This thesis examines the impact of one party dominant systems on liberal democracy in developing countries. It is insufficient to argue that one party dominant systems – systems where one party dominates over a prolonged period - need not be further scrutinised because they occur within democracies. Instead it is contended that the term ‘democracy’ is but one public virtue in a political system and thus needs to be prefixed for it to have meaning beyond a method of government selection. The importance of this is highlighted when looking at two major trends in the understanding of democracy. The first is democracy as rule by the people -a non-authoritarian democracy- where governmental control is limited, and agents of voice and accountability are protected. Voice and accountability refers to citizens being able to exercise power over the process of decision-making and not merely power to select decision-makers. The second type of democracy is rule for the people -an authoritarian democracy- where governmental control extends over all spheres of society, and the operating space for agents of voice and accountability is constrained. Since unchecked centralisation is the anti-thesis of a non-authoritarian democracy, the observed tendency of dominant parties to use their predominant position to further consolidate their control is a concern. The apprehension is, as power is centralised so the operating space of agents of voice and accountability (including political and civil society) is constrained. Despite differences in the type of one party dominant system, whether they be hegemonic (Mexico) or dominant (South Africa) the ruling dominant/ hegemonic party uses similar methods of consolidating dominance – they essentially centralise power through the establishment of (1) economic, (2) political, and sometimes (3) ideological monopolies. These monopolies are established using internal and external methods of control (centralising of political power; party controlled process of political leadership selection; institutional arrangements and electoral amendments, which favour the ruling party; patronage and corporatism), which in turn effectively close down or limit the operating space of civil and political society, especially in developing countries which do not have histories of liberal-constitutionalism, and have vast socio-economic inequalities making them especially susceptible to the manipulation of ruling elites. Although one party dominant systems may initially have a uniting, stabilising effect, if continued they tend to lead towards either the entrenchment of authoritarianism or the establishment of authoritarianism, since dominance is achieved at the expense of competition, and independent and alternative voices. Uncompetitive democracies result in unresponsive governments. Pursuing a liberal democracy, while simultaneously monopolising power is to indulge in serious programmatic contradictions. Eventually something has to give and it is usually liberal democracy. Voice and accountability inevitably become inhibited in one party dominant systems due to the mechanisms of internal and external control used by the dominant or hegemonic party. These mechanisms of control culminate in, as they did in Mexico, there being ‘no life outside the ruling party’. Only when the economic, political and ideological monopolies are dismantled through either economic liberalisation, opposition maintaining its integrity, civil society keeping its independence and societies refusing to be drawn into relationships of patronage, can the space for voice and accountability be prised open again. In the interests of its citizens and the future success of its country, the ruling party of a one party dominant system needs to recognise that it is not the sole channel for the voice of its citizens and to acknowledge the space for agents of voice and accountability. Ensuring that non-authoritarian democracy remains the only game in town in a one party dominant system requires responsive and accountable government and effective agents of voice and accountability. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

The purpose of this study is to have an in-depth understanding of the importance of the institutional environment for financial development in 43 Sub-Saharan African countries during the years 2004-2018. Using new institutional economic theory (NIE) we study how the four institutional factors Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, and Voice and Accountability affect financial development. We also survey how the effect of institutional factors varies when there are either high, medium or low levels of corruption. Empirical results show a positive linear relationship between all institutional factors and financial development. However, when corruption levels are high the correlation between institutional factors and financial development varies and has a weak linear relationship. Inferential statistics results from a fixed effect regression model with robust standard errors shows; when we control for the financial environment, Political Stability and Absence of Violence is the only indicator for the institutional environment that has a positive significant effect on financial development. We thereby conclude that the institutional environment, mostly political institutions, are important for financial development. / Syftet med denna studie är att få en djupgående förståelse av institutionell miljö för finansiell utveckling i 43 Subsahariska afrikanska länder för åren 2004–2018. Med hjälp av den nya institutionella ekonomiska teorin undersöker vi hur de fyra institutionella faktorer Kontroll av Korruption, Rättsstat, Politisk Stabilitet och Frånvaro av Våld och Röst och Ansvarsskyldighet påverkar finansiell utveckling. Vi undersöker också hur effekten av institutionella faktorer varierar när det finns hög, medium eller låg nivå av korruption. Empiriskt resultat visar ett positivt linjärt samband mellan alla institutionella faktorer och finansiell utveckling. Däremot, när korruptions nivåerna är höga är korrelationen mellan institutionella faktorer och finansiell utveckling varierar och har ett svagt linjärt samband. Resultatet från inferentiell statistik med fixed-effektregressionsmodell med robust standardfel visar att; när vi kontrollerar för den finansiella miljön, kvarstår endast Politisk Stabilitet och Frånvaro av Våld som en indikator för institutionell miljö som har en positiv signifikant effekt på finansiell utveckling. Vi konstaterar därmed att institutionell miljö, särskilt politiska institutioner är viktiga för finansiell utveckling.