Following two decades of under-investment, vital elements of South African water infrastructure is in serious disrepair, if not in a crisis. The government is challenged by the cumulative demands of sustained economic growth; as well as the new trade and investment opportunities in the post-financial crisis period. There is a serious backlog in water infrastructure investment, for the development and management of water resources and water services. This under-investment is estimated at more than R110 billion. The three spheres of government – national, provincial and local– which have served South Africa well in past decades now appear unable and ill-equipped to grapple with the present planning and delivery challenge. This research project identified a number of funding models (14) for the financing of water infrastructure development projects. However, the classic public provision model of government planned, installed and financed infrastructure with pricing at marginal cost or on a loss–making basis – with returns recovered through the taxation system – continues to characterise much of South Africa’s publicly provided water infrastructure. Nowadays, water infrastructure is split between fully public, and mixed ownership (water agencies and/or entities); Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in the water sector is not yet a full reality. Further innovation in water infrastructure investment, including closing the circle between public and private-sector capital, is required. Complex issues of pricing, access, public policy and regulation, risk–sharing, tendering processes, taxation and governance have arisen as key challenges that will influence whether private provision of water infrastructure can grow as a viable new model in South Africa. Sustainability has introduced a further new dimension into the calculus of water infrastructure provision. Thus, a framework that takes account of environmental and social aspects, as well as economic aspects, is now widely accepted as necessary.

Following two decades of under-investment, vital elements of South African water infrastructure is in serious disrepair, if not in a crisis. The government is challenged by the cumulative demands of sustained economic growth; as well as the new trade and investment opportunities in the post-financial crisis period. There is a serious backlog in water infrastructure investment, for the development and management of water resources and water services. This under-investment is estimated at more than R110 billion. The three spheres of government – national, provincial and local– which have served South Africa well in past decades now appear unable and ill-equipped to grapple with the present planning and delivery challenge. This research project identified a number of funding models (14) for the financing of water infrastructure development projects. However, the classic public provision model of government planned, installed and financed infrastructure with pricing at marginal cost or on a loss–making basis – with returns recovered through the taxation system – continues to characterise much of South Africa’s publicly provided water infrastructure. Nowadays, water infrastructure is split between fully public, and mixed ownership (water agencies and/or entities); Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in the water sector is not yet a full reality. Further innovation in water infrastructure investment, including closing the circle between public and private-sector capital, is required. Complex issues of pricing, access, public policy and regulation, risk–sharing, tendering processes, taxation and governance have arisen as key challenges that will influence whether private provision of water infrastructure can grow as a viable new model in South Africa. Sustainability has introduced a further new dimension into the calculus of water infrastructure provision. Thus, a framework that takes account of environmental and social aspects, as well as economic aspects, is now widely accepted as necessary.

In this study, the rainfall, yield distributed water and water sold¡K¡Ketc., 41 parameters from 1974 to 2006 were assessed the reasonable water rate adjustment. At first, 41 parameters were analyzed by SPSS software for descriptive statistiics, Pearson relational analyzing the data of input/output of correlation with a £^ value and screening of variables. Then, actual water price and designed water price will be the out variable. Try to find the optimal neural network structure and try to analyze and produce the water pricing structure. The results show that the unit profit/loss from sales of Taiwan Water Corporation(TWC) for 33 years from 1974-2006, there are 11 years positive and 22 years negative, especially the past 20 years only on 1990, 2003, and 2005 are positive, the others are negative. TWC had not obtained the reasonable profit. Because since 1996, the range of return on water investment and return on equity are -0.98%-0.1% and 0.07%-0.52% lower than legal standard 5%, respectively. Moreover, the rate of water price for the household consumption expenditure from 0.791% in 1982 decrease to 0.39% in 2006. To compare with the rational level for World Health Organization asserted 2%-4%. The water price of Taiwan is only 10%-20% of the level. Furthermore, the rate of water price for disposable income is from 0.606% in 1982 drops to 0.305% in 2006 and the rate for GDP is 0.18%-0.2% in the past 10 years. In this study, the actual water price and designed water price were set as output parameter. The input variables divide to 29 and 19 units and hidden layer is set 1 or 2 layers. BPN(Back-Propagation Network) were through trial and error method to training, testing, and production the output. The training results show that 19 variables is better than 29 variables while we use actual water price and 2 hidden layers is better than 1 layer. However, when we use designed water price, 19 variables is still better than 29 variables, but 1 hidden layer is better than 2 hidden layers. The best production of water price of 1981, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 are 9.20, 12.62, 20.09, 23.07, 24.39 NT$, respectively. The values are close to designed water price 9.0, 12.6, 19.1, 22.2, 25.5 NT$. Whether we use 29 or 19 variables, 1 or 2 hidden layers, the training results indicated that the water price designed by household consumption expenditure is better than actual water price. Thus, the historical water price did not correspond to real operating costs for TWC in the past. In addition, the designed water price in this research can more correlated with the operating cost and efficiency of TWC.

In the first chapter, I consider the institutional structures as well as the doctrines typically encountered in the surface water sector. To investigate the sources and methods of government support in the water sector, I categorize different sorts of government support according to the location of water along the water cycle. I conclude the section with examples of observed water markets. In the second chapter, I consider the problem of water usage, developing a model to analyze the optimal pricing of water within a second-best economy. As a water supplier, the local government may price discriminate across consumers and farmers. I introduce the second-best pricing scheme, derive conditions for the marginal-cost pricing and inverse-elasticity rules, and analyze when the government optimally deviates from these two pricing schemes. In the third chapter, I provide an analysis of the data I collected from Turkey. First, I examine the data on reservoir flows, including service share and fixed costs of the reservoirs. Then, I provide details about the relationship between the quantity and price of irrigation and of tap water. Finally, in the fourth chapter, I apply the theoretical framework to the data from Turkey. In Turkey, the current water-pricing policy is dictated by the sole objective of breaking-even in each period. This results in large withdrawals, which is not sustainable in the long-run, hence not optimal. I analyze the dynamic optimal water resource management problem of a benevolent government. I compare the implications of the current and the optimal pricing policies.

<p>To address increasing irrigation water demand consecutive to the increasing population pressure in terms of food demand, there is an imperative of developing relevant mechanisms to regulate irrigation water consumption patterns. A radical shift from uncontrolled flooding irrigation as currently practiced by farmers in Mugerero paddy farming zone towards efficient allocation and use of water resources is important to save water that could be allocated to other water users.</p><p>This paper surveys current and past views on the way irrigation water is allocated in the irrigation scheme of Mugerero and how farmers are using water for paddy production purpose. The existing irrigation water practices as well as paddy productivity are assessed and the results are expected to be useful for water policy professionals, while addressing the growing water demand. According to the respondents, the causes of low paddy yields are the increasing and uncontrolled extension of paddy farming, non adapted irrigation infrastructure and water pricing systems as well as lack of updated knowledge and technologies on irrigation. These issues faced by the paddy farmers have led to pronounced economic, social and environmental consequences which are manifested in conflicts over irrigation water use, increasing soil salinity and pollution, destruction of infrastructure and above all, low irrigation paddy yields.The identification of the core problem in the irrigation system might be important for water managers as it would provide a starting point to establish comprehensive baseline towards efficient irrigation water allocation and use. This would improve paddy productivity within the formal as well as the growing informal paddy farming referred to “hors- perimeter” in the low land of Imbo region.</p>

This submission reviews the two successful examples of water markets, one in the developed world, the Murray Darling Basin in Australia and other in the developing world, the Limari Basin case in Chile respectively. Of central importance, we find the commodification of a natural resource, water, through a process of the progressing neoliberal agenda. As regards the outcome of this process in these two cases / while on the one hand the water markets have contributed to a more efficient allocation of water resources from less efficient to more efficient uses, on the other hand, problems related to environmental degradation in the former case and the social inequity in the latter have been unable to be solved.

La thèse est structurée autour de quatre articles. Le premier article - What determines efficiency? An analysis of the Italian water sector – offre une évaluation d’efficience du plus grand échantillon d’entreprises italiennes dans le secteur de l’eau qui ait jamais été rassemblé. Cela sur un horizon temporel de quatre ans. Le deuxième article – Hydropower rent in Northern Italy: economic and environmental concerns in the renewal procedure – a deux objectifs: le premier est d’estimer la rente de l’hydroélectricité en Italie, ce qui n’a jamais été intenté auparavant ; le seconde est d’analyser le trade-off entre l’appropriation de la rente et les améliorations environnementales. Le troisième article – Estimating a performance-based environmental fee for hydropower production: a choice experiment approach – développe une redevance basée sur la performance environnementale à mesure non seulement d’internaliser les coûts environnementaux que l’hydroélectricité détermine, mais aussi d'inciter les producteurs à aller au delà de la régulation environnementale existante : de cette façon, ils payent moins. Enfin, le quatrième article – Cheaper electricity or a better river? Estimating fluvial ecosystem value in Southern France – applique la méthodologie CE à l’étude du trade-off potentiel entre revenue-sharing et améliorations environnementales dans la Vallée d’Aspe (Pyrénées français), où plus de 100 MW de capacité hydroélectrique sont installés. / The thesis is structured as a collection of four papers and it is ideally divided into two parts: the first one, composed of just one paper, is an efficiency analysis of the Italian integrated water sector; the second part, made of the other three papers, is thematic and studies hydropower production in terms of rent generation and environmental impacts.The first paper – What determines efficiency? An analysis of the Italian water sector – offers an original evaluation of the efficiency of the biggest sample ever gathered of Italian water companies over a period of four years.The first paper of the thematic part – Hydropower rent in Northern Italy: economic and environmental concerns in the renewal procedure – has two objectives: the first one is to estimate the hydropower rent in Italy, which has never been done before; the second one is to investigate the trade-off between rent seizing and environmental improvements.The second thematic paper – Estimating a performance-based environmental fee for hydropower production: a choice experiment approach – develops a performance-based environmental fee able not only to internalize the environmental costs that hydropower causes, but also to stimulate producers to outperform existing environmental regulation: the more they outperform, the less they pay.Finally, the third thematic paper – Cheaper electricity or a better river? Estimating fluvial ecosystem value in Southern France – applies the DCE approach to study the potential trade-off between revenue-sharing and environmental improvements in the Aspe valley, located in the French Pyrenees, where more than 100 MW of hydropower capacity are installed.

To address increasing irrigation water demand consecutive to the increasing population pressure in terms of food demand, there is an imperative of developing relevant mechanisms to regulate irrigation water consumption patterns. A radical shift from uncontrolled flooding irrigation as currently practiced by farmers in Mugerero paddy farming zone towards efficient allocation and use of water resources is important to save water that could be allocated to other water users. This paper surveys current and past views on the way irrigation water is allocated in the irrigation scheme of Mugerero and how farmers are using water for paddy production purpose. The existing irrigation water practices as well as paddy productivity are assessed and the results are expected to be useful for water policy professionals, while addressing the growing water demand. According to the respondents, the causes of low paddy yields are the increasing and uncontrolled extension of paddy farming, non adapted irrigation infrastructure and water pricing systems as well as lack of updated knowledge and technologies on irrigation. These issues faced by the paddy farmers have led to pronounced economic, social and environmental consequences which are manifested in conflicts over irrigation water use, increasing soil salinity and pollution, destruction of infrastructure and above all, low irrigation paddy yields.The identification of the core problem in the irrigation system might be important for water managers as it would provide a starting point to establish comprehensive baseline towards efficient irrigation water allocation and use. This would improve paddy productivity within the formal as well as the growing informal paddy farming referred to “hors- perimeter” in the low land of Imbo region.

In this thesis I argue that access to an adequate quantity and quality of safe water in sustainable ways is a basic moral human right, one that has been legally recognized by the international community through UN Resolution 15/9. As a result of water’s being a basic moral human right, governments, institutions, and individuals are obligated to avoid depriving, protect from deprivation, and aid those deprived of access to safe drinking water. Using this as a foundation, I examine the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable Development Goals, and water pricing as strategies used to fulfill the right to safe drinking water. I also provide arguments in favour of (national and international) tax schemes that cover the cost of providing 50L of safe water per person per day. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

No Brasil, a Política Nacional de Recursos Hídricos apresenta a cobrança pelo uso da água como um instrumento de gestão de recursos hídricos de caráter econômico. Considerando esse caráter, a cobrança deve ter como objetivos: racionalizar o uso do recurso baseado na sua escassez; reconhecer a água como um bem de valor econômico, refletindo os custos ambientais advindos de sua utilização; e diminuir os conflitos entre os usos, induzindo uma alocação que considere o gerenciamento da demanda e as prioridades da sociedade. Além dessas metas, como instrumento de gestão de uma política que lista como primeiro objetivo \"assegurar à atual e às futuras gerações a necessária disponibilidade de água, em padrões de qualidade adequados aos respectivos usos\", a cobrança deve ser implementada de maneira que o agente usuário direcione seu comportamento no sentido da sustentabilidade ambiental. Mediante esses fundamentos, o que se pretende desenvolver neste trabalho é a aplicação de um modelo de cobrança sobre o uso da água que considera como princípio base a manutenção da qualidade ambiental medida pela adequada gestão da escassez de água e, compondo a busca dessa qualidade, a racionalização econômica e a viabilização financeira. Essa predominância do ambiente sobre aspectos econômicos vem no sentido de desqualificar argumentos segundo os quais, os impactos advindos dos usos da água serão corrigidos indefinidamente mediante investimentos financeiros em infra estrutura. Admitir que o desenvolvimento tem esse poder é supor equivocadamente que o meio econômico é limitante do meio ambiente e não o contrário. Esta constatação mostra qual é o problema da maioria das propostas de cobrança que valoram a água baseadas em custos de tratamento de resíduos e de obras hidráulicas. Por mais elaborados que sejam essas fórmulas de cobrança, chegando a ponto de se conseguir que fique mais caro, mediante um padrão ambiental corretamente definido, captar água ou lançar poluentes do que racionalizar usos, o preço da água não pode estar baseado em fatores cuja \"sustentabilidade\" pode acabar no curto prazo, dependendo do ritmo de crescimento econômico. A sustentabilidade dos recursos hídricos só será base da cobrança pelo uso da água se o valor cobrado for dificultando esse uso à medida que os recursos tornarem se escassos, e não quando os custos de medidas mitigadoras dessa escassez se tornarem muito elevados. Portanto, o modelo de cobrança proposto neste trabalho procura garantir que o agente econômico que está exaurindo o meio ambiente não possa ter capacidade de pagar por essa degradação, ajudando efetivamente a política de outorga do direito de uso da água na observância da capacidade de suporte do meio. / In Brazil, the Water Resources National Policy incorporates the water pricing as an economic tool for water resources management. Considering this definition, the water pricing must accomplish the following objectives: to promote the efficient use of the resource considering its shortage; to recognize the water as a good (commodity) with economic value, internalizing the environmental costs of externalities originated from the use of water resources; to reduce the conflicts of water use through an allocation system which balance the society priorities with the water demand management. The water pricing is included as a management tool in a policy whose primary objective is to \"ensure water availability for current and future generations with suitable quality standards according to its respective uses\". So besides the goals mentioned above, the water pricing must be implemented in a way to induce the user to behave towards the environmental sustainability. Based on these fundamentals, this research presents the conceptualization and application of a pricing model for water use that considers the principle of environmental efficiency evaluated by the adequate management of the water shortage. Following the environmental efficiency, the model also pursues the economic and financial efficiency of the water resource system. This predominance of the environment over the economy weakens arguments that the water use impacts would be compensated indefinitely by financial investments in infrastructure. To admit that economic development has this power is similar to mistakenly assume that the economic dimension is the limit for the environment, and not the opposite. This argument clarifies the problem of the majority of the water pricing methodologies, which define the value of water based on wastewater treatment costs and on hydraulic construction costs. Even if these pricing methods are very well defined in a way that they define prices for water diversion or wastewater discharges higher than prices for rational use, the price of water cannot be based on indicators whose sustainability may end in the short time, in accordance with the economic growth. The sustainability of the water resources as fundamental for the water pricing will be accomplished when the price charged for the water reflects the shortage of the resources, and not the cost for mitigation measures. So, the water-pricing model proposed in this research tries to guarantee that the economic agent who is degrading the environment will not be able to pay for the costs of this degradation.