Russia's renewed interest and involvement in the African continent is reminiscent of a time when the Soviet Union supported various ideologically aligned groups to win a geopolitical power struggle and assert its position as a global superpower. The motives seem to have changed, but the question is whether Russian warfare in Africa has changed as well. In this comparative study, the Soviet Union's support for the MPLA and their takeover in Angola in 1975 is compared with Russia's support for the military junta that seized power in Mali after a military coup in 2020, aiming to determine how Russian/Soviet warfare in Africa has evolved over time. Supported by Thomas Rid and Lars Ulfving's theoretical framework on so-called active measures, three operationalized variables are identified and analyzed as: white, gray, and black. Through qualitative text analysis, reports and literature from the cases are examined. The results of this study provide a deeper understanding of how hybrid warfare has been and is currently used as a means of Russian influence in Africa. The methods for this have rather been reinforced than changed historically by global development trends, especially the spread of information technology and the utilization of private companies and other actors. This study has confirmed that there is a historically rooted common Russian strategy to acquire and exert influence, a strategy based on the Soviet Union's traditional methods, active measures. A dual strategy consisting of both official policies and unofficial means where the unofficial means are driven by private actors, facilitating Russia's plausible deniability.

This study delves into the conflict landscape in the form of a case study of the Central African Republic, with a specific focus on the involvement of the private military company Wagner Group, framed within Mary Kaldor's theory of New Wars. The theory emphasises that since the 1990s wars have been carried out in the name of identity politics, are between the state and non-state actors, that violence is directed at civilians and that the global economy is a driving condition. These characteristics are generally true for the conflict in CAR. The Wagner Group's role remains largely unexplored within academic circles, necessitating a closer examination of its impact on conflict dynamics to better understand the broader implications for regional stability and global power dynamics. Since CAR became independent in 1960, CAR has been imprinted by armed conflict and widespread violence against civilians. In 2018 the government ceded parts of its monopoly on violence to the Wagner group through an agreement where the group protects the state in exchange for access to natural resources. The Wagner group's presence also contributes to increased regional conflict dynamics and can lead to increased violence and criminal activity.

CHARLES UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES Institute of Political Studies Department of Geopolitical Studies Master's Thesis Wagner Group and Opportunism in Russian Foreign Policy: Case Studies of the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Mozambique Abstract This research paper concerns Russian foreign policy and the tools it uses to accomplish its objectives. More specifically, the research is focused on the secretive private military company (PMC) Wagner Group. Wagner Group has been deployed around the globe to further the interests of Russia and is a key tool in Russia's opportunistic foreign policy. This paper seeks to answer the research question: At what point does the risk for Russia become too high to maintain the deployment of Wagner Group in a foreign country? Answering this research question will help academics and policymakers further understand the use of Wagner Group by the Russian government. Wagner Group is meant to be low risk to Russia. Previous research is sparse and often covers many deployments of Wagner Group. In contrast, this paper focuses on three case studies that allow for a more in- depth approach - Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Mozambique. Using qualitative analysis this paper discerned that in its use of Wagner Group, Russia will...