Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 241-300).

This thesis examines the nature and dynamics of U.S.-Iran relations during the Cold War under the leadership of U.S. President Richard Nixon, his adviser Henry Kissinger, and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran. This revisionist account critically examines the popular view of Mohammad Reza Shah as a mere instrument of American strategies of containment during the Cold War. Relying on recently declassified American documents, British government papers, and the diaries, memoirs and oral histories of Iranian actors, this thesis restores agency to the shah as an autonomous Cold War actor and suggests that Iran evolved from a client to a partner of the United States under the Nixon Doctrine. This partnership was forged during Nixon’s first term in office between 1969 and 1972, as the United States embraced a policy of Iranian primacy in the Persian Gulf region. Thanks to a long-standing friendship with the president, the shah was able to exercise extraordinary influence in the Nixon White House. This partnership reached its peak during Nixon’s second term as the United States supported Iran’s regional primacy against the challenge from Iraq. The shah drew Nixon and Kissinger into Iran’s secret war against Iraq in Kurdistan in 1972, by portraying Iran’s long-standing regional conflict with Iraq as a Cold War confrontation with the Soviet-backed Ba’th regime in Baghdad. When the shah unilaterally decided to abandon the Kurds in a deal with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 1975, Kissinger had little choice but to acquiesce, despite the personal embarrassment and domestic recriminations that followed. The U.S.-Iran partnership declined following Watergate and Nixon’s resignation in 1974. In spite of the best efforts of the shah and Kissinger, between 1974 and 1976 the United States and Iran were unable to reach an agreement on U.S. nuclear exports to Iran. President Gerald Ford tried to impose a discriminatory nuclear agreement on Iran that was rejected by the shah because it violated Iran’s national sovereignty. Under Ford, the United States reverted to treating Iran as a client rather a partner of the United States.

Alexane Said MASTER'S THESIS Iran and the United States' Relations in the Context of the Nuclear Deal Abstract _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ This study analyses the evolution of relations between Iran and the United States by applying the theories of realism, liberalism and the theoretical concept of strategic culture on their contest for power, control and sovereignty. From strategic partners to strategic enemies and back to pragmatic tolerance, both countries have maintained a troublesome relationship which entered a new era of cooperation with the implementation of the Nuclear Deal in January 2016. This deal is a geopolitical breakthrough that should improve the relations between the two countries as it is in both their strategic interests to collaborate. With sanctions removal and by choosing the diplomatic route, Iran can get access to a larger trade and investors' market which could help its economy tremendously and could be seen as an important international actor. Moreover, since the deal allows for the supervision and investigation of Iran's uranium facilities, this allows for greater transparency, profitable for the US and the international community. After the Nuclear Deal implementation, American and Iranian actions on the...

The White Revolution was a set of six reform measures put to the Iranian people via referendum on 6 Bahman 1341 (26 January 1963), based on a plan for social justice linked with economic development, encased in the concept of a bloodless revolution from the top. This did not happen unexpectedly; it was the culmination of events spanning several years, which accelerated during the John F. Kennedy Presidency. Various plans and reforms paved the way for the White Revolution and certain events as well as political and economic developments encouraged reform. There were similarities between plans and some reforms influenced others, or were shaped to suit different agendas. All played a part in instigating the White Revolution. This included Prime Minister ʻAlī Amīnī’s 15-point plan, the Shah’s Royal Farmān, the Third Development Plan, and the six-points of the White Revolution itself. The question this thesis seeks to answer is to what extent the Kennedy administration was responsible for instigating the White Revolution by influencing the various steps that paved the way for the 6 Bahman referendum?The United States had at its disposal various means by which it might apply pressure and influence development. This included, economic aid, military assistance, numerous advisers, agencies on the ground, plus support for the Shah and other Iranians. Given the Kennedy administration’s association with modernisation and development, the existing historiography has portrayed this period in US-Iranian relations as one of increased pressure on the Shah to reform with the White Revolution being the result of such pressure. This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by challenging this portrayal by providing the first detailed, analysis of the period 1961-63, utilising a vast array of newly released documents. This is not the first study to conclude agency on the part of Iran for the White Revolution, but is the first to do so though a detailed, balanced approach, which doesn’t ignore the significance of the US-Iranian relationship. Thus, this thesis is at the forefront of revisionist accounts of US-Iranian relations during the Cold War critiquing the portrayal of the Shah and others as mere tools of the US and reaching the conclusion that contrary to widely held beliefs it was Iranians rather than Americans who instigated the White Revolution by initiating and directing reform.