The use of special operations forces has increased over the last decades. But the theories on how special operation forces best will be used to conduct special operations does not keep up with the development in the field. There are theories in the field of special operations, among them are Robert G. Spulak and William H McRaven. According to McRavens theory there are six principles that are to be met to be successful in a special operation. Robert G. Spulaks theory says that the personal attributes of the soldiers are essential for success. These two theoretical frameworks are used to examine one operation where special operations forces were used, Operation Neptune Spear. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the operation to see which of the theories that can explain the outcome. The operation is examined through a qualitative case study. The results of the study indicate that McRavens six principles can explain the outcome of the operation. The result also indicate that Spulaks theory can explain the outcome. Despite the differences in the theories both manage to explain the outcome of a special operation.

The aim of this study was to investigate how the small state Norway could use special operations in cooperation with allies against the great power Germany during World War 2. According to Clausewitz, defense favors the defender, but how could a small state manage to create friction for the German defensive bases in Norway? Can a theory of special operations help us understand this phenomenon? Scholars have found a lack of empirical studies of special operations and small states which this study aims to remedy. This study used a qualitative approach and examined two special operations in Norway, Operation Archery 1941 and Musketoon 1942. The study uses Spulaks theory of special operations to enhance the understanding of the outcomes. The study concludes that both operations were considered successful at the operational level but Musketoon failed on the tactical level due to lack of integrated operations and maintaining relative superiority. The integration of the Norwegians was considered important for the completion of the missions due to knowledge of terrain and interaction with civilians. This study has given an empirical contribution to the research gap of special operations and small states.

Special operations are conducted more than ever in modern warfare. Since the 1980s they have developed and grown in numbers. But with more attempts of operations and bigger numbers, comes failures. One of these failures is operation Red Wings where a unit of US Navy SEALs attempted a recognisance and raid operation in the Hindu Kush. The purpose of this paper was to see how that failure could be analysed from an existing theory of Special operations. This was to ensure that other failures can be avoided but mainly to understand what really happened on that mountain in 2005. The method used was a case study of a single case to give an answer with quality and depth. The study found that Mcravens theory and principles of how to succeed a special operation were not applied during the operation. The case of operation Red Wings showed remarkable valour and motivation, but also lacked severely when it came to simplicity, surprise, and speed.

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Vid Rysslands invadering av Ukraina förändrades den europeiska säkerhetsordningen drastiskt. Det försämrade säkerhetspolitiska läget runt Östersjön ställer nya förändrade krav på länders militära förmågor. Som en naturlig del av denna utveckling behöver småstater runt Östersjön ompröva hur man använder specialoperationer. Från att under decennier tillsammans med partners fokuserat på internationella insatser, aktualiseras nu uppgifter där nationellt försvar åter är prioriterat. Denna undersökning studerar hur småstater i krig med en stormakt kan använda specialoperationer för att undvika förlust. I centrum för undersökningen står Fortsättningskriget som utkämpades mellan Finland och Sovjetunionen 1941–1944, där Finland frekvent använde specialoperationer i samklang med konventionella förband för att nå militära framgångar. Undersökningen visar att finska specialoperationer låg till grund för strategiska vägval samt bidrog till konventionella förbands framgångar. Operationer på motståndarens territorium förstärkte friktioner som på olika sätt försvårade den sovjetiska krigföringen.

Specialförband och specialoperationer beskrivs ofta i förhållande till reguljära enheter och konventionella operationer. De beskrivs som något som ligger utanför reguljära förbands förmågor. Detta kan i sin tur ställa andra krav på specialförbandslogistiken än på logistiken för reguljära förband.   Den logistikteori som finns idag är i huvudsak baserad på fallstudier av konventionell krigföring. Det saknas alltså ett teoretiskt ramverk för specialförbandslogistik och idag baseras det på doktriner och handböcker som bygger på praktiskt vunna erfarenheter. Syftet med denna uppsats är att analysera fram viktiga principer för specialförbandslogistik och i och med det ge ett bidrag för att öka förståelsen för just fenomenet specialförbandslogistik vid genomförande av specialoperationer.   Genom att analysera specialförbands och specialoperationsempirin, både deduktivt med hjälp av befintlig logistikteori och induktivt genom extensiv läsning, har logistikteorin utvecklats. Några principer från logistikteorin har nyanserats och omarbetats, någon har strukits och några tillkommit. Principerna för specialförbandslogistik vid genomförande av specialoperationer är integrering, framsynthet, improvisation, flexibilitet, tillgänglighet, tempo, enkelhet, överlevnad, effektivitet, kreativitet, operationssäkerhet och interoperabilitet.

A conventional army is required to meet many needs and face many threats. However, when conventional warfare methods do not make the cut, Special Operations and Special Forces become a necessity. However, there exists few theories that sufficiently explain how Special Forces units around the world accomplishes these Special Operations. One of the few researches who has developed a theory regarding Special Operations is William H. McRaven with his theory of relative superiority.  McRaven´s theory proposes that there are six principles which determine the success of a Special Forces unit´s ability to plan, prepare and execute a Special Operation. The aim of the study is to understand McRaven´s theory´s explanatory power in explaining the results of Operation Neptune Spear and Operation Gothic Serpent. This study concludes that Operation Neptune spear attained almost all of the required principles. However, Operation Gothic serpent lacked half of the required principles. In order to create a favourable relation, one must create synergy between the principles in order to achieve relative superiority. The study concludes by illustrating that McRaven´s theory´s explanatory power increased.

This thesis studies the relevance of enablers in special operations. How come, that the well-known and famous theory of special operations by Admiral William H. McRaven, doesn’t discuss the relevance of enablers in support of special operations? The purpose of this study is to tentatively investigate the connection of enablers to McRavens theory of direct action special operations. The investigation will be conducted through a case study of two prominent special operations; Operation Gunnerside and Operation Neptune Spear. Both operations exemplify a direct action special operation raid, but in a various time in history and context. The result of this study indicates, the relevance of supporting intelligence, mobility and command and control, to reinforce McRavens six principles of special operations. Further on, the study shows the direct influence of enablers, on key events, in relation to McRavens theory of relative superiority.

Along with the development of today’s warfare the use of special operations as an overall asset has increased. Due to this, the request for scientific built theory has also increased. One of the most cited theories of special operations is developed by William McRaven. His theory is used by many other researchers and the principles that he has developed can be traced all the way to the Swedish Doctrine. According to McRaven these principles, if used correct, will increase the probability of a positive outcome in an operation. But what if this highly regarded principles won´t work for the operations it´s supposed to be applicable on? This research aims to falsify McRavens theory by testing it on two successful special operations. The result has shown that McRavens theory is applicable on one of the operations but not on the other. McRavens theory has been considerably weakened by this result and one conclusion is that the theory might not be as relevant for today´s operations as it was for the operations that were examined for his study.

In September 1942 three airplanes carrying British soldiers crossed the border into Greece, this event symbolized the start of Operation Harling which was part of the special operations executive’s unconventional warfare campaign. The operation culminated in the destruction of the Gorgopotamos viaduct. The Operation is described as one of the most spectacular sabotage operations in axis occupied Greece and include the support of two local guerrilla. This study uses McRavens theory of relative superiority to help analyse how success was achieved in operation Harling through a qualitative text study. The purpose of the study is to examine the phenomenon of unconventional warfare through a single case study with McRavens theory of special operations. Furthermore, the study also investigates the explanatory power of McRavens theory. The results show that three out of McRavens six principles were present in the operation, simplicity, security and surprise. The theory states that all six principles must be accounted for to achieve relative superiority, therefore the success in Operation Harling cannot be solely explained by McRavens theory. Thus, the result indicates that further research must be concluded to shed light on the concept of unconventional warfare.