focus and direction. The resulting manual FMFM 1, Warfighting, officially adopted maneuver warfare as service doctrine and organizational warfighting philosophy.

The military has an important role in peace and development work. Having skilled, experienced and knowledgeable personnel on peace-promoting missions abroad is crucial to ensure the missions success. A consequence of attrition is that military organizations lose valuable skills, experiences and qualities of service members. Preventing attrition is essential to maintain readiness, morale and knowledge. It also has a positive impact on peacekeeping missions, humanitarian relief and interactions with civil society. Current research on attrition has focused on early attrition; separation that occurs before a full term of service. It has focused on pre-enlistment factors of individuals that would make them less suitable to remain in the military. Current research has looked at attrition among all branches of the United States military. The focus of this thesis is to identify the main reasons for attrition among enlisted United States Marines. Focus is on the effect dissatisfaction of service and civilian opportunities has on attrition. It will also identify areas in need of improvement to prevent attrition. This research is a qualitative field study taken with an abductive approach. The main method of data collection was in-depth semi-structured interviews with active and retired U.S Marines, on site in North Carolina. The theory used to analyze the results is the Rational Choice-Theory, an individualistic theory that focus on individual’s actions and the values and beliefs shaping the action. Dissatisfaction because of bad leadership, military structures, long days of work and lack of motivation affected attrition. Civilian opportunities such as college and spending more time with family also played a part in the decision-making regarding reenlistment. Among the Marines, dissatisfaction arising from long-term issues was the factor that affected attrition the most. Civilian opportunities were in some cases the last pull needed to leave service. The findings can assist in making changes that will have a positive effect on the Marines. It can encourage Marines to pursue a longer military career, and hence keep valuable skills and experiences. These Marines can then continue to do important work within the peace and development field.