No description available.

No description available.

The present dissertation develops some theoretical models which analyze the impact on wages of the financial and technological choices operated by firms. Chapter I considers the effects of technological change on efficiency-wages. We adopt Kremer's (1993) "O-Ring" production function, where technical progress can be represented through a change in the number of tasks to be performed in production. More complex production processes imply higher wage levels and higher general equilibrium unemployment. The model is extended to analyze within-group wage dispersion. In Chapter II, we adopt an alternating-calls strategic bargaining model where the incentive to reach an early agreement does not rely on time-preferences, but on intrinsic decay in the cake's size. When outside options remain positive and constant over time and the interval between calls shrinks to zero, the solution to this game converges to the Nash-solution, where the outside options take the status quo positions. This result contrasts with Rubinstein (1982), where outside options can matter only as corner- solutions. The model is extended to consider the role of market factors on wage determination. Chapter III considers the strategic role of debt in wage negotiations. Since debt provides a "credible threat" in bargaining, the entrepreneur can increase her profits by borrowing. Debt, thus, constitutes a (partial) remedy to Grout's (1984) under-investment problem. Chapter IV extends the model developed in Chapter III to analyze the implications that strategic borrowing can have on technological sophistication. We show that debt may have positive effects not only on the quantity of investment, but also on the degree of sophistication of the chosen projects. Chapter V (with G. Marini) analyses the role of foreign debt in promoting investment in Less Developed Countries that are subject to political risks. We show that, when default can trigger trade sanctions, foreign debt reduces the negative effects of political uncertainty on capital accumulation. Chapter VI (with F.Bagliano) contrasts the explanation for mark-up countercyclicality offered by the "price-war" model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) with the alternative explanation, based on "liquidity constraints", proposed by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996).

No description available.

Chen, Fengjiao. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 34-35). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Wage Bargaining and Strike --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Outside Option --- p.7 / Chapter 3 --- The Model Setting --- p.9 / Chapter 4 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1 --- Equilibrium when b < We --- p.12 / Chapter 4.2 --- Equilibrium when b = We --- p.13 / Chapter 4.3 --- Equilibrium when b > We --- p.15 / Chapter 4.4 --- Opting Out is an Equilibrium --- p.26 / Chapter 4.5 --- Implications on Preemption and Renegotiation --- p.27 / Chapter 5 --- Discussion --- p.28 / Chapter 5.1 --- Without Outside Option (HHFG Model) --- p.28 / Chapter 5.2 --- Committed to Strike (Shaked 1994) --- p.29 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Influence of discount factor 5 --- p.30 / Chapter 5.4 --- Equilibrium Refinement by Good Faith Bargaining Rule --- p.31 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.32

<p>Calmfors and Driffill in 1988 argued that there is a humpshaped relation between the degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures within an economy and unemployment. They collected aggregate economic data from 17 different OECD economies and ranked them according to their relative degree of centralisation to prove their model. The model was further developed by Rowthorn who in 1992, using individual data from the same countries, concluded that there is a negative linear relationship between the degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures and wage dispersion.</p><p>During the past two decades the Russian economy, as well as the Russian trade union movement, has transformed greatly. Membership rates in trade unions have fallen and bargaining leverage of trade unions vis-á-vis employers has decreased. Using data from ten sectors within the Russian economy (collected in interviews with trade union representatives in Moscow, June 2006) this essay questions whether the theoretical assumptions above hold in the Russian context. By ranking the sectors according to their relative degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures and using these rankings as explanatory variables in econometric analyses with unemployment rates and wage dispersion rates as dependent variables, this essay finds little proof that the theoretical framework of Calmfors and Driffill holds within the Russian economy. However, Rowthorn’s model of centralisation and wage dispersion seems to be more valid.</p>

<p>During the Fall of 2001 a survey created by Kathleen Cannings and sponsored by the Swedish Medical Association was sent out to a random sample of 1 out of every 12 medical doctors in Sweden. Using this data, linear regressions have been estimates to study the effects of variables such as age, gender, and unionization on the wages of Swedish doctors. The results indicate that variables such as age, tenure, and union bargaining all have a positive impact on wages. The relative wage advantage was around 7 percent for both age and union bargaining, while the effect of tenure was lower by about 5 percent. These three variables have more positive effects for male doctors, which suggest that gender discrimination is still a reality in the medical field. During 2001, male physicians could expect an almost 6 percent higher average wage than their female colleges.</p>

During the Fall of 2001 a survey created by Kathleen Cannings and sponsored by the Swedish Medical Association was sent out to a random sample of 1 out of every 12 medical doctors in Sweden. Using this data, linear regressions have been estimates to study the effects of variables such as age, gender, and unionization on the wages of Swedish doctors. The results indicate that variables such as age, tenure, and union bargaining all have a positive impact on wages. The relative wage advantage was around 7 percent for both age and union bargaining, while the effect of tenure was lower by about 5 percent. These three variables have more positive effects for male doctors, which suggest that gender discrimination is still a reality in the medical field. During 2001, male physicians could expect an almost 6 percent higher average wage than their female colleges.

Calmfors and Driffill in 1988 argued that there is a humpshaped relation between the degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures within an economy and unemployment. They collected aggregate economic data from 17 different OECD economies and ranked them according to their relative degree of centralisation to prove their model. The model was further developed by Rowthorn who in 1992, using individual data from the same countries, concluded that there is a negative linear relationship between the degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures and wage dispersion. During the past two decades the Russian economy, as well as the Russian trade union movement, has transformed greatly. Membership rates in trade unions have fallen and bargaining leverage of trade unions vis-á-vis employers has decreased. Using data from ten sectors within the Russian economy (collected in interviews with trade union representatives in Moscow, June 2006) this essay questions whether the theoretical assumptions above hold in the Russian context. By ranking the sectors according to their relative degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures and using these rankings as explanatory variables in econometric analyses with unemployment rates and wage dispersion rates as dependent variables, this essay finds little proof that the theoretical framework of Calmfors and Driffill holds within the Russian economy. However, Rowthorn’s model of centralisation and wage dispersion seems to be more valid.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Cornell University, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references.