Specialförband nyttjas allt mer i dagens konflikter och det organisatoriska innehållet i specialförbandssystem skiljer sig åt, där vissa länder har utökat sitt system med lätt infanteri i en understödjande roll. Detta skapar ett behov för Sverige att analysera andras erfarenheter avseende nyttjande av understödjande infanteriet. Syftet med denna studie är att bidra med ökad förståelse avseende de för- och nackdelar som uppkommer på taktisk nivå när understödjande infanteri nyttjas vid specialoperationer. Denna studie använder ett teoretiskt analysramverk bestående av McRavens teori och de principer han har utvecklat kring specialoperationer. Undersökningen visar sammanfattningsvis att understödjande infanteriet bidrar till en in-satsstyrkas samlade effekt och förmåga, samt att de möjliggör för kärnförbanden att lyckas med huvuduppgiften. Resultatet i en specialoperation påverkas genom samtliga prestationer av den personal och de förbandsenheter som ingår i specialoperationen.

On 10 September 2000, the British Special Forces conducted Operation Barras that aimed to free seven soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment held hostage by a guerrilla group during the civil war in Sierra Leone. The problem that the study aims to explain is if the tactical execution was significant in the success of the operation and, if so, what was successful. The purpose of this study is to explain what made Operation Barras successful by studying its tactical execution. To do this, the principles of speed and surprise from McRavens theory of relative superiority have been used to conduct a qualitative case study. The results of the survey show that the principles are used and that they contributed to the success of the tactical execution. It was primarily the principle of surprise that could explain why the execution was successful. The principle of speed was used in the initial stage but this declined because of a strong-willed opponent. Those principles provide two perspectives on studying the operation and its complexity. The study can fill part of the gap found in research on what it was that made operation Barras successful and contribute to further understanding within the area of special operations.

The use of special operations forces has increased over the last decades. But the theories on how special operation forces best will be used to conduct special operations does not keep up with the development in the field. There are theories in the field of special operations, among them are Robert G. Spulak and William H McRaven. According to McRavens theory there are six principles that are to be met to be successful in a special operation. Robert G. Spulaks theory says that the personal attributes of the soldiers are essential for success. These two theoretical frameworks are used to examine one operation where special operations forces were used, Operation Neptune Spear. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the operation to see which of the theories that can explain the outcome. The operation is examined through a qualitative case study. The results of the study indicate that McRavens six principles can explain the outcome of the operation. The result also indicate that Spulaks theory can explain the outcome. Despite the differences in the theories both manage to explain the outcome of a special operation.

Special operations are conducted more than ever in modern warfare. Since the 1980s they have developed and grown in numbers. But with more attempts of operations and bigger numbers, comes failures. One of these failures is operation Red Wings where a unit of US Navy SEALs attempted a recognisance and raid operation in the Hindu Kush. The purpose of this paper was to see how that failure could be analysed from an existing theory of Special operations. This was to ensure that other failures can be avoided but mainly to understand what really happened on that mountain in 2005. The method used was a case study of a single case to give an answer with quality and depth. The study found that Mcravens theory and principles of how to succeed a special operation were not applied during the operation. The case of operation Red Wings showed remarkable valour and motivation, but also lacked severely when it came to simplicity, surprise, and speed.

Special forces have been a part of nations military capabilities for quite some time but what is it really that they can contribute with that is beyond the means of more conventional forces, and how should an operation executed by special forces be conducted? During the Falklands war, the Special Air Service (SAS) performed numerous operations that were important to the overall campaign of retaking the Falkland Islands, but why were they successful, and in some cases unsuccessful?   This paper aims to utilise McRavens theory on relative superiority to see if it possible to explain why special operations succeed or fail. Through a qualitative case study, the principles of McRavens theory are applied on two separate operations which were conducted by the SAS during the Falklands war. The principles being Simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. These principles together form the basis on which relative superiority is achieved and as this paper shows can help to explain why special forces succeed or fail with their missions. The results of the paper also show that even if the principles are a prerequisite for success, the elements which make up these principles do not necessarily need to be fulfilled for an operation to be successful.   In summary, this paper shows that McRavens theory on relative superiority can be used to explain why special forces succeed or fail. But it is important to note that the elements themselves which the principals are built upon of do not necessarily spell success on their own.

A conventional army is required to meet many needs and face many threats. However, when conventional warfare methods do not make the cut, Special Operations and Special Forces become a necessity. However, there exists few theories that sufficiently explain how Special Forces units around the world accomplishes these Special Operations. One of the few researches who has developed a theory regarding Special Operations is William H. McRaven with his theory of relative superiority.  McRaven´s theory proposes that there are six principles which determine the success of a Special Forces unit´s ability to plan, prepare and execute a Special Operation. The aim of the study is to understand McRaven´s theory´s explanatory power in explaining the results of Operation Neptune Spear and Operation Gothic Serpent. This study concludes that Operation Neptune spear attained almost all of the required principles. However, Operation Gothic serpent lacked half of the required principles. In order to create a favourable relation, one must create synergy between the principles in order to achieve relative superiority. The study concludes by illustrating that McRaven´s theory´s explanatory power increased.

This thesis studies the relevance of enablers in special operations. How come, that the well-known and famous theory of special operations by Admiral William H. McRaven, doesn’t discuss the relevance of enablers in support of special operations? The purpose of this study is to tentatively investigate the connection of enablers to McRavens theory of direct action special operations. The investigation will be conducted through a case study of two prominent special operations; Operation Gunnerside and Operation Neptune Spear. Both operations exemplify a direct action special operation raid, but in a various time in history and context. The result of this study indicates, the relevance of supporting intelligence, mobility and command and control, to reinforce McRavens six principles of special operations. Further on, the study shows the direct influence of enablers, on key events, in relation to McRavens theory of relative superiority.

Along with the development of today’s warfare the use of special operations as an overall asset has increased. Due to this, the request for scientific built theory has also increased. One of the most cited theories of special operations is developed by William McRaven. His theory is used by many other researchers and the principles that he has developed can be traced all the way to the Swedish Doctrine. According to McRaven these principles, if used correct, will increase the probability of a positive outcome in an operation. But what if this highly regarded principles won´t work for the operations it´s supposed to be applicable on? This research aims to falsify McRavens theory by testing it on two successful special operations. The result has shown that McRavens theory is applicable on one of the operations but not on the other. McRavens theory has been considerably weakened by this result and one conclusion is that the theory might not be as relevant for today´s operations as it was for the operations that were examined for his study.

In September 1942 three airplanes carrying British soldiers crossed the border into Greece, this event symbolized the start of Operation Harling which was part of the special operations executive’s unconventional warfare campaign. The operation culminated in the destruction of the Gorgopotamos viaduct. The Operation is described as one of the most spectacular sabotage operations in axis occupied Greece and include the support of two local guerrilla. This study uses McRavens theory of relative superiority to help analyse how success was achieved in operation Harling through a qualitative text study. The purpose of the study is to examine the phenomenon of unconventional warfare through a single case study with McRavens theory of special operations. Furthermore, the study also investigates the explanatory power of McRavens theory. The results show that three out of McRavens six principles were present in the operation, simplicity, security and surprise. The theory states that all six principles must be accounted for to achieve relative superiority, therefore the success in Operation Harling cannot be solely explained by McRavens theory. Thus, the result indicates that further research must be concluded to shed light on the concept of unconventional warfare.

During years of insurgency in Afghanistan the Taliban has not been defeated. They have however adapted into a more sophisticated organization than in the beginning of the insurgency. Rather than identifying them as a simple terror organization this study aims to analyze the Taliban ability to utilize sophisticated tactics and conduct special operations. By using William H. McRavens theory on relative superiority, this studies purpose is to investigate whether the 2012 attack on Helmand’s Camp Bastion can be compared to special operation or not. The study will be conducted as a case study analyzing the reports made by both U.S and British armed forces following the attack. This study concludes that the Taliban attack on Camp Bastion can be comparable to a successful special operation in almost every way according to the theory of relative superiority by McRaven. The study shows that the operation is only lacking parts of the principles simplicity and repetition.