The Thesis was aimed at evaluation of the level of motivation and stimulation of work performance in a company upon a worked out analysis and proposal of suitable measures for improvement in this sphere. I chose Hypoteční banka, a. s.. The first part of the Thesis summarises theoretical knowledge of motivation and stimulation of work performance. It also characterizes the company, its history, size, number of staff and financial data about company. I performed an analysis of motivation and stimulation based on a questionnaire survey, evaluation and gave proposals for improvement. I conducted an in-depth unstructured interviews with staff HR.

Since the 1980s, household debt has been increasing rapidly. The high level of household indebtedness has been accompanied by a high household bankruptcy rate. My research attempts to provide a better understanding of the theoretical mechanisms behind these credit market and bankruptcy statistics. One of the purposes of Chapter 7 bankruptcy law is to improve debtors' work incentives by giving them a ``fresh start''. Chapter 13 bankruptcy, on the other hand, prescribes a repayment plan that garnishes future wages from debtors to repay creditors, which acts like a wage tax in standard models. In the first chapter, I ask the question ``How much does a fresh start increase labor supply by improving work incentives?'' Because the bankruptcy decision is endogenous, Chapter 7 filers tend to have less earnings and more debt than average individuals. Estimation of the change in labor supply as a consequence of the bankruptcy treatment must therefore take into account selection effects which is complicated by the interdependence of labor and credit market decisions. To answer my question quantitatively, I construct a dynamic partial equilibrium job search model with both bankruptcy choices which allows direct assessment of counterfactual outcomes. Competitive financial intermediaries offer a menu of loan sizes and interest rates that make zero profits. The model predicts that in the short run, a fresh start on average increases the labor supply of Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers by 3.5% over repayment and 3.4% over Chapter 13 bankruptcy. the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) dictates that adverse events such as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy must be removed from an individual's credit record after ten years. The intent of the law is to provide partial consumption insurance by giving an individual a fresh start. However, the law obviously weakens incentives not to default, which can result in higher interest rates that in turn reduce intertemporal insurance. Because of this tradeoff, it is unclear what is the optimal length of time that an adverse event should be on an individual's credit record. In the second chapter, I assess the welfare consequences of varying the length of time that adverse events can be on one's credit record. We calibrate the model to US data where the exclusion parameter is for ten years. Then I run a counterfactual to find the length that maximizes ex-ante welfare. I find that the optimal length is much lower, specifically 2.5 years, than the current regulation and that the consumption equivalent welfare gain (slightly over 1%) of such a policy change is large. In the third chapter, I explore how such credit checks (information on observable credit market actions) might help with incentives in labor market when there is a monopolistic employer. According to a Survey by the Society for Human Resource Management (2010), 25% of human resource representatives interviewed in 1998 indicated that the companies they worked for ran credit checks on potential employees while the fraction increased to 43% in 2004 and 60% in 2009. Ever since Holmstrom (1979), we've known that wage contracts can be designed to improve incentives for workers. I show by means of example that if the employer can have wage contracts contingent upon the asset choice of employees, the profit may be increased. However, some employees may be worse off. We may then assess the welfare consequences of a law (the Equal Employment for All Act (H.R. 3149)) prohibiting the use of credit information in employment decisions which currently sits before Congress. / text

The Thesis was aimed at evaluation of the level of motivation and stimulation of work performance in a company upon a worked out analysis and proposal of suitable measures for improvement in this sphere. I chose Stora Enso Timber Planá s. r. o. The first part of the Thesis summarises theoretical knowledge of motivation and stimulation of work performance. It also characterizes the company, its history, size and number of staff. I performed an analysis of motivation and stimulation based on a questionnaire survey, evaluation and gave proposals for improvement. I would propose the following recommendation to the company: a simpler form of lodging suggestions and complaints by means of a dedicated letterbox,improvement of staff information, motivation component of salary, use of moral stimulation and extra work benefits.

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Dans un contexte de vieillissement démographique où l’on peut, entre autres, craindre une montée des pénuries de main-d’œuvre, des interventions gouvernementales ont été envisagées afin de s’en prémunir. Parmi les solutions envisageables, celle d’inciter les personnes âgées à demeurer plus longtemps ou à revenir sur le marché du travail a été empruntée par les gouvernements du Canada et, à plus forte raison, du Québec qui est la seule province à s’être doté d’une politique basée sur le concept de vieillissement actif encadrant ces réformes. Notre travail a permis de recenser la mise en place d’incitatifs financiers dont l’objectif était l’incitation à l’emploi des personnes âgées, ce qui nous mène à faire le constat d’une reconfiguration de la logique institutionnelle des politiques publiques destinées aux personnes âgées. Bien que ces mesures aient été adoptées depuis plusieurs années, nous ignorions l’efficacité de celles-ci et remarquons que peu d’évaluations avaient été entreprises sur les mesures d’incitation financière destinées aux personnes âgées au Canada. Nous notons que les changements entrepris étaient diversifiés dans leur nature, ce qui représente une opportunité particulièrement féconde en matière de recherche en politiques publiques de comparer ces instruments au sein d’une même population sur une courte période de temps. Notre travail de recherche a ainsi pour principale question d’évaluer les effets de ces incitatifs financiers sur la participation des personnes âgées au marché du travail, sur le type d’emploi occupé et sur l’intensité de celui-ci. Notre cadre théorique combinant des théories issues des sciences économiques classiques et des courants institutionnalistes nous permet de générer différentes hypothèses sur les marges extensives et intensives de travail, sur le type d’emploi occupé ainsi que sur les effets hétérogènes selon le profil sociodémographique. À partir des microdonnées de l’Enquête sur la population active et d’un modèle économétrique basé sur la méthode des différences dans les différences, nous avons évalué au sein d’un même modèle l’efficacité de quatre types de mesures différentes : la possibilité de cumuler des revenus d’emploi et des rentes de retraite, un crédit d’impôt sur l’offre de travail, un crédit d’impôt sur la demande de travail et un mécanisme de bonus-malus sur les rentes de retraite. Trois types de régressions ont été entreprises : premièrement, une régression binomiale sur le fait de participer au marché du travail; deuxièmement, une régression linéaire sur le nombre d’heures travaillées; et, troisièmement, une régression multinomiale sur le type d’emploi. Nos résultats sur les marges extensives de travail montrent que toutes les variables incitatives ont exercé une influence à la hausse sur l’activité des personnes âgées. Bien que des effets hétérogènes soient observés selon la mesure, l’incitatif le plus efficace apparaît être la possibilité de cumuler des revenus d’emploi et des rentes de retraite alors que le crédit sur l’offre de travail et le mécanisme de bonus-malus n’exercent une influence importante que sur des sous-groupes précis de la population, généralement aisés. Ce sont les personnes moyennement scolarisées, les hommes et les personnes âgées de 60 à 64 ans qui ont vu une plus forte hausse de leur activité en réaction aux incitatifs. Au contraire, les personnes les moins scolarisées présentent la plus faible réaction, bien qu’ils soient expressément ciblés par plusieurs mesures. Il nous semble par conséquent que des obstacles institutionnels peuvent interagir avec les incitatifs financiers et limiter leur efficacité. Au niveau des marges intensives et du type d’emploi, les mesures incitatives ont, de manière agrégée, peu influencé l’intensité du travail, ce qui s’explique par des effets opposés selon les mesures mises en place. Alors que certaines mesures encouragent théoriquement à travailler plus intensément, d’autres mènent plutôt les personnes à réduire l’intensité de leur travail ou à travailler à temps partiel. En règle générale, ce sont les personnes les plus scolarisées et les hommes qui semblent avoir davantage la marge de manœuvre pour ajuster l’intensité de leur travail ou de choisir un emploi à temps partiel afin d’optimiser leurs préférences. / In a context of demographic ageing, where there are fears of growing labour shortages, measures had to be considered to mitigate its negative effects. Among the possible solutions, that of encouraging older people to stay longer or return to the workforce has been taken up by governments in Canada and, even more so, in Quebec, the only province to have adopted a policy of active aging to frame these reforms. Our work has enabled us to make a detailed inventory of financial incentives aimed at encouraging the employment of older people, which we analyze as a major reconfiguration of the institutional logic of public policies aimed at the elderly. While many measures had been taken, we are unaware of their effectiveness, and noted that few evaluations had been undertaken in Canada. We note that those changes were diversified in nature, which represents a particularly fruitful opportunity for public policy research, since it enables us to compare their effect within the same population over a short period of time. The main aim of our research was to assess the effects of these incentives on older people's participation in the labour market, and on the type and intensity of their employment. Our theoretical framework, composed of orthodox and heterodox economic theories, enables us to generate various hypotheses on extensive and intensive work margins, as well as on heterogeneous effects according to socio-demographic profile. Using microdata from the Labour Force Survey and an econometric model based on the difference-in-difference method, we evaluated the effectiveness of four different types of measures within the same model: the possibility of combining employment income and retirement pensions, a tax credit on labour supply, a tax credit on labour demand, and a bonus-malus mechanism on retirement pensions. Three types of regressions were undertaken: first, a binomial regression on participation in the labour market; secondly, a linear regression on the number of hours worked; and, thirdly, a multinomial regression on job type. Our results on participation in the labour market showed that all incentive variables had an positive influence on the activity of the elderly. Although heterogeneous effects were observed, the most effective incentive was the possibility of combining employment income and retirement pensions, whereas the labor supply credit and the bonus-malus mechanism only exerted a significant influence on specific sub-groups of the population, generally the wealthier. People with a medium level of education (secondary and partial post-secondary), men and people aged 60 to 64 saw the greatest increase in their activity. In contrast, the least educated (0 to 8 years of schooling) showed the weakest response to incentives. While the latter could be targeted by incentives, institutional barriers may interact with the latter and limit their effectiveness. At the level of intensive margins, incentives had little influence on work intensity in aggregate terms, which can be explained by opposite effects depending on the measures implemented. Indeed, while some measures theoretically encourage people to work more intensively, others tend to lead them to reduce the intensity of their work or to work part-time. Generally, it is the better-educated and men who seem to be more capable to adjust their work intensity or choose part-time employment to optimize their preferences.