The military concept of a Center of Gravity (COG) in conflicts, introduced by Carl von Clausewitz in the 1820s, is now an element of numerous military doctrines that planners draw on in designing strategies for winning wars. Over the last twenty-five years, the concept has become increasingly central to U.S. warfare doctrine. The world has changed a great deal since the introduction of COG. And in today's asymmetric environment, in which non-state actors use unconventional tactics, it is becoming extremely difficult to apply the COG concept. The primary reason for this difficulty is that non-state actors do not operate as a unitary body, which makes it difficult to target a COG that would lead to a decisive victory. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze both conflicts in which state-sanctioned militaries' applied the COG concept and conflicts in which non-state actors used asymmetric tactics. The thesis attempts to determine the applicability of COG in an asymmetric environment. If the Center of Gravity concept is determined inapplicable, then the U.S. military must either redefine it or create a new means to deal with this new type or warfare. / US Navy (USN) author.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / This thesis is a major review of the acute biological effects of chemical and radiological weapons. These agents of modern warfare have a broader spectrum of biological effects than the weapons of past wars and also present more profound biological sequelae. In order to cope with the threat that these weapons pose, it is necessary to be familiar with the types of agents which might be used, the symptomatology, the modes of physiological effect, and the basic mechanisms of cellular action. The acute radiation syndrome is covered in detail along with hypotheses of the cellular action of ionizing radiation and a review of methods for protection against radiation [TRUNCATED]

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 27, 2003). "June 2000." Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Capital Bible Seminary, 1994.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1995. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-179).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1995. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-179).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1995. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-179).

This thesis examines military performance in both urban and traditional non-urban environments. Cases used in this study are German operations on the Russian front, Israeli operations during the Yom Kippur War, and U.S. Marine operations in South Vietnam. This thesis establishes a framework for analysis consisting of six factors. These include environment, time, informational aspects of military operations, application of existing technology, intangible human factors, and the decisionmaking of both political and military leaders. Analysis of the three cases points to a number of common trends including, shortcomings when units enter in the urban environment. We note a lack of urban operations training, an increase in time to accomplish tasks, a resistance to operate at night, difficulty processing and communicating information, and micromanagement of city fighting by political and military leaders who typically refrain from such management during non-urban combat. Results of this study suggest a need to incorporate consideration of our six factors into current doctrine. / US Army (USA) author.

Thesis advisor: Dr. Hiroshi Nakazato / Thesis advisor: Dr. Gerald Easter / Losing By Winning: America's Challenge Waging Counterinsurgency Warfare is an analytical study of America's experience waging counterinsurgency warfare in the Philippine- American, Vietnam and Iraq Wars. In each war, counterinsurgency warfare was applied to achieve the strategic objectives of American Foreign Policy as outlined by the President of the United States at the outset of each war. Initially, large swaths of the American electorate and political class favored achieving the strategic objectives of each war studied. Over time, as counterinsurgency tactics were put to use, and made headway towards achieving the strategic objectives of the conflict, public support for each war precipitously declined over time and either jeopardized the ability of the United States to complete its counterinsurgency campaign or lose them altogether. This occurred because images of atrocities and perceptions of violations of the laws of warfare (both real or imagined) were formed in the minds of Americans which created a political dynamic where the American public and their elected leaders in Washington D.C. could no longer legitimize continuing to support the ongoing war. The analytical insights drawn from this study give one an understanding of the unique challenges that confront the United States in employing counterinsurgency warfare to achieve the strategic objectives of the United States in the wars its fights. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): John Arquilla, Anna Simons. Includes bibliographical references (p. 182-188). Also available online.