Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / "5 April 2007." "National Defense Univ Norfolk VA"--DTIC cover. AD-A468 782. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-101). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--Baylor University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 134-139).

Vietnam War literature is a reflection of a sustained tension between politics and history on the one hand and morality and the effect of the war on human nature on the other hand. Although the authors under discussion urge the reader to forget the political, moral and historical milieu of the Vietnam War, it is impossible to separate the war from those three factors and by extension, the literature that stems from it. I have chosen Philip Caputo’s A Rumor of War (1977) and Robert Mason’s Chickenhawk (1983) because I think they represent, perhaps in the simplest and least obtrusive way, the voices of 55 000 men whose names appear on a black, granite wall in Washington. The authors chose to write their respective memoirs for the Everyman who died in, or lived through, the aberration that was Vietnam. Through their reconstruction of the war and their experiences, they keep the demand for recognition of those who fought (whether morally sanctioned or not) in Vietnam for their country. While American society tried to force the war from its psyche because so many of them thought it was unjust, immoral and unnecessary, authors like Caputo and Mason demanded that the nation examine itself on the whole and reconsider its political endeavours. But perhaps one of the starkest revelations is their portrayal of the corruption of innocence, loyalty and idealism of those soldiers who represented their country abroad.

This thesis describes the development of psychological operations capabilities, introduction of forces, and the employment in Vietnam during the period 1960-1965. The complex interplay of these activities is addressed, as well as the development of PSYOP doctrine and training in the period prior to the introduction of ground combat forces in 1965. The American PSYOP advisory effort supported the South Vietnamese at all levels, providing access to training, material support, and critical advice. In these areas the American effort was largely successful. Yet, instability in the wake of President Ngo Dinh Diem's overthrow created an impediment to the ability of psychological operations to change behaviors and positively affect the outcome.

Life Holders is a collection of personal essays reflecting on my interactions with others concerning my military service.

Robert S. McNamara served as U.S. Secretary of Defense (SOD) for Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. McNamara participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations in 1961 and became a key formulator of Vietnam policy. This thesis challenges scholarship that characterizes McNamara as a fierce hawk who relentlessly executed military escalation in Vietnam. By drawing parallels between McNamara’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War, and by exploring how McNamara’s concept of loyalty to the presidency influenced his decisions, this thesis argues that the SOD was willing to escalate the situation militarily as a form of political communication with the adversary. To McNamara, military pressure was a means to create avenues for diplomacy. McNamara became increasingly uncomfortable – and ultimately resigned in 1968 - when the Johnson administration pursued military escalation without an organized campaign towards negotiations. He was therefore not as hawkish as other scholars have claimed. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2020. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

A delayed type of combat-related disorder among Vietnam veterans has resulted in increasing numbers of such veterans seeking mental health assistance and the inclusion of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a new classification in the DSM III. With symptoms of re-experiencing, emotional numbing, hyper-alertness, sleep disturbance, survival guilt and avoidance, PTSD can be extremely disruptive of social, intellectual, and occupational functioning. While imaginal flooding of combat scenes has been shown to dramatically reduce PTSD symptomatology, the only supporting evidence published to date has been case studies. This is the first controlled study of the treatment using a clinical sample of the population. Subjects were sixteen male Vietnam combat—exposed veterans who sought out patient treatment at the VAMC in Salem, Virginia. Aged 33 to 40, they all suffered from PTSD. A yoked design was utilized in which one group (£;8) received a supplemental flooding treatment and the other (ns=8) did not. All subjects received standard hospital out patient treatment which generally consisted of both Vietnam Veteran group and individual therapy. / Ph. D. / incomplete_metadata

This master's thesis deals with the development and implementation of counterinsurgency warfare by the military and government of the United States during the Vietnam War. The main point of this work revolves around the fact that the United States did not develop a successful and comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine during this period. However, certain counterinsurgency units and programs were developed that did achieve success in deterring the guerrilla war waged by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. The Phoenix Program and especially the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program, which was developed and operated by the U.S. Army Special Forces, proved that counterinsurgency warfare could be waged successfully against an elusive foe. As the Vietnam War escalated, the United States relied upon the technology, the mobility, and the firepower of America's conventional military to try and destroy an unconventional enemy. This reliance upon conventional military strategies and tactics eventually led to the withdrawal of American troops and the defeat of the Republic of Vietnam by the communist forces of North Vietnam. I believe that the United States and the Republic of Vietnam could have prevented a communist victory through the proper development of counterinsurgency warfare doctrine. This doctrine would include a combination of counterinsurgency tactics and strategies I social reform, economic assistance, military training, and political stability. The United States learned many valuable lessons in Vietnam, including the importance of maintaining specialized units that could be used to fight a limited war against a dedicated enemy with a political agenda. Warfare has never been an exact science, and a nation must be prepared to deal with any contingency. / Master of Arts

This study examines how three liberal publications (Washington Post, Newsweek, and New Republic) and three conservative publications (Wall Street Journal, U.S. News & World Report, and National Review) reported six different events of the Vietnam War. Chapter one will examine the publications’ coverage of the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August 1964 and the November 1965 Pleiku attack. The 1968 Tet offensive will be the concern of chapter two. Chapter three looks at how the six publications covered the My Lai incident, the Christmas bombing of 1972 (Linebacker II), and the release of American prisoners of war (Operation Homecoming). / Master of Arts

This thesis examines the communist insurgencies in Malaya (1948-1960) and Vietnam(1961-1963). A British Colonial Service Officer, Robert Thompson, helped develop the successful counterinsurgency doctrine during the Malayan Emergency. Later he carried this knowledge to Vietnam to help in the anti-Viet Cong struggle. U.S. leaders welcomed lessons of the Malayan Emergency and their application in parts to the Vietnamese situation in the form of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Thompson’s transfer of knowledge from Malaya to Vietnam shows a historical analogy taken out of context by U.S. leadership. I begin my study by looking at British evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine and practices, specifically the New Villages in Malaya, and Robert Thompson’s role in the process. The second chapter examines Thompson’s transferal of Malayan knowledge to Vietnam and the U.S. acceptance of and support for his efforts. I also compare these insurgencies in chapter two to show the differences between them and prove my thesis. Finally, the third chapter shows some reasons why the Strategic Hamlet Program failed and whether Thompson’s program was doomed to fail or not. By examining the Strategic Hamlet Program, an understanding of how the U.S. evolved policy in the Vietnam War becomes possible. / Master of Arts