The differences in the international responses to the violent conflicts in East Timor (1998–1999), Maluku (1999–2003) and Aceh (1998–2005) are examined in this research. Given the growing acceptance of the significance of the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, the humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh might prima facie have justified humanitarian intervention similar to that in East Timor. By analysing the differences from the Indonesia’s domestic political point of view it is clear that the conscience-shocking situation caused by the violent conflicts was not the compelling factor for the international community to militarily intervene. The deployment of a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) was decided only after the UN and foreign major countries believed that such military intervention would not jeopardize the ongoing process of democratization in Indonesia. This suggested that Indonesia’s domestic circumstance was central to whether a similar measure in Maluku and Aceh would take place or not. Due to the reformasi (political reform) in Indonesia within which the independence of East Timor took place, two main changes within Indonesian politics, namely the growing sentiment of anti-international intervention and the continuing democratization process, helped to ensure that humanitarian intervention in the two other regions did not happen. / These two conditions were fortified by the increasingly consolidated democratic politics which brought the communal conflict in Maluku to the Malino Peace Agreement. The emergence of a stronger and democratic government in Indonesia, furthermore, made cooperation with the international community possible in seeking a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict in Aceh. By involving the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) agreed to the Helsinki peace agreement and accepted the role of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to secure its implementation. Thus, a strong democratic government made an international military intervention for humanitarian purposes unnecessary.

After the end of Cold War, the US has involved in several battles such as two Golf Wars, Afghanistan War, and Kosovo War. With the integration of C4ISR system, the model of existing war has been redefined and changed from the traditional type of ¡§force to force¡¨ to the new type of ¡§hide and seek.¡¨ To integrate the new generation of technology in war has become the main objective of each national department of defense in the world. However if we take the lessons of war which mentioned above and think in the opposite direction from the classical theory of war, the basics of high military performance of the US force are not concluded only by the enhancement of high tech weapons. What else are the key issues which influence the consequence of war? Even the human society has evolved into the age of globalization and information. During the progress of economic integration between two sides of Taiwan Strait, the growing interactivity of economy does not have flow-out effect on the politics. Moreover the conflicts between two political powers become more and more apparent. Political conflicts also turn this area into the powder magazine of war in the world. The overall strength of China, the only imagined adversary of our country, has leapt forward since public revolution in 1978. For years, economic revolution has pushed the pace of China¡¦s military modernization faster and faster. For example, People¡¦s Republic Army has taken a great leap on the training exercise with the expansion of military exchange and with the equipment of new Soviet aircrafts. This new trend is taking away the advantage of quality of our Air Force. This brief takes the new trend in consideration and researches from the perspective of military operation. Questions are obtained from the basic fly training, the cornerstone of Air Force foundation. Taking the well-known strong force of US for example, this brief tries to realize the nature of Air Force through researching the ability of military personnel and to compare the difference of Air Force on basic fly training with other modern countries. The main objective of this brief tries to establish the basics of research and thesis using the research model concerning about subjects of constructing national defense. This brief uses the methods of analysis and comparison together to increase the precision of research theory as well. Even with the restrictions of flexibility and sampling, the first conclusion still shows there is no large difference on basic fly training between R.O.C and US. Cadets finished basic trainings have different fly abilities in R.O.C and US. The leading factors which conclude this difference are not only the training resources and environment but also the enforcement of training and the control of standards in US. Therefore, even the modernization of weapon gets faster and faster, the national force still has the great responsibility of defending national security. Bedsides expending more on military purchase, finding a way to strengthen the basic training which benefits the overall military power is not the one we can throw away.

Thesis (MMil (Security and Africa Studies. Military History)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Henry Timson Lukin was born and educated in Britain. After completion of his schooling at the Merchant Taylor’s School in 1875 he had hoped to enter the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, but failed the entry examinations. However, seizing the moment of a war in South Africa, he left in 1879 for Natal, where he worked first as a road foreman, but soon, with the help of a cousin, Lieutenant Jack Spurgin, he was commissioned into the 77th Regiment and under the command of Major H.M. Bengough and saw service during the Anglo-Zulu War. Having distinguished himself in the field in Zululand, Lukin was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Cape Mounted Riflemen (CMR) and served with this outfit in the Basuto War (1881), the Langeberg campaign (1896-97) and the South African War (1899-1902). During the South African War he received the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for the defence of Jammersbergdrift and played an important role in capturing key rebel commando leaders, including Commandant Johannes Lötter and Commandant Gideon Scheepers. After the war he received the Commander of the Order of St Michael & St George (CMG) and was appointed as the Commandant General of the Cape Colonial Forces. He played an important role in establishing the structures of the Union Defence Forces (UDF) and was appointed as Inspector General of the Permanent Force in 1912. He influenced the debate on colonial warfare with the writing of the maxim handbook and a training pamphlet, Savage Warfare: Hints on Tactics to be adopted and Precautions to be taken and during the First World War distinguished himself as commander of a force of the South African troops in German South-West Africa (1914-1915) and as commander of the South African Brigade in Egypt (1916) and in France (1916-17). He was promoted to Major General when he assumed the command the 9th Scottish Division in December 1916. In 1917 one of the highest honours was bestowed upon him when he was knighted. The illness of his wife, Annie Marie (Lily) necessitated a transfer to Britain, where he commanded the 64th Division until the end of the war. He retired from the military shortly after the Armistice and returned with his wife to South Africa, where he remained active in a variety of ex-servicemen’s organisations, including that of 1 South African Infantry Brigade. He was also a guest speaker at various functions, including the unveiling of monuments and memorials, and served on the Defence Commission of Enquiry (1924). Major General Sir Henry Timson Lukin died after a full, varied and distinguished military career in December 1925. Lukin and the Brigade had an enormous impact on the creation of a new South African identity during the First World War and period immediately after and played an important role in the formation of a new South African military organisation and culture.

In order to explain presidential decisions to use force, a model is developed that incorporates three distinct decision-making environments. The results indicate the president is responsive not only to domestic and international environments, but also to the resource evaluation environment. The evidence here demonstrates that while these two environments are important the president can't use force arbitrarily; rather, his evaluation of resources available for the use of force can limit his ability to engage the military during crisis situations.

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / This thesis examines the U.S. policy for employing military forces across the globe. The major transformational trends in improving U.S. military capabilities over the past two decades, and the changing international security environment have impacted the way in which American leaders focus on the global military posture strategy. The American military interventions in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan help determine whether the United States has demonstrated true global reach capability without the advantage of permanent forward operating bases. The Philippines-U.S relationship provides an opportunity to assess whether the United States has demonstrated the capability and commitment to defend its national interests and its ally and to maintain peace and stability despite the removal of major U.S. bases. U.S. capability and commitment may allow greater flexibility in choosing alternatives to the current policy of permanent forward basing around the globe.

The aim of the research was to consider the relationship of political ends and the use of military force and, using empirical data gathered from South Africa's experience from 1987 to 1988, to consider whether there might be any implications for existing theory. The question that was formulated for research was: What relationship could be distinguished between the South African government's use of military force in Angola and the government's political ends? The conclusion was reached that the relationship of the application of military force by the South African government to the attainment of political ends was one of inhibition. The concept of 'inhibitive war', refers to the severe .restraint on the use of military force, resulting from the influences of environmental conditions on political ends, so that the political ends themselves become a restriction on the achievement of military aims. / Political Sciences / M.A. (Strategic Studies)

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons: lack of trust, DPRK reluctance to permit transparency, and the difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is unwilling to back a threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons. / Major, United States Air Force

The aim of the research was to consider the relationship of political ends and the use of military force and, using empirical data gathered from South Africa's experience from 1987 to 1988, to consider whether there might be any implications for existing theory. The question that was formulated for research was: What relationship could be distinguished between the South African government's use of military force in Angola and the government's political ends? The conclusion was reached that the relationship of the application of military force by the South African government to the attainment of political ends was one of inhibition. The concept of 'inhibitive war', refers to the severe .restraint on the use of military force, resulting from the influences of environmental conditions on political ends, so that the political ends themselves become a restriction on the achievement of military aims. / Political Sciences / M.A. (Strategic Studies)

he title above comprises elements of the strategic studies concept 'foundations of military force'. Military force has been the final arbiter between the political entities of mankind throughout all ages. The prevalence of this social scourge has left a footprint in every dispensation of man's efforts at civilisation. Regrettably, warfare was and remains one of the core characteristics of human nature. The artefacts of antiquity are catalogued in archaeological periods. In nearly every instance each layer of human settlement is separated by the effects of warfare. Rather than a sub-discipline on the periphery it is demonstrated herein that military archaeology, refined with the post-World War Two scientific discipline of polemology, can and ought to be moved onto the centre stage of archaeology. The application of core polemological concepts to IA IIa accurately describes the unfolding of the United Monarchy's capacity to pursue political goals commensurate with its evolutionary war potential. / Religious Studies & Arabic / M.A. (Biblical Studies)

This thesis examines the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) from 1947 until it ceased to exist under that name with the release of the report of the Millar Inquiry in 1974. This thesis examines three broad areas: the organizational changes that the CMF adopted or had imposed upon it; the political decision-making surrounding the CMF; and a social analysis of the CMF which questions the viability and validity of a number of the CMF???s long held precepts. The thesis will show that the majority of circumstances and decisions surrounding the CMF were beyond its control. For example, the CMF could not change the prevailing military thought of the post-war period which emphasized increasingly the role of smaller, professional, readily-available armies. The first three chapters recount the CMF???s ???heyday??? in which the Army, assisted by National Service after 1950, was based around it and its influence at the highest levels was strongest. The next two chapters chronicle the background to Australia???s adoption of the ???Pentropic??? organization and the repercussions this had on the CMF. Chapters Six and Seven examine the consequences of the introduction of a second compulsory service scheme and the concomitant result which precluded the CMF from operational service in Vietnam. Chapters Eight and Nine deal with the Millar Inquiry, which offered the CMF a new hope, but in some regards, brought forth little beneficial gains for the CMF. The final chapters analyze some of the characteristics unique to the CMF, such as territorial affiliation, high turnover rates amongst the rank and file and the concept of the ???brilliant amateur???. This thesis concludes that, despite the mixed performance of the CMF, there is still a place for the citizen soldier in contemporary warfare, but far more consideration at the highest political and military levels must be given to the peculiar and difficult, but by no means insurmountable, problems citizen soldiering encounters in Australia.