Dissertation (PhD) Florida State University, 2007. / Advisor: Kevin Fenton, Florida State University, College of Music. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed 8-22-2007). Document formatted into pages; contains 230 pages. Includes biographical sketch. Includes bibliographical references.

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Proefschrift : Rechtsgeleerdheid : Nijmegen : 1979. Paru aussi en éd. commerciale--Zwolle--W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1979, ISBN 90-271-1604-0. / Bibliogr. des œuvres de H.L.A. Hart p. 231-235. Bibliogr. p. 236-242. Résumés en allemand, anglais, français. Index.

劉傑雄. / 手稿本及手稿本複印本. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988. / Shou gao ben ji shou gao ben fu yin ben. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves [13]-[16] / Liu Jiexiong. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988. / 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 哈特對法律道德關係的看法 --- p.14 / Chapter （甲） --- 社會律則的一般分析 --- p.14 / Chapter （一） --- 社會律則的意義 --- p.14 / Chapter （二） --- 社會律則兩方面的陳述 --- p.16 / Chapter （三） --- 義務 --- p.18 / Chapter （乙） --- 道德 --- p.21 / Chapter （一） --- 道德的意義 --- p.21 / Chapter （二） --- 道德的基本成份 --- p.22 / Chapter （三） --- 道德的特質　 --- p.30 / Chapter （丙） --- 法律 --- p.36 / Chapter （一） --- 基始律則──義務律 --- p.36 / Chapter （二） --- 從屬律則──轉變律、審裁律和認可律 --- p.37 / Chapter （三） --- 法律的成份 --- p.47 / Chapter （丁） --- 法律與道德的關係 --- p.48 / Chapter 第二部份 --- 狄奧堅對哈特的批評 --- p.61 / Chapter （甲） --- 一個基本的概念──原則 --- p.62 / Chapter （一） --- 原則的意思 --- p.62 / Chapter （二） --- 原則和律則 --- p.67 / Chapter （三） --- 原則的來源 --- p.70 / Chapter （乙） --- 對哈特法律理論的批評 --- p.72 / Chapter （一） --- 哈特的兩個選擇 --- p.73 / Chapter （二） --- 第一個選擇──至少有些原則具有法律的約束力 --- p.76 / Chapter （三） --- 第三個選擇──任何原則不具有法律的約束力 --- p.76 / Chapter （四） --- 哈特法律理論的兩難 --- p.88 / Chapter （五） --- 認可律的漏洞 --- p.90 / Chapter （丙） --- 法律與道德的關係 --- p.100 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 哈特與狄奧堅爭辯之評估 --- p.103 / Chapter （一） --- 哈特與狄奧堅爭辯之論題 --- p.103 / Chapter （二） --- 爭辯的爭論點 --- p.103 / Chapter （三） --- 第一個爭論點 --- p.106 / Chapter （四） --- 第二個爭論點　 --- p.116 / Chapter （五） --- 狄奧堅理論的毛病 --- p.124 / 結語 --- p.131

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 241-256). Also available on the Internet.

In the postscript to The Concept of Law, H.L. A. Hart describes the on-going debate inspired by his book, focusing on the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin. In this essay, I will discuss Dworkin’s criticisms of Hart, as well as Hart’s responses, showing that while Hart responds adequately to some criticisms, he fails to respond adequately to others. I will also reconstruct and evaluate the arguments given for and against the separation thesis by Dworkin and Hart. Finally, I will argue that the debate about the separation thesis – the thesis that morality and law are separable – is misguided, conflating as it does two distinct questions. These are the questions of what the positive law is, that is, the law that is posited in a specific time and place, and of what the natural law is, that is, the law that (if it exists) is universal and timeless. Once we distinguish these questions, we will see that the answer to the question of whether law is separable from morality depends on which sense of ‘law’ is relevant, and that there are two different answers corresponding to the two senses of positive law and natural law. Positive law is separable from morality while natural law is not. / text

Thesis (D.M.A.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008. / Includes abstract. Vita. Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-05, Section: A, page: 1598. Adviser: Ian Hobson. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 176-181), discography (leaves 181-182), and webliography (leaves 182-183). Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales) / Esta tesis presenta una reflexión metateórica de la historia de la filosofía del derecho de los siglos XX y XXI al interior de la tradición analítica. Para dicho propósito se divide en tres ejes argumentativos. El primero presenta la elucidación de la noción de tradición analítica en filosofía, a partir de la distinción entre “tradiciones y concepciones filosóficas” propuesta por M. E. Orellana Benado, con el fin de dar cuenta de sus orígenes, rasgos distintivos y discusiones más relevantes. El segundo ofrece una comprensión iusfilosófica de la tradición analítica en el siglo XX. Sobre la base de: la Teoría Pura del Derecho (1934) de Hans Kelsen y El Concepto de Derecho (1961) de H. L. A. Hart. Analizando las dos aproximaciones metodológicas de este último (al derecho como sociología descriptiva y como teoría jurídica analítica) y sus puntos centrales. Finalmente, revisa las consecuencias que trajo la publicación de la segunda edición de El Concepto de Derecho (1994) con el Postscript, añadido por sus editores, texto en el que Hart responde a sus críticos. El tercer eje argumentativo muestra en dos partes el desarrollo de la filosofía jurídica analítica de los tres primeros lustros del siglo XXI. Una de ellas considera la importancia y actualidad de los proyectos de Kelsen y Hart, mientras que la otra indagará en el surgimiento de nuevas concepciones iusfilosóficas como el naturalismo jurídico, el pragmatismo jurídico, el Law & Economics y los estudios críticos del derecho

Com publicação de O Conceito de Direito, de Herbert Hart, introduziuse na teoria do direito toda uma gama de novos problemas que, a partir da segunda metade do século XX, tornaram-se o centro dos debates da filosofia jurídica, marcadamente para o positivismo jurídico. A questão do método aparece como particularmente especial nesse conjunto de problemas. As teses centrais de O Conceito de Direito dependem diretamente de teses correlatas sobre a possibilidade de uma teoria descritiva do direito que leve em consideração a perspectiva interna dos participantes de um sistema jurídico. A forma como Hart estrutura essa teoria apresenta certa peculiaridade. Diferentemente dos autores da tradição positivista, Hart não se vale de uma concepção de ciência ou métodos científicos para o desenvolvimento da teoria. Não se trata de importar métodos para obter avanços. Pelo contrário, Hart vai defender a ideia de que para se obter uma melhor compreensão teórica do direito precisamos, ao desenvolver a teoria, atender às características do objeto. Significa dizer que, para sabermos o tipo de método que vamos utilizar na teoria do direito, precisamos saber antes exatamente quais características o objeto tem, para então moldarmos um método adequado a estas características. / With the publication of Herbert Hart’s “The Concept of Law”, a whole new range of problems were introduced in legal theory and they became the core of debates in legal philosophy from the second half of the 20th century, especially for legal positivism. The issue of method is relevant within this set of problems. The central theses of “The concept of Law” rely directly on corresponding theses about the possibility of a descriptive legal theory that takes into account the internal perspective of the participants of a legal system. The way Hart structures this theory is unique because, differently from other authors within a positivist tradition, he does not use a concept of science or scientific methods in order to develop the theory. The question is not about importing methods so as to obtain advances. In contrast, Hart advocates that, to obtain a better theoretical comprehension of the law, we need to meet the specifications of the object while developing the theory. In other words, in order to know which type of method will be used in law theory, it is necessary to know in advance the exact features of the object, so as to format a method that is adequate for those characteristics.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:48:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000410180-Texto+Parcial-0.pdf: 121592 bytes, checksum: e01ba0b7d2f79219d78c679fefe63ff8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / This work addresses some of the most important issues about judicial discretionary powers. Positivist perspectives are reviewed and it is suggested methods to surpass its doctrine, whose teachings have not been adequate enough to explain a plausible interpretation of Law. It is defended that the act of enforcing the law is unique and demands interpretation, comprehension and application of Law. Therefore, it is argued in this research that hermeneutical philosophy approach (GADAMER) is essential because the linguistic turning point has ceased traditional separation of subject and object, and it is understood that well-founded interpretation shall be present when both elements are put together. These issues have been framed from the debates between the law philosophers Herbert Hart and Ronald Dworkin. According to Herbert Hart, a soft positivist, it is allowed, in hard cases (based on problems of uncertainty about rights), to enforce rules in different manners, and the judge may use his creative power when facing the open texture of the rules. On the other hand, Ronald Dworkin denies discretionary powers to judges because they must give “the right answer” in all cases grounded on pre-existing moral principals. It is sustained in this research that the “right answer approach” (DWORKIN) is not compatible with democratic values in a constitutionally pluralistic community, and in every case the adjudicator must reach the “best answer” (JUAREZ FREITAS) among all possibilities. / Nesta dissertação questionamos alguns dos aspectos mais importantes da teoria da discricionariedade judicial. Criticamos e propomos a superação das posturas positivistas, as quais não se mostram adequadas para bem explicar o fenômeno da interpretação do direito. A idéia central é a defesa de que o ato aplicativo do direito é único e implica a interpretação, a compreensão e a aplicação do direito. Propomos, assim, que a abordagem da hermenêutica filosófica (GADAMER) é fundamental, pois a viragem lingüística rompeu com a tradicional separação entre o sujeito e o objeto, e se passou a entender que a boa interpretação somente ocorre na devida união entre ambos. A partir das discussões travadas pelos jusfilósofos Herbert Hart e Ronald Dworkin traçamos os contornos desta questão. Para Hart, um positivista brando, frente aos casos difíceis (baseados nos problemas da incerteza do direito), permite-se que as regras sejam aplicadas de diversas maneiras, e frente à textura aberta das regras o juiz irá dispor de seu poder de criação do direito. Por outro lado, Ronald Dworkin nega que o juiz tenha poder discricionário, pois em todo e qualquer caso tem a responsabilidade de encontrar a “resposta correta”, baseado nos princípios morais pré-existentes à decisão judicial. Defende-se, ao final, que a “única resposta correta” (DWORKIN) não corresponde aos ideais democráticos de uma sociedade constitucionalmente pluralista, e em todo caso o juiz deve procurar a “melhor resposta” (JUAREZ FREITAS) entre as possibilidades que estão à sua disposição.