The Military Intelligence Division (MID) was the U.S. Army's intelligence agency that reported to the Chief of Staff within the War Department. During the years 1917- 1927, the MID routinely conducted surveillance of Mexico, including: espionage, mail censorship, radio intercepts, intelligence gathering, and development of plans for the invasion of Mexico. This study utilizes a tripartite model to evaluate the production and analysis of military "intelligence" by the MID in Mexico during the period 1917-1927. First, the organization and development of the Military Intelligence Division from its origins in 1885 through the year 1927 is explored with sections on institutional history and objects of investigation. Second, a quantitative analysis of intelligence documents identifies the focus and priorities of the MID in Mexico. Third, a textual analysis of intelligence documents makes use of a cross-cultural framework to demonstrate the prevailing attitudes, perspectives and world views of the MID toward the Mexican state and its peoples. The thesis question as to whether the U.S. Military Intelligence Division created an accurate and complete picture of "reality" of Mexico is answered in the negative. The MID perspective was colored by cultural bias, ignorance, and misunderstanding. Ultimately, the MID failed to grasp the reality of Mexico because it failed to ask the right questions. It seriously misunderstood the nature of Mexico and its peoples, especially in its relationship with the United States .. The particular model developed for this study lends itself to the possibility of further research in the area of international history and cross-cultural studies. The use of multiple analysis techniques provides a more comprehensive picture of the various factors involved that influence historical events.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 2, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 8, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

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This thesis deals with the role of the JOS as the principal military advisers of the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It concentrates on the JSC’s perception of Soviet military and political intentions and capabilities in the postwar era and on the JCS’s military proposals regarding the external threat. The purpose of the thesis is to assess the JCS’s role substantively rather than to evaluate the relative role of the JCS as an agency amongst other key agencies dealing with foreign policy.

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The thesis evaluates the extent to which human rights were promoted in United States Military Humanitarian and Civic Assistance exercises in Latin America. This is important because the promotion of human rights is a stated foreign policy goal, even in security cooperation programs. It will be argued that a human rights focus matters in the selection of training objectives, engagement in the interagency process, and coordination with the host nation. Comparative case analysis of Opening Roads-Ecuador 1987 and New Horizons-Nicaragua 1999 indicates that the post-Cold War US military is implementing some principles congruent with a human rights perspective, such as promoting sustainable development and good governance. / Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve

In order to explain presidential decisions to use force, a model is developed that incorporates three distinct decision-making environments. The results indicate the president is responsive not only to domestic and international environments, but also to the resource evaluation environment. The evidence here demonstrates that while these two environments are important the president can't use force arbitrarily; rather, his evaluation of resources available for the use of force can limit his ability to engage the military during crisis situations.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / "5 April 2007." AD-A468 869. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.