There is no abstract available for this thesis.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 1986. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-145).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, June 2000. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

This thesis seeks to establish William H. Taft’s influence over the U.S. experiment with empire in the Philippines. It shows how a politician who is often characterised as a loyal servant of Theodore Roosevelt, at least before 1909, was in fact a key driver of policy decisions. Taft’s views of empire may have been built on the ideas of others, but his own synthesis of these ideas and the career path he followed during this period single him out as one of the most influential figures in U.S.-Philippine relations. Taft saw the Philippine relationship as a long-term prospect and foresaw a future where the islands would eventually become a dominion of a United States, like the relationship between Great Britain and Canada. This, it is argued here, was Taft’s distinct “imperial vision.” This thesis reassesses the role of Taft in the American imperial experiment in the Philippines between the years 1900 and 1921. During this period Taft was the highest-profile figure arguing consistently for a permanent imperial relationship with the Philippine Islands. Various historians have covered Philippine affairs during this period, but none has made such a detailed analysis of Taft as a leader in guiding Philippine policy toward retention. Taft held a number of high-level roles during the period 1900-1913 – when the Republican Party continuously controlled Philippine policy – which allowed him to maintain a permanent influence over the nature of U.S.-Philippine relations. After this period Taft had less direct influence, but utilised his experience, reputation and contacts to speak out against the Democratic Party’s policy for the islands and became the figurehead of a campaign to retain the Philippines.

On 10 September 2000, the British Special Forces conducted Operation Barras that aimed to free seven soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment held hostage by a guerrilla group during the civil war in Sierra Leone. The problem that the study aims to explain is if the tactical execution was significant in the success of the operation and, if so, what was successful. The purpose of this study is to explain what made Operation Barras successful by studying its tactical execution. To do this, the principles of speed and surprise from McRavens theory of relative superiority have been used to conduct a qualitative case study. The results of the survey show that the principles are used and that they contributed to the success of the tactical execution. It was primarily the principle of surprise that could explain why the execution was successful. The principle of speed was used in the initial stage but this declined because of a strong-willed opponent. Those principles provide two perspectives on studying the operation and its complexity. The study can fill part of the gap found in research on what it was that made operation Barras successful and contribute to further understanding within the area of special operations.

Zugl.: Mainz, Univ., Diss., 2002

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Akron, School of Dance, Theatre, and Arts Administration-Theatre Arts, 2009. / "August, 2009." Title from electronic thesis title page (viewed 10/21/2009) Advisor, James Slowiak; Faculty readers, Durand Pope, David Bush; School Director, Neil Sapienza; Dean of the College, Dudley Turner; Dean of the Graduate School, George R. Newkome. Includes bibliographical references.

A conventional army is required to meet many needs and face many threats. However, when conventional warfare methods do not make the cut, Special Operations and Special Forces become a necessity. However, there exists few theories that sufficiently explain how Special Forces units around the world accomplishes these Special Operations. One of the few researches who has developed a theory regarding Special Operations is William H. McRaven with his theory of relative superiority.  McRaven´s theory proposes that there are six principles which determine the success of a Special Forces unit´s ability to plan, prepare and execute a Special Operation. The aim of the study is to understand McRaven´s theory´s explanatory power in explaining the results of Operation Neptune Spear and Operation Gothic Serpent. This study concludes that Operation Neptune spear attained almost all of the required principles. However, Operation Gothic serpent lacked half of the required principles. In order to create a favourable relation, one must create synergy between the principles in order to achieve relative superiority. The study concludes by illustrating that McRaven´s theory´s explanatory power increased.

Issued also as Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / Bibliography: p. 285-294.

Thesis (M.A.)--Acadia University, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-146). Also available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.