Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio State University, 2000. / Cover title. Includes vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-96). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

Thesis (Ph. D.) -- Ohio State University, 2003. / Includes vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 341-356). Also available via Internet from the Ohio State Library and Information Network electronic theses public database. Adobe Acrobat reader required. Address as of 1/06/2006: http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi?osu1054563128.

M.A. (National Strategy) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Even with the end of the Cold War, the question, Were the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an action-reaction arms race? remains important and controversial. The bulk of empirical mathematical arms race research suggests that the US and USSR were not so engaged. Indeed, most such research into the matter suggests that US arms acquisitions were driven overwhelmingly by internal or domestic forces, as were Soviet arms acquisitions. Given the longstanding political, economic and military rivalry, between the US and USSR, the finding that they were not engaged in an arms race is perplexing. This is particularly so with respect to nuclear weapons acquisitions. Orthodox nuclear deterrence theory clearly posits that the attempt by each side to maintain a balance of nuclear forces with the other and hence deter the other from launching a first-strike should result in an action-reaction nuclear arms race. Why, then, does the overwhelming mass of quantitative research suggest that the opposite was true, in practice, in the US-Soviet case? The problem, in part, has been that researchers have been using underspecified mathematical models of action-reaction arms race interaction. The most famous of these models is Richardson’s 1960 action-reaction model. Researchers have long been aware that Richardson’s model is underspecified and as such that it may not be capable of revealing the true nature of US-Soviet military interaction. Since the late 1960s, arms race researchers have attempted to move beyond Richardson’s simple arms race specification. Several new approaches to arms race analysis have subsequently emerged: the game theoretic approach, the economic (stock adjustment) approach, and the expectations (adaptive, extrapolative, and rational) approach. Taken individually, neither of these approaches has, however, yielded much fruit. In this dissertation, the game, stock adjustment, and rational expectations approaches were combined for the first time into a single, more comprehensive, analytical approach and a new action-reaction arms race model was derived, which we have named the GSR Model. In addition, it was argued that a new approach was needed for testing arms race models. Arms races are generally seen as competitions of total armed versus total armed might. Arms race models have, accordingly, been tested against data on states’ annual military expenditures. We argued instead that an arms race is made of several subraces, the object of each subrace being a specific weapons system and a specific counter weapons system, deployed by an opponent and designed to thwart the former’s political and military effect. Models should, then, be tested for each subrace in a given arms race, that is, against data on weapons system-counter weapons system deployment levels. Time frames for the analysis of a given weapons system-counter weapons system competition should be set to accord with the period in which those systems were dominant in the military calculations of the competing states. In effect, we have specified an alternative approach to mathematical arms race analysis, the micro approach to mathematical arms race analysis. The GSR Model was tested against data on annual US and Soviet strategic nuclear warhead deployment levels, — specifically, those onboard ICBMs (1960-71) and submarines (1972-87). The GSR model was also tested against annual US-Soviet aggregate strategic nuclear warhead deployment data (ICBM, SLBM and bomber based totals), 1967-84. Estimates of the GSR model suggest that the US and USSR were in fact engaged in an action-reaction arms race over submarine launched nuclear warheads. Regression analysis also indicates that the US and USSR strongly interacted, asymmetrically, over ICBM based nuclear warheads. There appears to have been no interaction over aggregate warhead deployments. Finally, the implications of these findings for the maintenance of a stable nuclear deterrent were discussed. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The role of Japan in any U.S. strategic policy will be decided from the outcome of two debates. These two debates, the Japanese security policy debate and the American strategic policy debate, have been conducted within the leading groups of each country. The debates, both independently and at their points of interaction, illustrate the dynamic nature of the problem of forecasting the kind of security role Japan will perform in any future American strategic policy for the Northeast Asian region. Against a background of a Soviet regional military build-up and increasingly strident American calls for Japan to improve its defence capabilities, the Japanese debate signals a growing consensus for an enhanced security role. However, this trend must be severely qualified by the enduring impact of certain constitutional, political and economic constraints upon security policy-making. The importance that certain leading Japanese groups give to the domestic determinants of policy seems to have been discounted by many leading Americans. Any enhancement of Japan's security role must be accommodated by the Japanese domestic political environment; an environment which retains strong pacifist sentiments. The recent movement towards a military alliance between the two countries needs to be balanced against the continuing relevance that a good proportion of leading Japanese and the Japanese public hold for a minimum defence posture supported by the American security commitment, as embodied in the U.S.-Japan treaty. The American strategic policy debate is concerned with two main policy arguments. The unilateralist/maritime supremacy argument sees the world in essentially bipolar terms and seeks to augment American power so as to be able to overcome a potential enemy, solely through the use of U.S. power. The coalition/defence argument views the world in multipolar terms and believes that deterrence against an enemy should suffice and that this can best be achieved through the utilization and management of allied as well as American forces. The examination of the policy arguments within each of the debates reveals that each is in an insufficiently developed stage to greatly assist our predictions as to Japan's future security role in any American strategic policy. Arguments that Japan is willing to accept specific regional security are easily countered by equally valid ones which foresee no direct security role within any American strategic policy of the near future. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the six special military units which were authorized and created by the War Department under the direction of Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. In relating the military history of such special units the study determines what contributions and significance they made to the Union war effort.

<p dir="ltr">This dissertation investigates the Transition Assistance Program and its effectiveness in preparing United States Veterans for post-military civilian life. Using a mixed-methods approach, the study combines qualitative and quantitative data collection to provide comprehensive insights into Veterans' transition experiences, needs, and expectations. The research addresses the limited understanding of Veterans' perceptions of the Transition Assistance Program and highlights the need for comprehensive assessment. It includes online questionnaires to capture Veterans' perspectives. Key findings reveal challenges faced by Veterans during transition and emphasize the need for customization and robust resources. Recommendations propose integrating various technologies to aid Veterans during and after their transition. In conclusion, this study illuminates the Transition Assistance Program's efficacy and proposes innovative ways to support Veterans during their transition to civilian life. It provides valuable insights for policymakers and stakeholders to enhance Veterans' transition experiences.</p>

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1965 B13 / Master of Science

No description available.