Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 222-236). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, June 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 222-236). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--RAND Graduate School, 2007. / Title taken from PDF title screen (viewed October 18, 2007). Includes bibliographical references.

This study examines the effects of SEC office change on regulatory oversight and firms' reporting quality. Firms are assigned to the SEC's filing review offices. However, the SEC regularly change office assignment for firms in some industries. I find that SEC oversight on newly assigned firms will be more intense. Firms are more likely to receive comment letters and there are more accountants on the filing review team. Then I provide evidence that firms improve their reporting quality after office change. Firms' financial reports are less likely to be restated and more readable. The effects start in the first year of office change and are stronger for firms with long office tenure. The SEC is more likely to be involved in newly assigned firms' restatements and asks fewer questions about severe issues in the comment letter. Overall, the results suggest that office change brings a "fresh look" benefit and leads to an increase in the intensity of SEC oversight. Firms improve their reporting quality by anticipating the increase.

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