Univ., Diss.--Regensburg, 1999. / Literaturverz. S. [249] - 274.

The argument illustrated in the thesis outlines Zbigniew Brzezinski’s ability to manipulate himself and his agenda to top priority as the national security advisor to President Carter. It further argues that Brzezinski deserves more blame for the failure of American foreign policy towards Iran; not President Carter. The sources include primary sources such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and President Jimmy Carter’s memoirs as well as information from President Carter’s library in Atlanta, Georgia. Secondary sources include historians who focus on both presidential policy and President Carter and his staff. The thesis is organized as follows: the introduction of Brzezinski, then the focus turns to his time in the White House, Iran, then what he is doing today.

O presente trabalho se propõe a refletir acerca da trajetória e pensamento geopolítico e estratégico do acadêmico e analista político Zbigniew Brzezinski, incluindo o período em que atuou como Conselheiro de Segurança Nacional do presidente norte-americano Jimmy Carter entre 1977 e 1980. Como estrategista focado na política externa dos EUA, sobretudo em relação à Eurásia, ele teve durante toda a sua carreira um posicionamento muito intenso e controverso em relação à União Soviética e à Rússia, sobretudo baseado nas teorias geopolíticas clássicas de John. H. Mackinder e Nicholas J. Spykman. O enfoque deste estudo é relacionado às continuidades e mudanças em seu pensamento estratégico, principalmente buscando compreender melhor suas percepções sobre o papel e alinhamento político global da Rússia. Pretende-se, desta forma, aprofundar o entendimento e posicionamento de Brzezinski em relação ao pertencimento cultural e estratégico da Rússia na Eurásia e no mundo. / This paper aims to reflect on the geopolitical and strategic thought and trajectory of the academic and political strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski, including his period as National Security Advisor of North-American President Jimmy Carter between 1977 and 1980. As a strategist focused on the foreign policy of the USA, particularly regarding Eurasia, he had during his whole career some very intense and controversial positions regarding the Soviet Union and Russia, especially based on the classic geopolitical theories of John H. Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykjman. The focus of this study is related to the continuities and changes of his strategic thought, seeking mainly to better understand his perceptions on the role and global political alignment of Russia. It is intended therefore to elaborate on Brzezinskis understanding and positions regarding Russias cultural and strategic belonging in Eurasia and the world.

O presente trabalho se propõe a refletir acerca da trajetória e pensamento geopolítico e estratégico do acadêmico e analista político Zbigniew Brzezinski, incluindo o período em que atuou como Conselheiro de Segurança Nacional do presidente norte-americano Jimmy Carter entre 1977 e 1980. Como estrategista focado na política externa dos EUA, sobretudo em relação à Eurásia, ele teve durante toda a sua carreira um posicionamento muito intenso e controverso em relação à União Soviética e à Rússia, sobretudo baseado nas teorias geopolíticas clássicas de John. H. Mackinder e Nicholas J. Spykman. O enfoque deste estudo é relacionado às continuidades e mudanças em seu pensamento estratégico, principalmente buscando compreender melhor suas percepções sobre o papel e alinhamento político global da Rússia. Pretende-se, desta forma, aprofundar o entendimento e posicionamento de Brzezinski em relação ao pertencimento cultural e estratégico da Rússia na Eurásia e no mundo. / This paper aims to reflect on the geopolitical and strategic thought and trajectory of the academic and political strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski, including his period as National Security Advisor of North-American President Jimmy Carter between 1977 and 1980. As a strategist focused on the foreign policy of the USA, particularly regarding Eurasia, he had during his whole career some very intense and controversial positions regarding the Soviet Union and Russia, especially based on the classic geopolitical theories of John H. Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykjman. The focus of this study is related to the continuities and changes of his strategic thought, seeking mainly to better understand his perceptions on the role and global political alignment of Russia. It is intended therefore to elaborate on Brzezinskis understanding and positions regarding Russias cultural and strategic belonging in Eurasia and the world.

Richard Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972 marked a diplomatic breakthrough for Sino-American relations after two decades of mutual animosity since the Korean War. Nevertheless, the bilateral relations underwent a long stalemate in the mid-1970s, before the United States and China finally reached normalization of relations in December 1978. The scholarship on Sino-American relations in the 1970s tends to focus on Nixon’s visit or normalization of relations, without paying adequate attention to how Washington and Beijing dealt with the mid-decade deadlock. My report addresses this gap in the literature by analyzing the changing dynamism of Sino-American relations, determined first by Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong, and later by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deng Xiaoping. Kissinger sought to establish a triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and China, where the United States could manipulate the Sino-Soviet antagonism to improve its relations with both communist giants. With the failure of his initial idea of creating an anti-Soviet united front with Washington, Mao, through his Three World theory, championed the Third World struggle against both superpowers in competition for global hegemony in the disguise of détente. With Kissinger clinging to superpower détente and Mao determined to maintain a revolutionary China, their strategies were doomed to a stalemate. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski tried to create a bilateral structure, where the United States cooperated with China to confront the Soviet Union, which expanded its influence globally despite ongoing détente. Unlike Mao, Deng sought to replace revolution with development as China’s national agenda, by emphasizing modernization, instead of the Three World theory, in Chinese foreign policy. Their global strategies necessitated mutual cooperation, creating momentum for normalization negotiations, especially after Brzezinski’s trip to China in May 1978. The shifting dynamism in Sino-American relations from the Kissinger-Mao years to Brzezinski-Deng years, therefore, precipitated normalization of relations in the late 1970s. / text