This study examines William H. McRaven's theory of why special operations succeed. The theory is tested on Operation Nimrod which took place after the theory was published and carried out against a non-state actor. Operation Nimrod was a special operation in which the British special forces SAS conducted a hostage rescue operation against six terrorists on the Iranian embassy in London 1980. McRaven's theory contains six principles that need to be utilized to achieve relative superiority. The theory is one of few used in research at the tactical level of special operations and the principles can also be found in the Swedish doctrine. The study aims to test the generalizability of the theory to modern cases since few studies have tried this before. The result of this case study shows that all six principles in McRaven's theory of special operations have been used in Operation Nimrod where relative superiority arose. This shows a connection between the theory and a successful special operation which results in the generalizability of the theory being strengthened through this study.

A conventional army is required to meet many needs and face many threats. However, when conventional warfare methods do not make the cut, Special Operations and Special Forces become a necessity. However, there exists few theories that sufficiently explain how Special Forces units around the world accomplishes these Special Operations. One of the few researches who has developed a theory regarding Special Operations is William H. McRaven with his theory of relative superiority.    McRaven´s theory proposes that there are six principles which determine the success of a Special Forces unit´s ability to plan, prepare and execute a Special Operation. The aim of the study is to understand McRaven´s theory´s explanatory power in explaining the results of Operation Neptune Spear and Operation Gothic Serpent.   This study concludes that Operation Neptune spear attained almost all of the required principles. However, Operation Gothic serpent lacked half of the required principles. In order to create a favourable relation, one must create synergy between the principles in order to achieve relative superiority. The study concludes by illustrating that McRaven´s theory´s explanatory power increased.

The use of special operations to achieve political and strategical aims have risen in modern warfare. There is a lack of studies about special operations in general and especially studies about protection against these operations. Therefore, the aim of this essay is to explain how a defensive actor can achieve success against an offensive special operation. Through analyzing William McRaven´s theoretical framework about relative superiority, how an offensive special operation can achieve success, with the reversed ambition three hypotheses are formed. Namely that the probability of the success of a defensive actor depends on a) concealed actions or unsystematic changes in the defense b) a relative to the special operation matutinal indication of the enemy by the defensive actor c) the defensive actor manages to contain or delay the enemy in battle. This study substantiates these hypotheses through the study of two cases of special operations, the raid on Makin Island 1942 and Operation Prelim 1982. The two latter hypotheses were strengthened in the study; however, the result depends on the delamination and definitions of vital concepts of the study. In combination, the hypotheses are an embryo of academical understanding of protection against a special operation and should be considered an inspiration for additional and more extensive studies on the phenomenon.

The use of special forces has increased rapidly due to terrorist threats, hybrid and irregular warfare. This has also resulted in an increased need for special and conventional forces to cooperate. Pirate attacks outside the horn of Africa and the bombing of USS Cole demonstrate how these asymmetrical threats also have an impact on the naval arena. The aim of this thesis is to understand how the six principles in McRaven’s special forces theory can explain the outcome of the rescue operation during the Maersk Alabama Hijacking in 2009, where DEVGRU (United States Navy Special Warfare Development Group) and conventional naval forces cooperated and managed to successfully liberate Captain Richard Philips. These findings will contribute to assess the critical prerequisites of success for special forces operations in the modern naval environment and evaluate if these operations can be explained by existing special forces theories. The result of this study shows that McRavens theory can explain the outcome of the rescue of Philips, were the principles of surprise, simplicity and security had large significance. The rescue operation also shows that cooperation between DEVGRU and the US navy vessels were essential for the operational success.

Recent studies have shown an increased relevancy for special operations warfare. Special operations have been acclaimed as a cost beneficial means of achieving strategic ends. Although this is the case there is a significant lack in the realm of contemporary special operations theory. Operation Barrasin 2000 and Operation Neptune Spear in 2011 have both been renowned for being daring, well conducted but foremost successful. Nevertheless, thorough research of these operations signals their absence. This study contributes to the field by examining these two successful special operations through the lens of a theoretical framework, based on prominent special operations theorists, in order to determine what principles led to their prosperity. Although a majority of the theoretical principles could be recognised in both operations, not all of these were beneficial to the outcome. The results have shown that the principles of strategic and political comprehension, technology, practice, intelligence, personal commitment and speed mainly contributed to success. Conclusions also show that the principle of intelligence could be considered superior to the other principles. This conclusion is drawn due to the fact that accurate intelligence enabled several of the other principles, for example practice and strategic and political comprehension.

On the night between 9 and 10th of April 1973 Israel conducted Operation Spring of Youth as a retaliation to the terrorist attack during the summer Olympics in Munich 1972 where eleven Israeli athletes and coaches were killed. The operation was part of the larger operation Wrath of God. The operation took place in Beirut and targeted three high ranking PLO and Fatah members, the PFLP headquarters and three ammunitions and weapons factories in the city. The operation was hugely successful and is described as one of the largest and most comprehensive operations of its kind that Israel has conducted. The aim of this study is to explain why this operation could be carried out with such success despite being conducted in enemy territory against a vastly larger advisory in the capital of a state hostile to Israel. To answer this question the study uses William H. McRavens theory on relative superiority to explain how this operation could be carried out successfully. In conclusion the success could be traced to the extensive gathering of intelligence, rigorous planning, and preparations of the operation. Innovation, unconventional methods, the element of surprise, and a speedy execution also played a great part in why this operation succeeded.

On the 24th of April 1980, the US military conducted Operation Eagle Claw that aimed to free 53 American citizens held hostage by an Iranian student terror organisation in the US embassy in Teheran, Iran. This study uses the factors of simplicity, security and rehearsal to investigate why this rescue mission resulted in failure. These three factors derives from the principles of Simplicity, Security and Repetition from McRaven´s theory of relative superiority, and the criteria of Feasible Objectives, Flexibility of Mind and Tactical Competence from Gray´s theory on when special operations succeed. Based on a qualitative single case study, the results suggest that the factors of simplicity and rehearsal were absent during the planning and preparation of the operation, but that the factor of security was, however, present in excess. In the end, this dynamic generated a complex plan that was not properly rehearsed, which resulted in mission failure. The study contributes to existing research on Operation Eagle Claw, and gives further understanding to the area of special operations and its relevance to the Swedish Armed Forces.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how new risks associated with the organizational development of special operations forces should be best dealt with in a supplement to William McRaven's theory of relative superiority. The special operations’ forces structure is approaching the size of more conventional forces and a development of theories may be needed to address the growth challenges the organization is experiencing. The questions this thesis aims to answer are: How were the new risks present in Operation Neptune Spear and what were their consequences for the operation? How were these consequences managed? The research design contains a single case study based on text and process tracing methodology and analysis.The result of the thesis confirms that risk factors linked to organizational development can be traced in Operation Neptune Spear and therefore affects McRaven's theory. The author proposes a supplement to the theory in order to better manage these risks.