On 10 September 2000, the British Special Forces conducted Operation Barras that aimed to free seven soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment held hostage by a guerrilla group during the civil war in Sierra Leone. The problem that the study aims to explain is if the tactical execution was significant in the success of the operation and, if so, what was successful. The purpose of this study is to explain what made Operation Barras successful by studying its tactical execution. To do this, the principles of speed and surprise from McRavens theory of relative superiority have been used to conduct a qualitative case study. The results of the survey show that the principles are used and that they contributed to the success of the tactical execution. It was primarily the principle of surprise that could explain why the execution was successful. The principle of speed was used in the initial stage but this declined because of a strong-willed opponent. Those principles provide two perspectives on studying the operation and its complexity. The study can fill part of the gap found in research on what it was that made operation Barras successful and contribute to further understanding within the area of special operations.

Recent studies have shown an increased relevancy for special operations warfare. Special operations have been acclaimed as a cost beneficial means of achieving strategic ends. Although this is the case there is a significant lack in the realm of contemporary special operations theory. Operation Barrasin 2000 and Operation Neptune Spear in 2011 have both been renowned for being daring, well conducted but foremost successful. Nevertheless, thorough research of these operations signals their absence. This study contributes to the field by examining these two successful special operations through the lens of a theoretical framework, based on prominent special operations theorists, in order to determine what principles led to their prosperity. Although a majority of the theoretical principles could be recognised in both operations, not all of these were beneficial to the outcome. The results have shown that the principles of strategic and political comprehension, technology, practice, intelligence, personal commitment and speed mainly contributed to success. Conclusions also show that the principle of intelligence could be considered superior to the other principles. This conclusion is drawn due to the fact that accurate intelligence enabled several of the other principles, for example practice and strategic and political comprehension.