<p>This paper examines how debt cancellation, given under the HIPC-initiative, has affected corruption over the period 2000-2006. The examination is foremost interesting due to earlier research showing that high corruption leads to unequal distribution of economic resources. This, combined with the objective of the HIPC initiative to reduce poverty, indicates that combating corruption must be successful in order to fulfill the goals of the initiative. A linear regression shows that countries that have benefited from the HIPC-initiative indeed have a lower corruption than other countries. A panel-data analysis shows on the other hand that no effect on corruption due to debt cancellation or reforms undertaken in the program can be confirmed.</p>

This paper examines the effect of governance on inequality, specifically if improvements in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators affect inequality as measured by two Gini coefficients: Market Gini, before taxes and redistribution, and Net Gini, after taxes and redistribution. The data for the Gini measurements was taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) and the data for the Worldwide Governance Indicators was taken from the World Bank. Data for fifteen (15) years, from the start of the Worldwide Governance Indicators until 2013, was combined with data from SWIID for the same years. In all, data from one hundred fifty-six (156) countries with a full set of six (6) indicators for the years that had at least one corresponding Gini measurements were used in this study: in total one thousand seven hundred and forty-seven (1747) observations. In a pooled OLS regression, controlling for growth with the variable GDP per Capita expressed as a per cent (%) change on an annual basis, the individual indicators gave the following results, where a positive sign indicates increased inequality and vice versa: Control of Corruption and Regulatory Quality showed a positive sign for both Gini measurements. Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and the Absence of Violence/Terrorism, gave a negative sign for both Gini measurements. Voice and Accountability showed a positive sign for Market Gini and a negative sign for Net Gini. The fact that an improvement in Control of Corruption increased inequality both before and after taxes and redistribution was unexpected and should be further researched.

This paper examines how debt cancellation, given under the HIPC-initiative, has affected corruption over the period 2000-2006. The examination is foremost interesting due to earlier research showing that high corruption leads to unequal distribution of economic resources. This, combined with the objective of the HIPC initiative to reduce poverty, indicates that combating corruption must be successful in order to fulfill the goals of the initiative. A linear regression shows that countries that have benefited from the HIPC-initiative indeed have a lower corruption than other countries. A panel-data analysis shows on the other hand that no effect on corruption due to debt cancellation or reforms undertaken in the program can be confirmed.

The institutional quality concept, advanced by academic literature as a mean to enhance output growth, suffer from the absence of a clear implementation strategy. Considering that developing countries usually lack resources to be able to afford large-scale universal institutional reforms, the lack of roadmap puts substantial obstacles to practical application of the given concept. This thesis therefore goes beyond the simple statement of institutional primacy and sets an objective to differentiate the institutional effects relative to the level of development. To test it empirically, fixed effects model is chosen and interaction terms between the measures of institutional quality and the share of middle class are employed. Obtained coefficients indicate that institutions promote economic growth only when middle class share exceeds 25%. At the same time, different aspects of institutional quality exhibit contradictory dynamics. The control of corruption becomes growth enhancing only when middle class constitutes over one third of the population, while the relevance of government effectiveness for economic growth on the contrary decreases with the enlargement of middle class. These findings confirm the presence of conditionality and deny the existence of universal recipe for institutional reforms. Implementation of better institutions based on context-specific approach would therefore bring greater results in terms of economic growth than the direct adoption of best-practice institutions, so intensively advanced by the World Bank and the IMF.