The imperial visits to the United States by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 1954 and Emperor Hirohito of Japan in 1975, while billed as unofficial by all parties involved, demonstrated the problematic nature of America's unstable Cold War political agendas, connected African and Asian Americans with alternative sources of race, nationality, and ethnic pride, and created spaces for the emperors to reinforce domestic policies while advancing their nations on the world stage. Just as America's civil and governmental forces came together during the imperial tours, in 1954 and 1975 respectively, to strongly promote Cold War ideological narratives to a global audience, African American and Japanese American racial and ethnic groups within the United States created their own interpretations of the tours. Likewise, the governments and imperial institutions of Ethiopia and Japan both appropriated American efforts in an attempt to renegotiate political relationships and produce imperial narratives for domestic consumption. However, fundamental contradictions arose during these tours as both Ethiopia and Japan simultaneously sought to embrace America and to expand their presence on the world stage. The full nature of the political, economic, and social ramifications of these two imperial visits, and the contradictions in American's Cold War policies revealed by the tours, has yet to be explored. Reactions to the emperors' tours demonstrated the connections and conflicts between race, nation, and identity. Further the narratives of Ethiopia's and Japan's role on the world stage, particularly during these "unofficial" imperial tours, have yet to be fully examined by historians. Only by examining the emperors' tours within a broader transnational context, taking multiple political, racial, and economic perspectives into account, can the consequences of these visits be fully observed and understood.

The aim of the research was to consider the relationship of political ends and the use of military force and, using empirical data gathered from South Africa's experience from 1987 to 1988, to consider whether there might be any implications for existing theory. The question that was formulated for research was: What relationship could be distinguished between the South African government's use of military force in Angola and the government's political ends? The conclusion was reached that the relationship of the application of military force by the South African government to the attainment of political ends was one of inhibition. The concept of 'inhibitive war', refers to the severe .restraint on the use of military force, resulting from the influences of environmental conditions on political ends, so that the political ends themselves become a restriction on the achievement of military aims. / Political Sciences / M.A. (Strategic Studies)

The aim of the research was to consider the relationship of political ends and the use of military force and, using empirical data gathered from South Africa's experience from 1987 to 1988, to consider whether there might be any implications for existing theory. The question that was formulated for research was: What relationship could be distinguished between the South African government's use of military force in Angola and the government's political ends? The conclusion was reached that the relationship of the application of military force by the South African government to the attainment of political ends was one of inhibition. The concept of 'inhibitive war', refers to the severe .restraint on the use of military force, resulting from the influences of environmental conditions on political ends, so that the political ends themselves become a restriction on the achievement of military aims. / Political Sciences / M.A. (Strategic Studies)