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This is a study of regional security in the Middle East from a Critical Security Studies perspective. The main aim of the thesis is to provide an account of the pasts, presents and futures of regional security in the Middle East cognisant of the relationships between the three in one's thinking as well as practices. This is achieved through the threefold structure of the thesis, which looks at Cold War pasts (Part I), post-Cold War presents (Part II) and possible futures (Part III). The thesis also has a set of more specific aims. First, it aims to present a critique of prevailing security discourses in theory and practice with reference to regional security in the Middle East and point to unfulfilled potential immanent in regional politics. Second, the thesis aims to explore the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions and theories and practices of security. And finally, it aims to show how Critical Security Studies might allow one to think differently about the futures of regional security in the Middle East. The overall thesis is that the Critical Security Studies perspective presents a fuller account of regional security in the Middle East; it offers a comprehensive framework recognising the dynamic relationships between various dimensions and levels of security, as voiced by multiple referents.

Thesis (M.A.)--West Virginia University, 2004. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains iv, 125 p. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 118-125).

The aim of this work will be to analyze the final phase of the Cold War. The 1980s was an extraordinary period for anyone interested in the history of the Cold War. Not only did the Cold War end or bring their final stages, but even before the 1980s, with a similarly almost unprecedented limitation of tensions between the two major players in the East-West conflict, the US and the Soviet Union. In my diploma thesis I will analyze the basic premises of the "triumphalistic" and "revisionist" schools of the Cold War. Diploma thesis from the concept of "national security approach". The conclusion of the work is that Ronal Reagan has had an impact on the end of the study wars and thus does not apply the conclusions of the "revisionist" school. However, there are no conclusions that apply only to cases where only diplomatic and compromise measures are involved.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 538-567). Also available on the Internet.

La thèse analyse les transformations de l’encadrement juridique de la guerre, et montre sa reconfiguration contemporaine dans la régulation de la sécurité globale. Celle-ci se caractérisé par des assemblages normatifs nouveaux et par une rationalité managériale visant à gérer la sécurité par l’anticipation des risques. / The dissertation analyzes transformations in the legal construction of war, claiming it is now being reimagined within a global regulation of security. This contemporary security governance is characterized by new normative assemblages and by a managerial rationality, aiming at managing security by preventing risk.

There is little solid research that explores counterinsurgency practices against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), not only from the standpoint of what is being done, but, rather, what should be done based on past COIN successes. Notable works on counterinsurgency in Colombia include the research of Tom Marks, who focused on operational strategy and tactics; Kevin Self, who professes the importance of controlling territory in defeating the FARC, by addressing the social and institutional ills within Colombia itself; and Dennis Rempe, who notes US involvement in shaping Colombia's COIN strategy. Using a comparative case study model, this thesis provides an analysis of Colombia?s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics through the lens of successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Iraq, Algeria, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After all, no matter how successful a COIN force is militarily, their accomplishments will ultimately be fruitless if the conditions which fuel insurgency remains present. This paper begins by providing the historical context for the conditions which shaped the Colombian social order, which led to the revolutionary movement. It then follows the growth of the FARC, examining that organization?s strengths and weaknesses. The FARC is contrasted by outlining recent COIN transformation efforts within the Colombian government, to include little acknowledged failures and successes, strengths and weaknesses. An important focus is placed on Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez? Democratic Security Policy as the model for Colombia?s current COIN efforts. After next examining various ongoing factors contributing to the Colombian insurgency?to include institutional failures, illicit funding and the problem of paramilitary groups?this thesis examines past COIN efforts by other governments. Finally, after applying lessons learned from thee past COIN efforts?cross-referencing historically successful and unsuccessful tactics with tactics used and not used by Bogota in its fight against the FARC?I provide recommendations to the government of Colombia (GOC) on how to improve its COIN efforts. Although it is important to look at this problem set from an external standpoint, we must still factor in internal factors that have limited Colombia?s ability to emerge victorious, such as allowing porous borders, airspace and coastlines; placing a priority on killing or capturing the enemy and not on engaging the population; and the primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency; disregard of basic human rights; an insufficient judiciary structure; failure to halt financial support mechanisms; and the lack of an outlet for political inclusion . From this vantage point, we will be able to see that these elements?when properly implemented?have proven successful over time and may enhance GOC success and ultimately result in victory over the insurgency that has plagued their country for 40+ years