United States military interventions commonly attempt to generate a post-conflict political order congenial to American national interest, that is, to shape a usable peace. The Clausewitzian imperative, that the use of force must serve policy, points to the strategic significance of the postconflict environment. The civil dimension is the arena where US policy succeeds or fails. This study examines US military doctrine and practice of civil affairs in order to address a strategic problem: how to translate the use of force into a usable peace? Civil affairs or civil military operations cope with civilians during operations, control populations and facilitate US military exit. This study offers theoretical, historical, and policy analysis of US civil affairs. Theoretically, if war is a continuation of policy by other means, civil affairs effect a transition back to a mode of policy. Over time, US doctrine adjusted to different conflict environments and policy imperatives provided by civilian leadership, shifting emphasis to military government, civic action, counterinsurgency, and finally, to peace operations. Because US military culture disdains involvement of soldiers in governance, and in order to expedite transitions, two principles are consistent features of the US approach: civilianization, to transfer authority to civilian agencies; and indirect rule, to nurture friendly indigenous regimes. Civil affairs implements policy. US interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) imperfectly translated political goals into military objectives; suffered from inconsistent goals from Washington; and failed to plan adequately for the civil dimension. The study identifies a number of factors that influenced the American approach to civil affairs in these cases, including analogical reasoning behind the US interventions, orientation toward low-intensity conflict at the time of the intervention, the impact of combat operations during interventions, and the availability of local resources for reconstruction after intervention. The civil dimension of military operations has become more prominent in last decade of intervention in internal conflicts, under limited rules of engagement, in the service of humanitarian objectives. As operations have become more multilateral and multi-agency, cultural tensions have become more pronounced. This study provides a basis for further exploration of the fundamental, but increasingly complex strategic imperative for US military forces, to shape a usable peace.

Even with the end of the Cold War, the question, Were the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an action-reaction arms race? remains important and controversial. The bulk of empirical mathematical arms race research suggests that the US and USSR were not so engaged. Indeed, most such research into the matter suggests that US arms acquisitions were driven overwhelmingly by internal or domestic forces, as were Soviet arms acquisitions. Given the longstanding political, economic and military rivalry, between the US and USSR, the finding that they were not engaged in an arms race is perplexing. This is particularly so with respect to nuclear weapons acquisitions. Orthodox nuclear deterrence theory clearly posits that the attempt by each side to maintain a balance of nuclear forces with the other and hence deter the other from launching a first-strike should result in an action-reaction nuclear arms race. Why, then, does the overwhelming mass of quantitative research suggest that the opposite was true, in practice, in the US-Soviet case? The problem, in part, has been that researchers have been using underspecified mathematical models of action-reaction arms race interaction. The most famous of these models is Richardson’s 1960 action-reaction model. Researchers have long been aware that Richardson’s model is underspecified and as such that it may not be capable of revealing the true nature of US-Soviet military interaction. Since the late 1960s, arms race researchers have attempted to move beyond Richardson’s simple arms race specification. Several new approaches to arms race analysis have subsequently emerged: the game theoretic approach, the economic (stock adjustment) approach, and the expectations (adaptive, extrapolative, and rational) approach. Taken individually, neither of these approaches has, however, yielded much fruit. In this dissertation, the game, stock adjustment, and rational expectations approaches were combined for the first time into a single, more comprehensive, analytical approach and a new action-reaction arms race model was derived, which we have named the GSR Model. In addition, it was argued that a new approach was needed for testing arms race models. Arms races are generally seen as competitions of total armed versus total armed might. Arms race models have, accordingly, been tested against data on states’ annual military expenditures. We argued instead that an arms race is made of several subraces, the object of each subrace being a specific weapons system and a specific counter weapons system, deployed by an opponent and designed to thwart the former’s political and military effect. Models should, then, be tested for each subrace in a given arms race, that is, against data on weapons system-counter weapons system deployment levels. Time frames for the analysis of a given weapons system-counter weapons system competition should be set to accord with the period in which those systems were dominant in the military calculations of the competing states. In effect, we have specified an alternative approach to mathematical arms race analysis, the micro approach to mathematical arms race analysis. The GSR Model was tested against data on annual US and Soviet strategic nuclear warhead deployment levels, — specifically, those onboard ICBMs (1960-71) and submarines (1972-87). The GSR model was also tested against annual US-Soviet aggregate strategic nuclear warhead deployment data (ICBM, SLBM and bomber based totals), 1967-84. Estimates of the GSR model suggest that the US and USSR were in fact engaged in an action-reaction arms race over submarine launched nuclear warheads. Regression analysis also indicates that the US and USSR strongly interacted, asymmetrically, over ICBM based nuclear warheads. There appears to have been no interaction over aggregate warhead deployments. Finally, the implications of these findings for the maintenance of a stable nuclear deterrent were discussed.

This study examines the use of graduated escalation in Vietnam under the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson and attempts to discover the underlying causes that led to the enactment and the continuation of this policy throughout his administration.Factors studied include Johnson's perception of his place in history, his personal style of control, his dual loyalties to expanding "The Great Society" as well as stopping communism through military pressure, and his limited cultural understanding of the needs of the Vietnamese people and the intentions of their leaders.The conclusion is that, while Johnson was a canny politician in his own arena, his controlling personality probably prevented him from considering all of the options open to him in resolving the Vietnam problem and his simplistic, frontier type of diplomacy closed other doors and forced him along a path of frustration and defeat. / Department of Political Science

M.A. (National Strategy) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Even with the end of the Cold War, the question, Were the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an action-reaction arms race? remains important and controversial. The bulk of empirical mathematical arms race research suggests that the US and USSR were not so engaged. Indeed, most such research into the matter suggests that US arms acquisitions were driven overwhelmingly by internal or domestic forces, as were Soviet arms acquisitions. Given the longstanding political, economic and military rivalry, between the US and USSR, the finding that they were not engaged in an arms race is perplexing. This is particularly so with respect to nuclear weapons acquisitions. Orthodox nuclear deterrence theory clearly posits that the attempt by each side to maintain a balance of nuclear forces with the other and hence deter the other from launching a first-strike should result in an action-reaction nuclear arms race. Why, then, does the overwhelming mass of quantitative research suggest that the opposite was true, in practice, in the US-Soviet case? The problem, in part, has been that researchers have been using underspecified mathematical models of action-reaction arms race interaction. The most famous of these models is Richardson’s 1960 action-reaction model. Researchers have long been aware that Richardson’s model is underspecified and as such that it may not be capable of revealing the true nature of US-Soviet military interaction. Since the late 1960s, arms race researchers have attempted to move beyond Richardson’s simple arms race specification. Several new approaches to arms race analysis have subsequently emerged: the game theoretic approach, the economic (stock adjustment) approach, and the expectations (adaptive, extrapolative, and rational) approach. Taken individually, neither of these approaches has, however, yielded much fruit. In this dissertation, the game, stock adjustment, and rational expectations approaches were combined for the first time into a single, more comprehensive, analytical approach and a new action-reaction arms race model was derived, which we have named the GSR Model. In addition, it was argued that a new approach was needed for testing arms race models. Arms races are generally seen as competitions of total armed versus total armed might. Arms race models have, accordingly, been tested against data on states’ annual military expenditures. We argued instead that an arms race is made of several subraces, the object of each subrace being a specific weapons system and a specific counter weapons system, deployed by an opponent and designed to thwart the former’s political and military effect. Models should, then, be tested for each subrace in a given arms race, that is, against data on weapons system-counter weapons system deployment levels. Time frames for the analysis of a given weapons system-counter weapons system competition should be set to accord with the period in which those systems were dominant in the military calculations of the competing states. In effect, we have specified an alternative approach to mathematical arms race analysis, the micro approach to mathematical arms race analysis. The GSR Model was tested against data on annual US and Soviet strategic nuclear warhead deployment levels, — specifically, those onboard ICBMs (1960-71) and submarines (1972-87). The GSR model was also tested against annual US-Soviet aggregate strategic nuclear warhead deployment data (ICBM, SLBM and bomber based totals), 1967-84. Estimates of the GSR model suggest that the US and USSR were in fact engaged in an action-reaction arms race over submarine launched nuclear warheads. Regression analysis also indicates that the US and USSR strongly interacted, asymmetrically, over ICBM based nuclear warheads. There appears to have been no interaction over aggregate warhead deployments. Finally, the implications of these findings for the maintenance of a stable nuclear deterrent were discussed. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

United States military interventions commonly attempt to generate a post-conflict political order congenial to American national interest, that is, to shape a usable peace. The Clausewitzian imperative, that the use of force must serve policy, points to the strategic significance of the postconflict environment. The civil dimension is the arena where US policy succeeds or fails. This study examines US military doctrine and practice of civil affairs in order to address a strategic problem: how to translate the use of force into a usable peace? Civil affairs or civil military operations cope with civilians during operations, control populations and facilitate US military exit. This study offers theoretical, historical, and policy analysis of US civil affairs. Theoretically, if war is a continuation of policy by other means, civil affairs effect a transition back to a mode of policy. Over time, US doctrine adjusted to different conflict environments and policy imperatives provided by civilian leadership, shifting emphasis to military government, civic action, counterinsurgency, and finally, to peace operations. Because US military culture disdains involvement of soldiers in governance, and in order to expedite transitions, two principles are consistent features of the US approach: civilianization, to transfer authority to civilian agencies; and indirect rule, to nurture friendly indigenous regimes. Civil affairs implements policy. US interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) imperfectly translated political goals into military objectives; suffered from inconsistent goals from Washington; and failed to plan adequately for the civil dimension. The study identifies a number of factors that influenced the American approach to civil affairs in these cases, including analogical reasoning behind the US interventions, orientation toward low-intensity conflict at the time of the intervention, the impact of combat operations during interventions, and the availability of local resources for reconstruction after intervention. The civil dimension of military operations has become more prominent in last decade of intervention in internal conflicts, under limited rules of engagement, in the service of humanitarian objectives. As operations have become more multilateral and multi-agency, cultural tensions have become more pronounced. This study provides a basis for further exploration of the fundamental, but increasingly complex strategic imperative for US military forces, to shape a usable peace. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1965 B13 / Master of Science

This thesis deals with the role of the JOS as the principal military advisers of the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It concentrates on the JSC’s perception of Soviet military and political intentions and capabilities in the postwar era and on the JCS’s military proposals regarding the external threat. The purpose of the thesis is to assess the JCS’s role substantively rather than to evaluate the relative role of the JCS as an agency amongst other key agencies dealing with foreign policy.

No description available.

In order to explain presidential decisions to use force, a model is developed that incorporates three distinct decision-making environments. The results indicate the president is responsive not only to domestic and international environments, but also to the resource evaluation environment. The evidence here demonstrates that while these two environments are important the president can't use force arbitrarily; rather, his evaluation of resources available for the use of force can limit his ability to engage the military during crisis situations.