Before the introduction of the Euro many observers had expected an increase of inflationary pressures due to a de-coordination-shock to national wage bargaining. However, if anything systematically happened after the introduction of the Euro wage restraint increased (Posen and Gould 2006). A possible explanation for this finding is that a system of pattern bargaining has emerged with Germany figuring as a "centre of gravity" for European wage bargains (Traxler et al. 2008, Traxler and Brandl 2009). This paper studies wage and nominal unit labour cost spill-overs for the EMU for a panel over 13 manufacturing sectors from 1992-2005 and quantifies the effects of different countries. It turns out that there are strong interdependencies across EMU-members with regard to nominal wage growth. Indeed, a leading role accrues to Germany whose wage developments are twice as influential as those of the next important countries. Remarkably, the strong interdependence of wage growth is not reflected with regard to unit labour costs. Here, only the development in a core group composed of Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands, is bound to each other. The development of nominal unit labour costs in other countries is largely independent from each other and especially from this core group. (author´s abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Throughout the Eurozone’s economic crisis, little attention has been given to wage-setting practices. This lack of attention is surprising given that wages have been considered an important instrument for managing the economy in a currency union since the 1960s and have even been emphasized in successive blueprints for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Recent scholarship has found differences in wage-setting practices a key feature distinguishing healthy and crisis-stricken Eurozone countries. Indeed, in this emerging literature, countries that coordinate wages effectively have remained competitive under EMU and had fewer troubles in responding to the crisis, while those with weakly-coordinated wages have struggled mightily. In effect, this literature finds differences in EMU members’ wage-setting regimes at the heart of the economic crisis now facing the Eurozone and the trade imbalances between its Northern and Southern members. However, very little work has examined the specifics of individual labour market models under EMU. Indeed, while this new literature on wage setting and the crisis places wage setting models at its centre, it does not delve into the differences among highly coordinated systems. This oversight is problematic given that scholars of monetary union have suggested that the single currency may amplify the effects of subtle differences in national socioeconomic models, while others have suggested that EMU may be corrosive to some labour market models that coordinate wage setting. This study addresses this gap in the literature, dissecting labour market models by the mechanisms that deliver horizontal and vertical coordination, as well as the indicators to which they are calibrated. Using this framework, it then traces the experiences of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands under EMU, who use very different mechanisms to coordinate wages. It argues that while EMU has exacerbated longstanding problems in the Belgian wage-bargaining system, it has had little impact upon the German and Dutch systems. Rather, underlying changes in the institutions that manage wage setting in these countries, and changes in social partner organizations – particularly the trade unions – are far more consequential for their continued functioning under EMU. More broadly, these findings suggest that in fact, many designs of highly coordinated wage setting are capable of managing pressures from the single currency. For those Eurozone countries currently refashioning their labour market models, tighter coordination may be just as viable an option as dismantling their wage-bargaining institutions. / Graduate / 0615 / ifdumka@gmail.com

The main contribution of my thesis is the analysis of substantial empirical material that I have collected from Community trade union actors. My analysis focuses on the institutional strategies of the sectoral European trade union federations and their implications for the Europeanisation of wages policy. I have demonstrated that the development of European coordination processes of national collective bargaining, particularly at sectoral level, has contributed to reviving the concept of collective bargaining and professional relations in the European Area, which until then had been covered in the literature by the social dialogue. I have identified three obstacles to collective negociations at a European level: the “depoliticised” wage in the economic partnership, employers identified as the “lobby partner” in the sectoral social dialogue, and the difficulties encountered in the Europeanisation of trade unions. L’apport majeur de notre thèse est l’analyse d’un matériel empirique conséquent que nous avons collecté auprès des acteurs syndicaux communautaires. Notre analyse se concentre sur les stratégies institutionnelles des fédérations syndicales sectorielles européennes et sur leurs implications en matière d’européanisation de la politique salariale. Nous avons démontré que le développement des processus de coordination européenne des négociations collectives nationales, en particulier au niveau sectoriel, peut contribuer à renouveler la conception de la négociation collective et des relations professionnelles dans l’espace européen jusqu’alors appréhendée dans la littérature par le dialogue social. Nous avons identifié trois obstacles à la négociation collective européenne : le salaire « dépolitisé » dans le partenariat économique, le patronat devenu « partenaire-lobby » dans le dialogue social sectoriel, et la difficile européanisation syndicale.

The main contribution of my thesis is the analysis of substantial empirical material that I have collected from Community trade union actors. My analysis focuses on the institutional strategies of the sectoral European trade union federations and their implications for the Europeanisation of wages policy. I have demonstrated that the development of European coordination processes of national collective bargaining, particularly at sectoral level, has contributed to reviving the concept of collective bargaining and professional relations in the European Area, which until then had been covered in the literature by the social dialogue. I have identified three obstacles to collective negociations at a European level: the “depoliticised” wage in the economic partnership, employers identified as the “lobby partner” in the sectoral social dialogue, and the difficulties encountered in the Europeanisation of trade unions.<p><p>L’apport majeur de notre thèse est l’analyse d’un matériel empirique conséquent que nous avons collecté auprès des acteurs syndicaux communautaires. Notre analyse se concentre sur les stratégies institutionnelles des fédérations syndicales sectorielles européennes et sur leurs implications en matière d’européanisation de la politique salariale. Nous avons démontré que le développement des processus de coordination européenne des négociations collectives nationales, en particulier au niveau sectoriel, peut contribuer à renouveler la conception de la négociation collective et des relations professionnelles dans l’espace européen jusqu’alors appréhendée dans la littérature par le dialogue social. Nous avons identifié trois obstacles à la négociation collective européenne :le salaire « dépolitisé » dans le partenariat économique, le patronat devenu « partenaire-lobby » dans le dialogue social sectoriel, et la difficile européanisation syndicale.<p><p><p> / Doctorat en sciences sociales, Orientation sociologie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished