Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 160-171).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 325-334).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 325-334). Also available via World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--York University, 1998. Graduate Programme in History. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [179-204]). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ33502.

An essential and critical component of the orders German front-line formations received in the ideological war against the Soviet Union was the Commissar Order of 6 June 1941. This order, issued by the High Command of the Armed Forces prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, required that front-line military formations, as well as SS and police units attached to the Army, immediately execute Soviet political commissars among prisoners of war. Soviet political commissars were attached to the Red Army at virtually every operational level, and were viewed by both Hitler and the High Command as the foremost leaders of the resistance against the Nazis because of their commitment to Bolshevik ideology. According to the Commissar Order, "Commissars will not be treated as soldiers. The protection afforded by international law to prisoners of war will not apply in their case. After they have been segregated they will be liquidated." / While there is no paucity of information on the existence and intent of the Commissar Order, this directive has only been investigated by scholars as a portion of a much greater ideological portrait, or subsumed in the larger context of overall Nazi criminal activities during "Operation Barbarossa." / Examining the extent to which front-line divisions carried out the charge to shoot all grades of political commissars is necessary if we are to understand the role and depth of involvement by front-line troops of the Wehrmacht in a murderous program of extermination during the German attack and occupation of the Soviet Union. Such an examination has simply not taken place to-date. My dissertation seeks to address this issue. The result is both a narrative on the genesis of the Commissar Order and its attendant decrees and agreements between the Army leadership and the SS ( SD) and Security Police, and a quantitative analysis of how many commissars were reported captured and shot by the front-line forces of the 17th Army over a seven month period.

The First World War is remembered by many as a series of gigantic battles along a system of tranches in France. However, a number of other engagements, equally important, took place. One of the most prominent and fascinating of these engagements was the Dardanelles Campaign. Beginning in February 1915, the campaign lasted until the evacuation of the Cape Halles positions in January 1916. It originated as an attempt by the political leadership in London to seek a victory which would ease the Imperial situation, strengthen allied diplomacy with the neutrals, boost morale and achieve a victory without the expansive methods being advocated by the 'Westerners' in northern France. [...]

Mechanization signaled the end of the cavalry but the renaissance of heavy cavalry doctrine. The tank heralded the return of breakthrough operations and maneuver warfare. Initially, the western cavalries refused doctrinal revision and chose instead to fight bitter rear guard actions against Fullerist zealots. / The Canadian Cavalry, prompted by Blitzkrieg's triumphs, effortlessly evolved into a tank force---virtually overnight. Canadian doctrine, however, was ersatz. Denied its own vast training areas, the RCAC was sandwiched into southern England and saddled with British warfighting techniques developed in the Western Desert. In Normandy, Canadian operational art was driven by Generals Simonds and Crerar, both gunners, who had neither the skill nor experience to conduct armoured warfare. Hampered by General Montgomery's inability to reproduce a strategic offensive comparable to that demonstrated on the Russian front, Allied armoured forces were squandered in mismanaged frontal attacks. / In the United States, the attempts to protect the horse forced a praetorian's revolt that ended with General Chaffee garroting the US Cavalry, eliminating it from future battlefields. The doctrinal dominance of the American Armored Force was subsequently threatened by a cabal under artillery General Leslie McNair who imposed the Tank Destroyer philosophy. Internecine squabbles and economic nationalism prevented America from producing a tank capable of meeting German panzers on even terms. Though failing technically, the US Armored force succeeded doctrinally via the Louisiana maneuvers and produced a balanced Armored Division. General Bradley's 12th Army Group arrived in France with a purposeful dogma that had been further refined at the Combat Command, Divisional, and Corps level in North Africa and Sicily. / American armour maneuvered during Operation Cobra but it did not fight massed panzers; this was soon redressed in Lorraine where American armoured doctrine reached tactical maturity. Canadian armour fought tank battles throughout Operations Spring, Totalize and Tractable, but it did not maneuver. American and Canadian armour's best opportunity for strategic victory occurred in Normandy. The Canadians, despite better tanks and favourable terrain, failed operationally and received no second chance.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Göttingen, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 411-451) and indexes.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 279-293).

Thesis (doctoral)--Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1983. / Errata slip and "Stellingen" (1 leaf) inserted. Includes bibliographical references (p. 282-292).