Dissertation (Ph.D.) -- The Institute for Clinical Social Work, 1994. / A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Institute of Clinical Social Work in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-137).

This thesis examines the communist insurgencies in Malaya (1948-1960) and Vietnam(1961-1963). A British Colonial Service Officer, Robert Thompson, helped develop the successful counterinsurgency doctrine during the Malayan Emergency. Later he carried this knowledge to Vietnam to help in the anti-Viet Cong struggle. U.S. leaders welcomed lessons of the Malayan Emergency and their application in parts to the Vietnamese situation in the form of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Thompson’s transfer of knowledge from Malaya to Vietnam shows a historical analogy taken out of context by U.S. leadership. I begin my study by looking at British evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine and practices, specifically the New Villages in Malaya, and Robert Thompson’s role in the process. The second chapter examines Thompson’s transferal of Malayan knowledge to Vietnam and the U.S. acceptance of and support for his efforts. I also compare these insurgencies in chapter two to show the differences between them and prove my thesis. Finally, the third chapter shows some reasons why the Strategic Hamlet Program failed and whether Thompson’s program was doomed to fail or not. By examining the Strategic Hamlet Program, an understanding of how the U.S. evolved policy in the Vietnam War becomes possible. / Master of Arts

On 23 April 1964, five months after assuming the office of President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson launched the "More Flags" program as United States policy. While the publicly stated purpose of.the "More Flags" program was to obtain as much non-military free world aid for the Republic of Vietnam as possible, the program's principle goal centered around Lyndon Johnson's desire to obtain an international consensus for America's policies toward Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The "More Flags" program continued to serve both goals for the remainder of Johnson's presidency. Although started with high expectations of success, the "More Flags" program never succeeded in achieving the levels of international cooperation Lyndon Johnson desired. In fact, the program's significant lack of success necessitated a number of changes, during the program's first year, in both its stated goals and in the methods used to prosecute it's implementation. The most important of these changes would be Washington's use of the program's beneficent objectives to mask it's use as the means through which the United States would purchase mercenary troops to fight in South Vietnam. "Mercenaries in Service to America: The 'More Flags' Foreign Policy of the United States," presents the available history of the "More Flags" program during the years of the Johnson Presidency, with an emphasis on the documentation of the program's use as a disguise for America's obtaining mercenary forces from the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. The non-mercenary troop contributions from Australia and New Zealand are likewise examined. The majority of documentary evidence comes from the original sources documents in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas.

Thesis (M.A.)--Miami University, Dept. of History, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39).