The history of the United States Marine Corps in Oregon, and of the many Oregonians who have served as Marines, is a unique story which has never been told. This thesis examines United States Marines from the state of Oregon and activities by Marines in the state. It covers the Oregon Marine experience from its start in 1841 through the Gulf War conflict of 1991 to the present. From 1838 to 1842, Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, United States Navy, led a remarkable exploration and scientific expedition around the world. In 1841, Wilkes visited the Pacific Northwest, and accompanying him aboard his flagship, the ll.S.S. Vincennes, was Quartermaster Sergeant Marion A. Stearns and thirty-two other United States Marines. Steams set a sound leadership example for both his Marines and those of the future as he landed from the sea and explored inland territory ranging from Puget Sound, to the Cascades, the Columbia River, and the Willamette Valley. Stearns' Marine detachment from the 11.SS Peacock even managed to survive their shipwreck upon the Columbia River bar. Oregon had thus begun her unique military heritage with respect to the United States Marine Corps. From this event in 1841, the one hundred and fifty year history of United States Marines in Oregon continued. In 1846, on the eve of the Mexican War, a Marine officer, First Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie, delivered a secret presidential message from James K. Polk to explorer John C. Fremont at Klamath Lake. Later, Marines from Union warship detachments visited Astoria and Portland during the Civil War. In 1898, at the Battle of Manila Bay, Private Charles C. Schroeder of Oak Grove, fought aboard the ll.S.S. Olympia with Commodore George Dewey. World War I and World War II found Oregon contributing a diverse and dedicated group of Marines who served valiantly in combat against German and Japanese forces. During the long Cold War with the Soviet Union, the wars in Korea and Vietnam exhibited a continuation of faithful Marine service by Oregonians. And in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm of 1991, Marines from Oregon continued as their forefathers had before them to honorably serve, sacrifice, and quietly return home. Their record of courage and professionalism are an important but little known part of Oregon's rich history.

Using recently declassified material, this thesis traces the Commandant Thomas Holcomb' s role in the development of the Marine Corps Defense Battalion. It thus combines biographical and institutional history. Holcomb was an excellent strategist, manager, and publicist. The defense battalion provides a case study for examining Holcomb's leadership as well as the larger historical context. On a tactical level, planners designed these units to defend island outposts against air, sea, and amphibious assaults. In holding island bases in the western Pacific, defense battalions fit into the grand strategy of the United States Navy. The units comprised one half of the Corps's dual mission: amphibious assault and base defense. Defense battalions also served an equally pivotal public relations function as Holcomb struggled -albeit with little success -- to secure scarce resources for the Corps. Understanding Holcomb's actions and the defense battalion's development illuminates the mentality of America's military and government before World War II. / Department of History

This thesis explores the activities of the U.S. Marine defense battalions from October 1939 to December 1942. More specifically, it explains why Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) decided to continue the defense battalions as separate entities when, by mid-1943, it needed additional men to replace its combat losses and to create new divisions. In this process HQMC disbanded other special units, such as the raider battalions, parachute battalions, barrage balloon squadrons, and the glider squadrons. It retained, however, the defense battalions because of their versatility and utility as demonstrated during the various operations they conducted in Iceland and the Central and South Pacific. In these locations defense battalions performed as: (a) island garrisons, (b) antiaircraft artillery units, and (c) landing forces. Their success in carrying out these missions led to their retention as separate entities throughout World War II.

This study is an operational and tactical study of a battle fought by the U. S. 1st Marine Division near "the Punchbowl," an extinct volcano of military value in the Taebaek Mountains of Korea, from late August through mid September 1951. That engagement was to be the last 1st Marine Division offensive of the Korean War. This battle, for Yoke and Kanmubong Ridges, has received little coverage from historians. That it is all but forgotten is surprising, since it was one of the hardest fought for United States Marines in the war. The casualties were high, and Americans did not understand why so many had to die for a war that seemed to already be set to conclude by negotiations. This study tells the story of that battle more completely than ever before, and assesses its significance to the course of the Korean War.

The United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy developed during the interwar period a doctrine that addressed the problems inherent in the substitution of naval gunfire for artillery support in an amphibious assault. The invasion of Betio Islet, Tarawa Atoll, in November of 1943 was the first test of this doctrine. It has been said many times since the war that the doctrine basically passed this test and that lessons learned at Tarawa increased the efficiency with which the Marine Corps and Navy applied the prewar doctrine during the rest of the war. An analysis of the planning and execution of naval bombardments in the Central Pacific Campaign, after the invasion of the Gilberts, does not support this claim. This analysis leads the researcher to three conclusions. First, the Japanese developed defenses against many of the effects of the gunfire support doctrine that blunted much of the force of American firepower. American planners were slow to recognize the implications of these changes and, consequently, were slow to react to them. Second, many naval commanders responsible for providing naval gunfire support for Central Pacific operations still equated tonnage of ordnance to effectiveness of bombardment, regardless of their frequent references to "the lessons of Tarawa." Finally, strategic concerns and outright ignorance played a large part in determining the use of naval gunfire, the first taking precedence over the "lessons" and the second leading to the ignoring of the "lessons" all together.

Historians John W. Dower, Craig Cameron, and Ronald Takaki argue that the Pacific War was a war of extermination fueled by race hate. Therefore, the clash between the military forces of the Japanese Empire and United States of America yielded a "kill or be killed" environment across the battlefields of the Pacific. This work examines the conduct of the Second Marine Division during its campaign of conquest against the Japanese held island of Saipan from June 15, 1944-July 9, 1944. It is based upon traditional military history sources to test their theories in context of the conduct of Marines toward Japanese soldiers and civilians during the Saipan campaign. Did Marines practice a war of extermination or conduct themselves in a humane manner?