Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2005. Graduate Programme in English. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 315-338). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNR11546

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At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate. Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.

At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate. Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.

During World War I changes in attitudes towards German and Austro-Hungarian immigrants developed in British Columbia. This thesis examines in which ways economic, social and political conditions influenced such changes. The immigrant of German origin experienced such a rapid change in his status that German businessmen who had previously been praised and accepted as progressive contributors to the economic and cultural development of the province, had their properties liquidated, their associations banned and their freedom restricted. When Canada entered the war with Great Britain, Germans and Austro-Hungarians became enemy aliens. Mobilization, fear of attack or of sabotage created an atmosphere in which the role of the enemy alien in Canadian life was reevaluated. Government administrators, politicians, workers and various associations raised the issue whether the enemy alien could be allowed to continue to work and live freely without restrictions. Were all people of German origin, including naturalized citizens, a threat to Canada's security? The federal government in the first months of the war answered these questions by formulating a moderate policy. The issue of the enemy alien's status entered a second stage when high unemployment, an intolerable welfare burden and anxiety over the progress of the war heightened resentment against the enemy alien. During the spring of 1915 a growing unanimity of feeling among the various segments of provincial society led to pressure for stricter measures. The internment of enemy aliens, the establishment of prisoner of war labour camps and the extraction of loyalty oaths from all German-Canadians were demanded. A third stage in the transformation of attitudes unfolded in 1918 and 1919 when veterans of the war poured into the province. For the regeneration and reconstruction of post-war Canada, the returned soldiers demanded the exclusion from Canada of immigrants from enemy countries. The war, and the problems it created conditioned the thoughts and feelings of British Columbians. The psychological impact of the war on many of the individuals who suffered personal losses led them to demand harsher measures than the federal government approved. Because of international laws and practical considerations the government hesitated to embark on stricter regulations. Internment of all enemy aliens or conscription of their labour might result in retaliation or unjust treatment of British and Canadian nationals in enemy countries. In 1916 the improvement in the economy created a demand for more labour. At the same time militia authorities were attempting to recruit larger numbers of men for overseas service. Enemy aliens, the federal government argued, were essential to war production and they would perform more effectively in private industry than in labour camps. Practical considerations, then outweighed the increasingly emotional demands of labour, business, community and returned soldiers organizations for the internment, registration and deportation of enemy aliens. However, in the post-war period economic considerations influenced the government to alter its policy. With the cut back in war production and the return of veterans seeking employment the pressure to remove enemy aliens from active participation in Canadian life was revivified. In response to demands from various segments of the British Columbian and Canadian population new immigration and naturalization laws were enacted to prevent former enemy aliens from participating in the new, post-war era in Canada. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Faced with the great and expanding volume of modern records created by government and other bodies, archivists have necessarily had to make choices about what to preserve and what to destroy. The conceptual basis for appraisal and practical implementation of appraisal in any given body of records are still matters not thoroughly worked out by archivists and archives. This thesis examines the conceptual basis of appraisal as it has been revealed in the literature on the subject, and applies to concepts found in the literature to appraisal of World War I military personnel files. The research strategy involves a reading of the professional literature on appraisal to determine the concepts which have been developed to rule the appraisal process, a survey of the disposition of military personnel records by several combatant states during World War I, and an analysis of Canadian military personnel records of the Canadian Expeditionary Force during World War I. Some attention has been paid to the military historiography and in particular to studies that appear to be relevant to a discussion of appraisal of military personnel records. It was found that by and large military personnel records were not treated as are other personnel or case files, which have rarely been preserved in their entirety by archives. Although the reasons for this are not entirely clear, a study of the CEF military personnel records suggests that they can be objectively analysed in the way archivists have proposed for other records. It is proposed that an initial analysis based on standards contemporary with the records can be undertaken, and a further, later appraisal can be made based on the research use to which the records are put in the interval. As well, the various options open to the Public Archives of Canada, which holds the CEF military personnel records, are discussed. / Arts, Faculty of / Library, Archival and Information Studies (SLAIS), School of / Graduate

Traditionally, improvements in the quality of life in Britain resulted from the temporary fusion of sometimes opposite interests which spurred Parliamentary action. Therefore, reform was rarely a party issue. Each reform question was treated separately and never as a part of a body of similar measures. Individuals were free to support or oppose particular reforms according to their own interests and motivations. The result of this lack of strong consistent reformist sentiment was a pattern of piece-meal legislative action with a notable absence of comprehensive social planning. The First World War, however, brought new challenges to British society. As the traditional, haphazard method of dealing with problems of social organization failed to meet the needs of a nation engaged in a total war, British society came to accept a high degree of central control and guidance under the banner of national efficiency. This acceptance of social planning opened up new opportunities to those reformers who had long sought to undertake the cure or Britain's social ills on a massive scale.