Along with the development of today’s warfare the use of special operations as an overall asset has increased. Due to this, the request for scientific built theory has also increased. One of the most cited theories of special operations is developed by William McRaven. His theory is used by many other researchers and the principles that he has developed can be traced all the way to the Swedish Doctrine. According to McRaven these principles, if used correct, will increase the probability of a positive outcome in an operation. But what if this highly regarded principles won´t work for the operations it´s supposed to be applicable on? This research aims to falsify McRavens theory by testing it on two successful special operations. The result has shown that McRavens theory is applicable on one of the operations but not on the other. McRavens theory has been considerably weakened by this result and one conclusion is that the theory might not be as relevant for today´s operations as it was for the operations that were examined for his study.

This study examines William H. McRaven's theory of why special operations succeed. The theory is tested on Operation Nimrod which took place after the theory was published and carried out against a non-state actor. Operation Nimrod was a special operation in which the British special forces SAS conducted a hostage rescue operation against six terrorists on the Iranian embassy in London 1980. McRaven's theory contains six principles that need to be utilized to achieve relative superiority. The theory is one of few used in research at the tactical level of special operations and the principles can also be found in the Swedish doctrine. The study aims to test the generalizability of the theory to modern cases since few studies have tried this before. The result of this case study shows that all six principles in McRaven's theory of special operations have been used in Operation Nimrod where relative superiority arose. This shows a connection between the theory and a successful special operation which results in the generalizability of the theory being strengthened through this study.

On the night between 9 and 10th of April 1973 Israel conducted Operation Spring of Youth as a retaliation to the terrorist attack during the summer Olympics in Munich 1972 where eleven Israeli athletes and coaches were killed. The operation was part of the larger operation Wrath of God. The operation took place in Beirut and targeted three high ranking PLO and Fatah members, the PFLP headquarters and three ammunitions and weapons factories in the city. The operation was hugely successful and is described as one of the largest and most comprehensive operations of its kind that Israel has conducted. The aim of this study is to explain why this operation could be carried out with such success despite being conducted in enemy territory against a vastly larger advisory in the capital of a state hostile to Israel. To answer this question the study uses William H. McRavens theory on relative superiority to explain how this operation could be carried out successfully. In conclusion the success could be traced to the extensive gathering of intelligence, rigorous planning, and preparations of the operation. Innovation, unconventional methods, the element of surprise, and a speedy execution also played a great part in why this operation succeeded.

In 1993 William McRaven developed a theory about how special forces units could achieve relative superiority against a larger, well-defended force. To achieve relative superiority, the unit mustconsider the six principles that in one way or other effects the result and makes the difference between failure and success. But a lot have happened since 1993. September 11, 2001 marks as a turning point in the war against terror when al-Qaeda hijacked airliners and flew them straight into World Trade Center and Pentagon. President George Bush declared war against terror immediately, a war that still is beingfought today. Since then, the use of special operations forces has increased dramatically but studies about them remains far behind. The aim of this study is to analyze if McRavens theory remain relevant in modern conflictsagainst terror organizations. This was achieved by applying McRavens theory on two cases, Operation Neptune Spear and The Raid on Yakla. The result shows that the theory has explanatory power but when operating under highest secrecy, information remains restricted for scholars and researchers. Making it difficult to generalize a theory of units of this character.