Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2006. / The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law in May 2000 by President Clinton to allow sub-Saharan countries to export designated products duty-free into the US. AGOA is a temporary measure that is non-reciprocal and not negotiated by the participating parties. The initiative was launched to liberalise the markets of developing countries on the road to become integrated in the global economy. The initial success of AGOA was limited, with only a few countries making use of AGOA to increase their exports into the US markets. Problems encountered were high levels of protectionism from the US and the existence of technical trade barriers (including sanitary measures in agriculture) and nontariff barriers (including quotas). African countries are using shipment as the main transport for exports, and the US barred transshipment due to corruption that occurred in the past. The AGOA also made provision for 'special provisions' measures to enable AGOA eligible countries to export apparel and textile to the US. The export of apparel was very successful until the Multifibre Agreement expired in 2005, leading to relocation of apparel factories to lower cost bases. The real beneficiaries from AGOA are oil-exporting countries that make up more than 90% of total AGOA benefits. South Africa is the only country who succeeded in diversified AGOA exports. AGOA has been supplemented by AGOA II (extending the product range) and AGOA III (extending the expiry date to 2015). After the EU-SA Free Trade Agreement has been concluded in 1999, the US started with FTA negotiations with the South African Customs Union (SACU) to improve the exposure of US products to the SACU market and to decrease the trade deficit. However, the agenda of the FTA negotiations included second generation issues of intellectual property rights, trade in services, investment and government procurement. The SACU negotiators learnt some lessons from the EU-SA FTA and progress was slow. The extension of AGOA to 2015 saw a decrease in the urgency of striking a SACU-US FTA. Negotiations slowed down and the decision was made in April 2006 to conduct talks on a lower level. This breathing time can be used by the SACU negotiators to develop an aggressive offensive strategy for future negotiations, and to build competency against the efficient and offensive US negotiators. The US-SACU FTA must still be pursued to ensure that the benefits of AGOA are locked in. It will be beneficial for SACU if the different needs for all the SACU countries are addressed and the negotiations are done in incremental steps .

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2007. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The SACU bloc, which accounts for one-half of the subcontinent's GDP, is the largest market for the US exports in SSA (Langton, January 2005). Wide differences exist among the economies of SACU - while SA has developed a significant manufacturing and industrial capacity, the other countries remain dependent on agriculture and mineral extraction. The grouping is dominated by SA, which accounts for 87% of the population, and 93% of the GDP of the customs area. SACU member states had a combined real GDP of $201bn in 2003. Services made up 65% of SA Trade in 2003 and had become a major player. In 2003, SACU was the 32nd largest trading partner of the US with two-way trade equivalent \ $7.3bn. Merchandise imports from SACU totaled $5.6bn in 2003, a 17.3% increase from 2002 and a 126% increase from 1996. They were composed of minerals such as platinum, diamonds, and titanium, textiles and apparel, vehicles, and automotive parts. Major US exports to the region include aircraft, vehicles, computers, and construction and agricultural equipment. Services trade between the US and SA has increased dramatically for both countries, with US exports increasing 154% and service imports from SA increasing by 383% respectively since 1992. The stock of US FDI in SA totaled $3.9bn in 2003 and was centered around manufacturing chemicals and services. The main economic objective of FTAs is to reduce trade barriers between member countries and liberalize trade and investment rules (Kanoute, November 2005). This improves market access which is the key to foreign export earnings and investment. But market access is a door that swings both ways, opening local markets to a flood of imports. This can undermine domestic production and employment, and thus exacerbate poverty. Some US civil society organizations have expressed concern that a SACU FTA could have negative consequences for poor Southern Africans, citing potential adjustment costs for import-competing farmers, poor enforcement of labour rights, privatization of utilities, and increased restrictions on importing generic drugs to treat HIV/AIDS (Langton, January 2005). The proposed FTA is ambitious, especially given the tight deadline and the broad range of topics on the negotiating table (Zunckel, Tralac). These include not only tariffs on goods, as is traditional in trade talks, but the wider global economic panoply of agriculture, rules of origin intellectual property, trade in services, investment, government procurement, trade remedies, labour, environmental standards and trade dispute settlement. The US gains reciprocity by gaining improved access to the SACU market than it currently enjoys under AGOA. The IP and "TRIPS plus" provisions are of particular concern to consumers (www.tralac.org.) Ongoing developments at the multilateral level bode against the advisability of entering into binding bilateral agreements with less favourable provisions on essential medicines. Foreign investment could lead to greater industrialization within SACU and competition within local industry, boosting efficiency. But safeguards and industrial policy must be utilized effectively to protect the region's developmental goals. Reliance on domestic courts as the forum of first instance (and state-to-state dispute settlements should those fail) is preferable, as it allows greater possibilities of defending the public interest of SACU citizens over investors' interests (Langton, January 2005). Reaching consensus on negotiating strategy in SACU is no easy feat. Formal negotiations began in June 2003, but talks have made little progress over the past years. The interests of the five different countries, at differing stages of development, have to be reconciled (Draper. 2004). No doubt SA, with its diverse array of interests relative to its BLNS partners in the customs union, will drive this. SACU negotiators, in common with those in many developing countries, have great difficulty in understanding, let alone mobilizing, their services sectors. Hence they have adopted a defensive posture, favouring liberalization only in those (few) sub-sectors that are well understood. SACU has formally accepted an offer made by the US to progress a so-called trade and investment cooperation agreement (TICA). Prior negotiation will be needed among SACU countries, who clearly have an interest in coordinating its negotiation with other US bilateral negotiating partners (Whalley & Leith, December 2003).

The Eisenhower Administration sought to create a large role for U.S. multinational corporations, who could provide a significant amount of the capital needed for trade expansion and industrial growth. This policy became known as "trade not aid." The trade not aid policy reflected both the fiscal conservatism and ideological beliefs of the Eisenhower Administration. By 1957 Eisenhower shifted to a policy of trade and aid. This study examines three foreign economic policies in the context of American-East Asian relations. It focused primarily on Japan, since that country served as the center of the American regional "workshop economy" concept in Asia. Tracing the development of the trade/aid program, this thesis then compares and contrasts governmental policies with business activity and opinion during the 1950s. It concludes that the foreign economic policy of the Eisenhower Administration contained serious flaws, served the needs of only a few countries in the region, and was weighted heavily toward a military support role rather than economic development. (Abstract shortened with permission of author.)

No description available.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

No description available.

Canadian border security policies are largely shaped by the asymmetrical relationship that exists between Canada and the United States. American markets are the primary destination for over eighty percent of Canadian exports, creating an economic dependence highlighted in the days following 9/11. As wait times at the American border extended to sixteen hours the importance of the shared border came sharply into focus. To ensure Canada‟s economic security the Canadian government needed to develop policies that would satisfy the American need for physical security and the Canadian need for economic security. This thesis applies John Kingdon‟s policy streams model to demonstrate and explain the subsequent development of Canadian border security policies. It also examines the institutional context for border security policies and examines two case studies: the Container Security Initiative and NEXUS. / vii, 133 leaves ; 29 cm

Abstract not available. / Thesis (MBA)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2005.

Despite the amount of scholarship on the Stamp Act Crisis, no study has used advertisements as a main source. This study attempts to show that a valuable, objective source has been overlooked, through the quantitative analysis of 5,810 advertisements before, during and after the Stamp Act Crisis from five port cities: Boston, Charleston, Philadelphia, New York, and Portsmouth. The findings reveal the colonists' strong connection to imported British luxury goods, and a lack of interest in American-made goods, especially before and after the boycott. Advertisements also demonstrate that the decision of many merchants to place the needs and expectations of their community before their own personal gain offered a rare economic opportunity for others. The colonists' devotion to imports tested the strength of the boycott, especially among Boston merchants, who continued to advertise imported goods a good deal more than any other city. This lack of dedication to the boycott on the part of the Boston merchants shows disunity among the colonies, at a time when many argue was the first instance of colonial nationalism. Capitalism challenged and undermined a commitment to communal sentiments such as nationalism. Moreover, if Americans did share a sense of nationhood during the Stamp Act Crisis, it cannot be gauged by a rejection of "Englishness."

The United Kingdom's postwar economic recovery and the usefulness of Marshall Plan aid depended heavily on a rapid increase in exports by the country's manufacturing industries. American aid administrators, however, shocked to discover the British industry's inability to respond to the country's urgent need, insisted on aggressive action to improve productivity. In partial response, a joint venture, called the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP), arranged for sixty-six teams involving nearly one thousand people to visit U.S. factories and bring back productivity improvement ideas. Analyses of team recommendations, and a brief review of the country's industrial history, offer compelling insights into the problems of relative industrial decline. This dissertation attempts to assess the reasons for British industry's inability to respond to the country's economic emergency or to maintain its competitive position faced with the challenge of newer industrializing countries.